One of the main differences in France's current approach to intervention, compared to its operations in Africa prior to its Mali intervention, is the growing role of the African military forces working with French forces. The 2013 white paper stipulates a preference for operations in which African-led forces are backed by French specialized forces and technology. French forces in Mali, after wrapping up their initial direct role in combat, have operated in this way with West African troops and a contingent of Chadian forces. French air support and quick reaction forces have, so far, allowed African forces to become the leading element of the stabilization operations in Mali.

This template would allow France to conduct or support future interventions in a role that is less politically controversial by acting in support of locals; it would also allow for an easier exit strategy because African forces would make up the main elements conducting operations. However, this approach would also mean that France would have to rely on forces that historically have been plagued by corruption, have lower training standards and are not as well-equipped.

The new white paper also discloses several ways in which France would prepare for this type of operation. The presence of French troops across Africa, most notably in Chad and Ivory Coast, was one of the main factors that allowed France to intervene quickly when jihadist forces threatened central and southern Mali. Because of this, France is emphasizing its defense partnerships with Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal and Togo, as well as its technical cooperation agreements with 16 other African countries. These relationships allow France to use facilities in these countries for forward deployments and as bases from which to support interventions. 

Instead of closing bases in Africa — one of the goals of France's previous Africa policy — the French Defense Ministry stipulates in the 2013 white paper that France will maintain its presence in African countries. The white paper specifically cites the Sahel and equatorial Africa, Mauritania, the Horn of Africa and certain areas of sub-Saharan Africa as primary areas of interest. Threats of jihadist groups and piracy are present in these regions, and most of France's economic interests in the natural resources sector are located there as well. Before the publication of the white paper, French policymakers had already hinted at the possibility of permanently retaining 1,000 troops in Mali after the bulk of France's troops are withdrawn as part of the transition into ongoing peacekeeping operations, which will be led by U.N. troops.

The white paper also suggests that French operations in Africa be supported by a permanent deployment of naval assets to several African ports where, according to the white paper, France will prepare facilities that will be able to accommodate French naval elements. These forward deployments are important since France had to rely on Germany, the United States and other allies for airlift, refueling and intelligence support during its intervention in Mali. Having troops in the region would allow France to use assets already nearby.

While the new white paper shows a rhetorical readjustment of the official policy toward security operations in Africa, France's ability to end or reverse the policy of removing forces from Africa will depend heavily on budgetary constraints. Because of ongoing austerity measures in France, the country's defense budget is facing some setbacks, with thousands of personnel to be removed from the military to free up funds for operations and modernizations. While the French military's financing prospects do not look bright, the newly released white paper has emphasized that the projected cuts will predominantly spare intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, as well as special operations forces and cyber defense capabilities. These assets will constitute a critical part of any French intervention in Africa, allowing Paris to deploy units and equipment that will be a significant force multiplier for its local allies, possibly alleviating the need to deploy a costly and less flexible force during its interventions in the continent.