Turkey's distribution of aid inside Syria could have a range of implications. It is unclear at this time if Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime has the resources to respond to a Turkish move into its border areas, but if it does, its response will be predicated on Turkey's actions and whether it expands its support for the Syrian rebels. The Syrian regime does not want a war with Turkey, but it also must show that Turkey will be punished if it pushes too far.
It is also not clear what Iran — al Assad's closest ally — will do. Turkey has accused both Syria and Iran of supporting the Kurdish militants that operate in southern Turkey and the border region Turkey shares with Syria, Iraq and Iran, and there could be a surge of attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (commonly known by its Kurdish acronym, PKK) in Hatay province and other areas of Turkey. Ankara is also worried that the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq may fracture, which could erode the political and economic gains it has made there and add to its problems with Kurdish militancy.Ankara has tried to deal with the turmoil in Syria while staying out of the conflict. It has provided sanctuary for Free Syrian Army rebels and has looked to its allies in the Kurdistan Regional Government for help in containing the Kurds in northern Syria.
While expanding its role in Syria, Turkey will also be looking for more regional support, especially from Israel. Political ties between Turkey and Israel have been strained since the May 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, but Turkish media reported Aug. 20 that an Israeli delegation led by Deputy Finance Minister Yitzhak Cohen visited Istanbul and Ankara last week and met with officials from the ruling Justice and Development Party to discuss ways to improve relations. Turkish officials reportedly extended the invitation. Meanwhile, Turkish and Israeli trade ties continue to grow.
Bilateral efforts by Turkey to re-establish positive relations with Israel would make sense for a variety of reasons. Israel would like to improve ties with Turkey and have it be the regional power overseeing a transition in neighboring Syria. Although it is not eager to have a Sunni-led government dominate Syria, Israel would prefer to have the post-al Assad government shaped by the Turkish ruling party's brand of pragmatic Islamism, rather than by the more radical Salafist strands within the rebellion.
If Ankara is expanding its involvement in Syria, it will do so in a measured fashion because it will be fearful of pushback from the Syrian regime and Iran via the Kurds. Israel reportedly has been active for years in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq and is thought to have deep intelligence links with Kurdish guerrillas. There are limits to the potential reaches of Turkish-Israeli cooperation, and it is unclear how much help Israel can give Turkey with the Kurds. Moreover, Israel will be looking to others aside from Turkey to shape a transitional government in Syria. Still, Israel and Turkey may have enough common ground over Syria to help them begin to rebuild ties.
