NBC News reported June 26 that the first shipment of U.S. weapons is expected to reach the Syrian rebels within the next two weeks. With U.S. weapons on the way to Syria and weapons from U.S. allies (particularly Gulf Cooperation Council countries and other Arab countries) already flowing into Syria, the United States is particularly concerned that the weapons will fall into the hands of extremist groups.
The upcoming shipment will primarily consist of small arms and ammunition; the United States has reportedly not yet made the decision to supply heavy weapons to the rebels. The U.S. decision to arm the rebels has emboldened U.S. allies, especially in the Gulf Cooperation Council, to send significant numbers of heavy weapons to the rebels including anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable air-defense systems. The heavy weapons in particular are a serious concern for Washington because they could cause significant damage if they are turned on the United States or its allies. A number of steps will be taken to limit the proliferation risks of such weapons, but these measures will not be foolproof.
One way to limit the proliferation risks is to send weapons that are not commonly available in the region. This would complicate the rebels' logistical situation, but the United States and its allies could limit the supply of ammunition to those weapons, rendering the armaments ineffective once their finite supplies run out. This has already been done with Croatian weapons that have been delivered to the rebels, such as the M-79 Osa rocket launcher.
A possible measure to restrict the proliferation of man-portable air-defense systems would be to supply anti-aircraft weapons that are not easily hidden or portable. For instance, there have been reports that the rebels may receive a shipment of SA-8 Gecko surface-to-air missile systems, which have better range and air defense capability than man-portable air-defense systems and are far easier to track and neutralize if deemed a threat.
The United States and its allies could also place tracking devices on some of the weapons to watch the flow of arms across the battlefield. In this case, the idea is not so much to stop the already-delivered weapons from being distributed to extremists but to stop shipments to groups that have demonstrated that they cannot control their weapons.
The most important measure to reduce the threat of proliferation remains the tight coordination and vetting of the rebel groups receiving the weapons. CIA operatives have reportedly accumulated considerable information while helping vet the rebels who received Gulf Cooperation Council weapons in recent years, and the United States may now have considerable intelligence that could facilitate the transfer of arms. Most prominently, the rebel Supreme Military Council is entrusted with receiving the weapons and further distributing them to rebel groups in Syria.
Despite these measures, the United States cannot expect to fully eliminate the risk of weapons proliferation into the hands of extremist rebel groups. Ammunition for a range of weaponry can be bought on the black market; tracking devices can be removed, disabled or ignored; and the rebel groups may not be completely reliable. These factors will limit the extent to which the United States would feel comfortable delivering quality arms in significant quantities.
The different rebel units often find themselves in desperate fights against advancing regime forces where their only option is to present a united front. In these cases, rebel units from different ideological backgrounds have often pooled together their equipment and supplies. Indeed, weapons supplied to non-jihadist groups in the past, ranging from grenade launchers to anti-tank rocket launchers to recoilless rifles, have often been documented in the hands of extremist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra due to such collaborations.
The Syrian arms market must also be taken into account. Rebel groups within Syria often trade or sell their weapons to other groups depending on their specific needs, including armored vehicles on occasion. In fact, this vibrant arms market is not limited to the rebels, since a substantial number of weapons acquired by rebels in the early days of the fighting were secured from regime-affiliated Popular Defense Committees for cash.
Once weapons arrive in Syria, it is extremely difficult for outside actors to maintain control over their subsequent distribution. There are several measures that can be taken to limit their distribution, but whether through outright seizure, donation or trade, some of these weapons are sure to wind up in extremist hands.
