Fighters from the AQIM proxy Ansar Dine reportedly arrived in Lere on Nov. 23. Under the leadership of longtime Tuareg rebel leader Iyad Ag Ghali, the fighters delivered an ultimatum to the MNLA: join Ansar Dine or leave Lere without a fight. The MNLA forces chose to abandon the town and reportedly moved closer to the Mauritanian border.
Occupying Lere comes days after fighters from the other AQIM proxy, the Movement for Jihad and Unity in West Africa, or MUJAO, defeated an MNLA force in the southeastern Gao region, taking control of the town of Menaka in the process.
Ansar Dine had previously taken the town of Goundam, and now with Lere, the two towns serve as redundant checkpoints on the southwest approach along the Niger River heading toward Timbuktu. This is the principal route from Mauritania, which would likely serve as a staging location for proposed international intervention forces in an attack on Timbuktu.
The south-central route into northern Mali travels through the Mopti region, which is the informal dividing line between southern and northern Mali. The first northern Malian town on the route, Douentza, became the AQIM forward location when MUJAO occupied it in September. Douentza is the main obstacle for intervention forces along the road that connects the Malian capital of Bamako to the Gao and Kidal regions.
Gao is MUJAO's hub in southeastern Mali. To defend against a southeastern approach, MUJAO has occupied Ansongo, a town approximately 100 kilometers (62 miles) southeast of Gao. Ansongo can be used as a checkpoint on the road from Niger's capital, Niamey. Niger is another possible staging location for the proposed intervention force. Lastly, MUJAO gained control of the town of Menaka, defeating MNLA forces there in mid-November. Menaka serves as a checkpoint in Gao, a remote southeastern region, and is the principal town on the road connecting that part of the region with the city of Gao as well as Niger with the city of Kidal.
Though AQIM's reinforcement of its defenses does not actually extend its territorial control, it is affecting the political and military planning of regional and international actors. The proposed military intervention force would consist of around 7,000 troops, with approximately 3,300 troops from the Economic Community of West African States regional bloc, 3,000 from Malian units and 200-400 advisers from Western countries. This force would have to get through Lere, Goundam, Douentza, Ansongo and Menaka before it can push AQIM from Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.
But pushing AQIM and holding these Malian regional capitals would not mean a defeat of the jihadists. Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, as well as the national capitals Bamako, Niamey and Nouakchott, are little more than trading posts with little ability, even in favorable conditions, to project power out into the remote forests, desert oases and mountainous redoubts across the Sahara and Sahel.
AQIM would decline conventional battle and opt to fight a staged withdrawal so it could survive and use guerrilla tactics to attack the intervention force's supply lines through these cities and towns and weakly guarded government and military outposts in the region. AQIM would also remain active in its criminal enterprises, such as kidnapping, drug smuggling and human trafficking, to finance their operations.
With the threat of AQIM maneuvering within the vast Sahel and Sahara, the international force and regional governments are trying to ensure the concept of operations contains the jihadists and does not merely displace them. Cooperating with willing Tuareg groups by reincorporating them into the national political process is part of the recovery process for northern Mali. Renewed development assistance for northern Mali will likely form part of that cooperation. Working closely with neighboring governments, principally those of Niger, Algeria and Mauritania, will be crucial for intelligence gathering and for attempts to disrupt AQIM cross-border movements. This cooperation is an important factor for political and military planning regionally and internationally.
