The use of five explosive devices in the attack required significantly more coordination than any other militant operation in Tripoli since the fall of the Gadhafi regime, but the plot as a whole was poorly implemented. Photos of the blast sites show that the explosions destroyed the cars but caused only minor damage to the immediate surroundings, causing only slight shrapnel damage on nearby walls. This indicates that the bombs were not true vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, a much heavier and more powerful type of device that uses the frame of the car itself as a weapon, but rather improvised explosive devices placed inside cars. Furthermore, the two explosions in cars on Omar al-Mukhtar Street took place outside the facility's gates, demonstrating that the assailants were not able to penetrate simple security barriers.
The early morning timing of the attack also minimized the number of casualties the blasts could inflict — a move that may have been intentional. In addition to having fewer witnesses present, staging the bombings early in the morning may have been designed to demonstrate a threat rather than to kill a large number of people. Indeed, the date of the attack, around the first anniversary of the fall of Tripoli to anti-Gadhafi rebels and on the eve of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr, suggests that the psychological impact of the plot may have been more valuable than the damage inflicted.
According to Libyan security officials, the assailants were likely supporters of the former Gadhafi regime. The Libya Herald reported Aug. 20 that Gadhafi loyalists had used an Internet chat room called Paltalk to organize the attacks. Immediately after the attack, chat room participants reportedly hacked into the Interior Ministry's radio communications and posted an audio recording of security officials' response online, suggesting that they had prior knowledge of the attack.
This could be the beginning of a new attack trend in Tripoli. After Gadhafi's ouster, the main source of instability in the capital stemmed from militia-on-militia tensions that escalated into violent clashes in the streets. Most of those tribal militias and brigades have since withdrawn to their native neighborhoods and towns outside Tripoli. The recent attacks also differ from those that occurred recently in Benghazi, where suspected jihadists and militants have been targeting symbols of the West such as the Red Cross and diplomatic offices and conducting an assassination campaign against security and intelligence officials with links to the former regime. The most recent attacks in Tripoli, however, have targeted symbolic state institutions and lack the tradecraft and focus of the assassinations in Benghazi.
The attacks take place only two weeks after Libya's National Transitional Council transferred power to the newly elected national assembly. The political process in Tripoli is still vulnerable to disruption, and Libya's fledgling government is facing numerous challenges to its authority from various local and regional players. This possible emerging attack trend by suspected supporters of the former regime will be important to monitor for signs of increased technical sophistication. Thus far, the assailants have demonstrated increased effort, but they have yet to display an ability to pose a strategic threat to the Libyan government.
