Over the past decade, Beijing has progressed in modernizing its military. Beijing has been particularly successful in updating military equipment and making considerable advances in military doctrine. It has improved military training substantially by focusing on less scripted and more realistic exercises and maneuvers. Since 2005, the People's Liberation Army Air Force has set up comprehensive multi-spectrum exercises. And Chinese sailors have also accumulated more experience as the People's Liberation Army Navy has steadily increased the number of warship sorties.
But Beijing understands that its military, however modernized, will be ineffective if its membership is divided, corrupt and unprofessional. Military success depends largely on the ability to fight under sophisticated network-centric conditions. For this to work in practice, the People's Liberation Army requires a high degree of professionalism, education and cohesion.
Asserting Control
Regulating the armed forces — the most critical aspect to the Communist Party of China's control — has long been a contentious issue. As the country's economic and political problems continue to manifest themselves, the Party will continue to rely on the military to maintain order. Indeed, without sufficient control of the military, the Party cannot enact any radical reforms without sacrificing its monopoly on power.
Under former presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the military had little accountability and oversight. Many cite their lack of control as the reason corruption, bureaucratic interests and declining morale runs rampant in the military today. But Xi's background and connections to army personnel have enabled the new president to assert control over the armed forces rapidly. It is that control that in turn has enabled him to enact military reform.
The recent move means to strengthen morale by repairing relationships between officers and the rank and file, making the People's Liberation Army more cohesive overall. But forcing officers to serve as privates in the field for a few weeks may not be the best way to instill professionalism in the Chinese military. Moreover, it is difficult to ignore the measure's Maoist undertones. Thus it is possible that Party is trying to harken back to a time when there was at least perceived equality in the armed forces.
A Sense of Permanence
In addition to the new measure, Xi has enacted several other reforms since assuming control of the Central Military Commission in November 2012. Most notably, he passed the "Ten Provisions," which prohibited extravagant receptions and banquets and banned alcohol consumption. Another measure prohibits government officials and generals from obtaining military license plates, which permit their owners to violate traffic laws with impunity. All these measures are designed to curb corruption and remind military officers that their dedication should not be to themselves but to the party and to the state.
Nevertheless, China's anti-corruption efforts face challenges. Having officers serve as privates, for example, may be important symbolically, but it does not necessarily impart the true experience of enlisted life. The enlisted men who temporarily outrank the "demoted" officers will be well aware of their true standing and will act accordingly.
The move, of course, is temporary, but for the larger efforts to redress corruption, they must be reinforced with a sense of permanence. The Party and the president would have to convince the officers that professionalization is not something to be suffered briefly, and that this aspect of Chinese military reform is as permanent as the modernization of Chinese training, equipment and doctrine.
