As negotiations among rival opposition factions and regional stakeholders intensify over a provisional government in Syria, the question of immunity for Syrian President Bashar al Assad continues to loom.

British Prime Minister David Cameron said Nov. 6 in an interview with Saudi-owned Al Arabiya that a "safe exit" could be arranged for al Assad. As he put it, "Anything, anything to get that man out of the country and to have a safe transition in Syria." Cameron followed up by saying that he would also, of course, favor al Assad "facing the full force of international law and justice."

There is a deep paradox in Cameron's message (and this is by no means limited to Cameron, either). Western governments — from Washington to Paris to London — are publicly demanding the removal of al Assad by essentially arguing that he has lost the authority to rule due to the gross atrocities his regime has committed against the Syrian people. To stymie the bloodshed, there is a consensus in the West that al Assad must go, and quickly. But a policy of regime change steeped in human rights rhetoric also implies that the accused tyrant will be brought to justice. That has, after all, been the purpose of the International Criminal Court since its founding in 2002.

But put yourself in the shoes of al Assad for a minute. Here is a man who has failed his father in holding Syria together under the firm grip of the Alawite minority. The fight for his regime is deeply personal and there are many who want him dead. He watched Saddam Hussein's chilling execution in 2006. He watched one year ago the tortured death of former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi on YouTube. He watched how a coma might have saved former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak from trial and possibly a death sentence. Of the Arab Spring targets, only former Tunisian leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali has managed to transition out of office with comparative ease. Given the dim prospects, a safe exit for al Assad remains elusive and the fighting goes on. Ironically, the same human rights agenda calling for the deposal of al Assad is also undermining his incentive to step aside, thereby prolonging the bloodshed.

Al Assad may have resigned himself to the idea that his days as Syrian president are numbered, but the decision to go out fighting from an Alawite enclave on the coast or through a negotiated settlement will depend on the very thorny question of who can actually guarantee immunity for the Syrian leader. Much of that responsibility will likely fall to Russia, but that also entails a Russian understanding with the United States and European leaders who have a vested interest in this conflict. To reinforce his side of this negotiation, it appears that al Assad may have planned ahead by allowing certain high-profile defectors to leave Syria in exchange for negotiating his immunity. Riad Hijab, for example, who was appointed prime minister just two months before he defected to Jordan in August, has been central to the negotiation with Russia and the United States to provide a safe exit and immunity for al Assad.

Whether that negotiation pans out still remains to be seen. In the meantime, Alawites are concentrating on the coast for safety. What's left of the Syrian Alawite-led military is preparing contingency plans to shift to insurgent tactics should the rebels end up controlling significant swathes of territory, forcing government troops to abandon heavy equipment and air power. This sort of planning is understandable when faith in the current negotiating process is limited, especially in such a charged sectarian environment.

And therein lies another problem: Al Assad, while still at the helm, is preparing for a long fight in case the negotiation over his personal fate unravels. But al Assad's personal concerns are just one factor influencing the length and intensity of this conflict. What about immunity for the rest of his inner circle, the wider regime and Baathists at large? Even if Alawites no longer regard al Assad's survival as synonymous with their own, they still face an existential crisis as a sect against a Sunni majority and will thus prepare for the worst. This reality does not bode well for those wishing for a swift and clean transition in Syria.