The heaviest French offensive combat operations at present are taking place in the northern Tigharghar Mountains bordering Algeria, where two French task forces have been hunting down the remaining militants. French and Chadian troops have purportedly killed jihadist leaders Abu Zeid and Mokhtar Belmokhtar. After clearing the Amettetai valley, northeast of Aguelhok, French and Chadian forces have now moved south into the Terz Valley. Chadian special operations forces have taken up blocking positions to prevent militants from escaping the valley as French troops clear through the area.
Another French task force, composed of elements of the light armored 1st Marine Infantry Regiment, has been conducting long-range reconnaissance in the eastern part of the Tigharghar Mountains. This task force has moved toward the city of Tinzaouatene, located on the Algerian border, to rid the area of residual jihadist elements. During this push, a French soldier was killed by an improvised explosive device, bringing the total number of French deaths to five. Despite the difficulties of fighting militants in rugged terrain, the robust French offensives have left the insurgents unable to mount an effective resistance.
Elsewhere, the French military has been deployed east of Gao to clear the city of jihadists. The city in central Mali has been attacked several times since the intervention began, including attacks on March 23 and March 24. Gao is relatively important; it will host the EU Training Mission responsible for retraining the Malian military. How effectively France rids the area of jihadists will help determine how effectively African forces can guarantee security after the withdrawal.
East of Gao, under the aegis of Operation Doro, French and Malian troops have secured the city of Menaka and the market of Djebok, where militants frequently purchase supplies. Over the past two weeks, French troops have killed some 50 militants and have confiscated heavy equipment, including pickups, 122 mm rocket launchers, heavy machine guns and bomb-making equipment. The French have also stepped up their efforts to clear areas of improvised explosive devices, especially in the northern mountains (where a French solider was recently killed) and in areas along the Niger River that were not considered dangerous at the outset of the intervention.
Despite all these operations, jihadists continue to pose a threat to French and Malian forces, as evidenced by a March 20 attack in Timbuktu during which some 50 militants moved against a French-held airport outside the city. During the firefight, a vehicle-born improvised explosive device blew up at a Malian military checkpoint, killing one soldier. The method of attack resembles those used by a group called the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, which has conducted similar attacks in Gao. The airport attack shows that the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa is moving its area of operation due to French and Malian military pressure.
A Matter of Legitimacy
As French forces clear as much ground and degrade as much of the militants' fighting capability as they can, African military forces are preparing to assume the main security responsibilities on the ground. Many French troops will remain when the military assumes more of a support and training role. Intelligence and special operations assets also will remain after most security responsibilities in northern Mali shift to the now 6,300-strong African force.
More contingents, such as the company of Guinean troops that recently arrived, have been deployed at Gao, and other European military trainers are arriving to train and assist African forces and French forces. The United Nations is soon expected to take on a larger role in Mali; the countries involved in the intervention are trying to secure a U.N. mandate, which would ensure financing to underwrite the mission. Since African forces are drawn from several countries, issues concerning funding, as well as diverging interests and domestic situations, undermine their efforts.
Beyond the transition of responsibility in military and security operations, a major issue in Mali will be reconstructing the military and finding a way to secure the north by cooperating with the local population. The first step in this process is to restore the legitimacy of the government. Once legitimized, the government will need to find common ground with the north. Only after an accommodation with the north is reached can security be transferred completely, though this is a process that could take years and could be threatened by a risk of insurgency.
The current government, which came to power through a coup in 2012, is expected to be replaced by a democratically elected government by July. France has pressed Malian officials to organize elections in order to stabilize the country and normalize relations with other countries. The election and subsequent negotiations will greatly impact the role northern Tuaregs will play in the country's politics. In preparation for these elections, two Tuareg groups that oppose jihadists, the Azawad Islamic Movement and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, have announced their intent to form a united Tuareg front, which will then work to normalize relations among different parts of Mali.
