Jordan's ethnic makeup includes citizens of Palestinian descent, the tribal East Bankers — which make up 40 percent of the country's population — and a variety of other tribal and Bedouin elements. The East Bankers once formed the Hashemite regime's power base, but their relationship with the monarchy has deteriorated since Jordanian King Abdullah II married Queen Rania, a Palestinian, in 1993. Since then, Palestinian-Jordanians have reaped added government benefits and private sector employment advantages. 

The Muslim Brotherhood consists of members from both dominant ethnic groups. Since its founding in the late 1940s, the Brotherhood has largely enjoyed a strong working relationship with the Hashemite regime. Still, to maintain its largely unchallenged rule, the monarchy has consistently balanced Jordan's major factions against each other — including the Brotherhood, which gained considerable strength during the 1989 parliamentary election. In the early 1990s, the regime changed Jordanian electoral law to make it more difficult for the Brotherhood to sustain its presence in the legislature. The move contributed to the Brotherhood's boycott of elections in 2010 — a maneuver that did not threaten the regime. However, in light of the political ascendance of Islamists in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya over the past year, the monarchy's need to undermine the Brotherhood's rise has become more urgent.

Protests and Boycotts

When unrest began to sweep the Middle East in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood joined demonstrations calling for the removal of then-Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit. Since then, the Brotherhood has continued to participate in and occasionally organize low-level protests, which have typically called for the removal of whichever prime minister happens to be in office (Jordan has had more than 60 prime ministers since independence in 1946, including three since 2011) or demanded greater powers for parliament. The rallies have tended to attract anywhere from a couple hundred to 1,000 protesters. They too have not threatened the monarchy and have led only to cosmetic reforms.

For the past month, however, the Muslim Brotherhood has not participated in any protests and instead appears to be preparing for the vastly larger Oct. 5 demonstration. If the Brotherhood succeeds in attracting tens of thousands of Jordanians, the event would reflect notable improvement in the group's rallying capabilities and a shift in its intent. The Brotherhood is more explicitly using the protests to demand constitutional reforms that, if enacted, would weaken the monarchy's oversight and control of the government, and it's seeking electoral law reforms that would increase the group's parliamentary power. 

The Brotherhood is also challenging the regime by sitting out parliamentary elections expected to take place before the end of the year — a move announced July 19. Compared to the 2010 boycott, this could have more significant consequences for the monarchy. Low-level unrest has persisted throughout Jordan for more than a year and a half. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, persistent, albeit larger protests have led to leadership changes in many countries — whether by concession or by force. To avoid such a fate, the Hashemite regime hopes that high turnout in the upcoming election would confirm the monarchy's legitimacy among Jordanians.

Moreover, Jordan's struggling economy is limiting the monarchy's finances and threatening crucial food and energy subsidies directed at citizens. Though Gulf states such as Kuwait and Qatar have pledged financial assistance, the funds will take time to filter into Jordan and even more to be distributed. Already, the monarchy has been forced to implement fiscal austerity measures; on Sept. 2, the government rolled back fuel subsidies for the second time in three months. The resulting fuel price hikes sparked additional protests, and the most recent subsidy cut was undone only days later by the monarchy in order to quell the unrest.

Under pressure, the monarchy has been going to great lengths to attempt to persuade the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the elections. For example, when Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal traveled to Jordan in July, King Abdullah sought his assistance in swaying the Brotherhood. More recently, the monarchy sent mediators to convince the Brotherhood to participate. Both attempts failed.

Balancing Factions

With the government focused on re-engaging the Muslim Brotherhood, the East Bankers and Palestinian-Jordanians have been airing concerns about the Brotherhood's favorable negotiating position. Both the East Bankers and the Palestinian-Jordanians lack the political machinery and organization of the Brotherhood and thus are threatened by its leverage over the monarchy. As a result, factions from both groups have been issuing statements and publishing articles denouncing the negotiations as well as the Brotherhood itself.

It is important to observe the stances of the Muslim Brotherhood, the East Bankers and the Palestinian-Jordanians to see if they become emboldened and try to extract concessions from the monarchy. The regime will need to balance each element while navigating Jordan's economic challenges to demonstrate the durability and strength of its grip on power. In this environment, intensified unrest in Jordan seems likely — especially ahead of the elections.