With the country still in mourning over the death of Chavez, Maduro indeed has a strong chance of winning the election. After all, Chavez hand-picked Maduro as his successor, and the former vice president has been building his campaign around that ordination. At a rally following Maduro's official registration as a candidate on March 11, pictures of Chavez abounded, and Maduro mimicked the late president's verbose and exuberant speaking style. A recording of Chavez singing the national anthem was played at the beginning and the end of Maduro's speech — a powerful and symbolic statement that even posthumously, Chavez remains a driving influence in Venezuela.

Openings for the Opposition

For its part, the opposition appears to have united behind Miranda state Gov. Henrique Capriles Radonski, who lost to Chavez in the Oct. 7 presidential election. However, even in the period leading up to Chavez's death, the governor had yet to secure such support. The opposition has been largely defined by division since Chavez took power more than a decade ago, and the late president's widespread popularity made it difficult to make a clear argument against him.  

During the current campaign — and beyond — it may be easier for the opposition to remain unified against Maduro, whose power and popularity are largely derived from Chavez. Assuming he wins the election, Maduro will have to prove himself as a leader. Upon attaining the presidency, he would need to make some difficult economic decisions while balancing and managing a multitude of rivalries within the chavista elite. He would need to maintain especially good relations with the Venezuelan military, which is currently represented among Maduro's close advisors by the head of the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, and Defense Minister Diego Molero. 

To bolster his popularity, Maduro would need to maintain high social spending, forcing him to find ways to increase the country's oil production. To do this, there is a small chance that he would need to seek foreign investment. But powerful elements within the Venezuelan political sphere would protest such an action as betraying the populist principles established by Chavez. Factions within the late president's United Socialist Party could begin to diverge from one another without Chavez holding the party together. If policy changes fail to uphold the government's populist commitments, militant, sometimes leftist, neighborhood groups known as colectivos could threaten to spark public violence.

Maduro's Tools

The political challenge of securing power among his inner circle — as well as the serious policy challenges capable of undermining public support — will afford Maduro little leeway in dealing with outside threats to his control. But Chavez dealt successfully with a similar situation in the years following a failed coup attempt in 2002. To constrain political competition, the regime levied accusations of corruption and other charges against numerous politicians, invalidating their candidacies in several elections and forcing some, including 2006 presidential candidate and opposition leader Manuel Rosales, to go into exile. To resolve economic challenges, Chavez relied on nationalizations and partial nationalizations of companies deemed not to be following government mandates. Internationally, Chavez positioned Venezuela as an opponent of the United States, crafting an image of roguish opposition to the global power, even while maintaining high levels of trade with its North American partner.

Maduro only assumed his temporary office days ago, but in addition to the continuous homages to Chavez, the interim president already appears to be following some of the late president's strategies. For example, he expelled two U.S. diplomats, appointed Chavez's son-in-law, Jorge Arreaza, vice president of the transitional government and exchanged extremely harsh words with Capriles. Like Chavez, Maduro also has a close relationship with the Cuban government, and he reaffirmed those ties in a March 11 statement promising to maintain a permanent union with the island state. Havana can help Maduro balance Venezuela's competing factions, as Chavez did, by using the Cuban intelligence presence in the country to monitor the various groups. In return, Maduro would promise to maintain high levels of oil exports to the island.

Moreover, the acting president can already pull the strings on the traditional legal and bureaucratic means of control in Venezuela. On March 12, for example, he established an anti-corruption commission — a possible early indicator of one way he plans to keep political rivals in check and control some of the country's more blatant political-economic imbalances. He also has state-controlled media resources at his disposal, including television, print, radio, newspapers and pamphleteers. Thus, while Maduro may lack Chavez's charisma, he will at least be able to employ tactics similar to those that helped his predecessor succeed.