The current political instability started with protests against high utility prices during the cold winter months. These protests led the center-right government of former Prime Minister Boyko Borisov to step down in February. However, the change in leadership with the May elections did nothing to calm the unrest. The continued protests over the past months highlight the general discontent over a political elite that is widely perceived as corrupt. Even before the month of continuous protests, a wave of self-immolations, carried out by individuals who were angry with politicians or did not see a way out of their dire economic circumstances, had put Bulgaria in the international spotlight.
The Growth of Protests
Daily protests in Sofia started on June 14 after Oresharski nominated a controversial politician and businessman, Delyan Peevski, as head of the State Agency for National Security. The pressure from street protests spurred the prime minister to retract the nomination, but the demonstrations continued. For the past 31 days, protesters demanding the resignation of the government — estimates on their numbers range from a couple of hundred to around 10,000, depending on the time and the day — have been marching through Sofia and gathering outside of parliament. Protests have also taken place in other cities throughout Bulgaria.
For now, the protesters' main demand is the resignation of the current government, but their agenda will probably lose focus as different political factions try to rally their supporters. Smaller protests in support of the government have also taken place. Government supporters are calling for the impeachment of President Rosen Plevneliev, because he has criticized the current government's actions. Protests have reportedly also taken place in front of Boyko Borisov's house, since the former prime minister now functions as opposition leader. On July 14, the former Bulgarian president and former head of the Socialist Party, Georgi Parvanov, said in an interview that the protest movement is becoming more politicized and that certain groups were trying to push the movement in a more nationalist direction.
The protests add pressure to a government coalition that was weak to begin with, and chances are high that a new government will come to power before the current administration's four-year term expires. The ruling coalition comprises the Socialist Party and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which represents Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish minority. Since the two parties fall short of a majority in parliament, the coalition relies on indirect support from the nationalist Ataka party. The government can implement few real changes — parliamentary sessions often stall because they cannot achieve a quorum. Ataka and the main opposition party, Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (often known as GERB), are frequently absent.
Bulgaria's widespread discontent means that even new elections would likely do little to restore social and political stability to the country. Protesters demand the resignation of the government, yet they do not wish to see the opposition take power. A poll conducted between June 27 and July 4 by Gallup International showed that, in the event of elections, the Socialist Party would garner 21.6 percent of votes, followed by the center-right GERB with 17.8 percent and the Turkish minority party with 6.7 percent — as of now, Ataka would fail to meet the parliamentary threshold. The poll also showed that there is no clear support for or against the protest movement, nor is there any enthusiasm for early elections.
The general discontent against the political elite is not only fueled by the machinations of the parties, but also by Bulgaria's weak economic outlook. Bulgaria in per-capita terms ranks as the European Union's poorest country, though its economy has not contracted since 2009, when it shrunk by 5.5 percent due to the global financial crisis. Since 2010, the country's economy has grown by an average of 1 percent annually, and it is expected to grow at the same rate this year. While Bulgaria's economic prospects thus appear brighter than those of other crisis-hit countries such as Greece or Portugal, they are bleak considering Bulgaria's performance before the crisis. Between 2003 and 2008, the economy had an average annual growth rate of over six percent. Unemployment, which according to Eurostat stood at 12.7 percent in May, is twice what it was in 2008. A poll commissioned by a faction in the European Parliament showed that 37 percent of respondents in Bulgaria want to move to another country, compared to 20 percent in 2008.
European Alienation
Bulgaria's political instability also risks isolating the country from the European Union. On July 8, the French and German ambassadors to Bulgaria criticized what they called the country's oligarchic model. The ambassadors warned against the concentration of powers in Bulgaria and called for collaboration among all parties to end the political crisis. Brussels will be apt to scrutinize Bulgaria more closely, and Sofia's political stalemate will probably lead to losses in EU funding over the coming years as projects or reforms are not pushed through quickly enough.
The potential rifts between Brussels and Sofia are likely welcomed by Moscow, as Russia sees an opportunity in Europe's crisis to strengthen relations, especially economic ties, with countries in Eastern and Central Europe. However, the political instability also means Russia faces greater uncertainty regarding the advancement of its natural gas pipeline, South Stream. Bulgaria would be an important transit state for the natural gas pipeline, which would run through the Black Sea and the Balkans. On July 8, during a visit to Bulgaria, Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller received assurances from the Bulgarian government that it still considers South Stream to be of strategic importance. However, the start date for the project remains unclear — construction was slated to begin this summer, but important permits are reportedly still missing.
The continued struggle among Bulgarian power factions, slow economic growth and popular discontent against the political elite mean that any Bulgarian government in the coming years will struggle to appease voters, foreign investors, the European Union and Russia. This in turn will inevitably generate further tensions with these groups.
