The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham's attacks have been part of the group's fight for territory and a leadership position within the wider jihadist movement in Syria. This effort has often led to tensions and skirmishes between the group and Jabhat al-Nusra, which the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham has attempted to subsume. The group has also been agitated by the Supreme Military Council's close coordination with the West. It opposes any Western interference in Syria and does not want to see any coordination with the West in the effort to topple Bashar al Assad.
In fact, Paris, London and Washington have been pushing the more moderate rebel groups, such as the Supreme Military Council, to act against the jihadist groups, including al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham. Though open strife between the rebel factions undermines the rebellion, the West is worried about the jihadist groups' growing strength and influence in Syria. The jihadists have assimilated many foreign fighters, including many from Europe, and there is considerable concern that the groups could seize chemical and other weapons, such as man-portable air defense systems, or send hardened militants back to the West.
An outright conflict between the Supreme Military Council and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham would throw the rebels into turmoil at a time when the wider rebel movement is facing significant pressure from regime forces in Homs and Damascus. However, such a rift also could greatly allay Western fears over arming the rebels. For instance, the U.S. Congress will be far more inclined to support the Supreme Military Council if the council is actively fighting not only the al Assad regime but also its one-time allies, the jihadists.
However, it is doubtful that an influx of weapons would counterbalance the damage to the rebellion caused by infighting. Already the rebellion has been threatened by increased clashes between Kurdish fighters and the rebels, among different rebel groups over energy resources and among the different jihadist groups.
Indeed, ever since Islamic State of Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi moved his group into Syria and claimed that a merger had taken place between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Syrian jihadist movements, tensions have been building within the rebel ranks. Unlike Abu Mohammad al-Golani, who is nominally the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Baghdadi has been uncompromising in his dealings with other rebel groups and civilian groups alike. While al-Nusra has provided social services in an attempt to cultivate good will from the populace and has coordinated with other rebel groups, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham has repeatedly been accused of carrying out executions across Syria and has repeatedly attacked other rebel groups. For example, on July 5 the group allegedly assassinated the leader of the Hamza Assad Allah Brigade and his brother in the town of al-Dana.
Al-Baghdadi and his group's unrestrained violence is reminiscent of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's leadership in Iraq. The extremism of al-Zarqawi's al Qaeda in Iraq ultimately worked against the group, driving the Sunni tribes toward the coalition with the creation of the Sons of Iraq program. While the threat from al-Baghdadi's group is unlikely to lead the broader rebellion in Syria to side with the al Assad regime, various rebel groups will increasingly end up fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham just as they fight the regime. Even al-Nusra may find itself increasingly pushed toward greater cooperation with the Supreme Military Council against al-Baghdadi.
Despite its significant combat expertise, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham simply does not have the numbers to face off against both the regime and other rebel groups. The United States has already placed a $10-million bounty on al-Baghdadi (second only to the bounty on al-Zawahiri), and with his group increasingly isolated, al-Baghdadi's odds of survival get smaller every day.
