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Al-Assir, the imam of the Bilal bin Rabah mosque near the southern Lebanese city of Sidon, has attracted considerable attention in recent weeks. He and his Salafist followers have threatened to forcibly disarm and evict Hezbollah members from Sidon, conducted sit-ins and rallies against the militant group and attempted to cut the group's highway access from its southern stronghold to Beirut. The Lebanese army typically avoids intervening in such matters due to fears that its forces could also fragment along sectarian lines. But in late February, Lebanese troops were deployed to the Sidon area to try to rein in al-Assir and prevent street clashes between his young supporters and Hezbollah, and tensions in Sidon have yet to escalate. 

Minorities in Syria and Lebanon

Minorities in Syria and Lebanon

On his own, al-Assir does not pose a significant Sunni threat to Hezbollah. The cleric is highly vocal and reportedly is the namesake of a rebel battalion in northern Syria's Idlib province, but his faction cannot compete with Hezbollah's military prowess. So far, al-Assir's supporters have been involved in only minor engagements with the Lebanese army and security forces for control of streets and roundabouts in Sidon, and they lack the manpower and capability to hold territory and cut Hezbollah's supply lines to the capital. But while al-Assir may not amount to more than a nuisance to the militant group, he has proved to be politically useful to other factions throughout Lebanon.

One example is Lebanon's Sunni political community, which remains deeply fragmented. Though Lebanese Sunnis see an opportunity in the Syrian conflict to embolden Sunni resistance against Hezbollah, the mainstream Sunni Future Movement, led by former Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, is still seen largely as politically and militarily impotent in Lebanon. Past attempts by the group to develop a Sunni militia in Lebanon capable of competing with other well-armed factions have faltered. Instead, more radical Salafist groups, particularly those in and around the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, have benefited to a greater degree from the free flow of weapons and fighters between the Persian Gulf and the Levant. Moreover, al-Hariri himself lives in Saudi Arabia and has had little success leading the movement remotely. However, by having al-Assir try to lead the Sunni challenge against Hezbollah, al-Hariri could demonstrate the dangers of a more extremist Sunni alternative to his own moderate leadership.

Lebanese Maronites, split between the country's two main political blocs, could also find al-Assir useful. In an increasingly charged sectarian environment, Maronites have reason to fear a radicalized Sunni community. The more virulent that al-Assir's sermons become, the more Maronites, such as Lebanese opposition leader Michel Aoun, could be able to re-energize their supporters and call for local Maronites to band together against the growing threats.

The political exploitation of al-Assir's actions is just one illustration of how sectarianism in Lebanon is becoming more pronounced while Syria fragments. Lebanese politicians remain in a heated debate over revisions to the country's electoral law, with one of the main proposals, known as the Orthodox Gathering law, calling for proportional voting based on sectarian lines within a single nationwide district. Instead of a winner-take-all system in individual mixed-sect districts, the proposed system calls for each citizen to vote only for candidates from his or her own sect on a national level. The electoral issue is far from resolved and could delay the June election, but the debate itself further reveals how Lebanon is expecting continued fragmentation that will leave each group to fend for itself.

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