Beijing could not afford to levy an excessively harsh punishment against Gu. Prior to the trial, Chinese news agency Xinhua reported that Gu committed her crime to protect her son. Regardless of the report's veracity, Xinhua made Gu a sympathetic figure and helped dispel public skepticism of how Beijing was managing the scandal. In fact, Beijing has been careful throughout the scandal to dissociate Gu's trial from her husband's ouster to avert against the more volatile consequences of bringing down one of China's most prominent and popular politicians.

More important than its severity, the sentence shows how the Communist Party of China will weigh in on Bo's future. Bo will not return to politics, and he is all but assured prison time. Had Gu been sentenced to death without reprieve, Bo's fate would be far less predictable. But with Gu slated to serve time in prison, Beijing probably will try to manage Bo as it has managed figures involved in other scandals, such as Chen Xitong, who was at odds with former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and Chen Liangyu, who was removed as Shanghai Party chief by current President Hu Jintao's administration. Already facing rising economic and social instability, Beijing will avoid any move that risks elevating Bo's case to the same level as the trials of members of the Gang of Four that ended the Cultural Revolution.

Corruption, Murder and Ideology

Like the cases of Chen Xitong and Chen Liangyu, both of whom ran counter to the political networks and ideological preferences of their respective Party leaderships, the Bo Xilai scandal is symptomatic of the core tensions endemic to Chinese politics in the post-Deng Xiaoping era. One such tension is caused by the growing struggle between two competing visions for China's future — understood broadly in terms of "Left" and "Right". The Left seeks to further consolidate the central government's control of national economic and political life and often favors development of the country's mostly rural interior, Beijing's traditional power base. The Right sees the interior — and by extension the state-run industrial complex built to sustain and develop it — as an impediment to economic growth. The Right favors a market-based path to economic reform, in which the more economically competitive coast continues to drive economic growth.

Shaped by geographic, cultural and historical differences, the division between the coast and the interior dovetails into a second source of tension in the Chinese system: the overriding importance of patronage networks. The Communist Youth League associated with Hu Jintao and primarily oriented inland, the Jiang's "Shanghai Clique" and the princelings of the incoming Fifth Generation leadership house a vast network that encompasses ministries, state-owned enterprises, local government associations and prominent educational institutions.

Within this context, Bo was something of a maverick. He is a Communist Party princeling who shared family and educational ties with the country's most powerful political families. He completely revamped the coastal port city of Dalian, which is now a major hub of international trade and foreign investment. He also served in Beijing as Commerce Minister under Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and for several years after his appointment to Chongqing in 2007, his "Chongqing Model" seemed to have been endorsed by Hu. 

Bo's ability to navigate patronage networks, regional interests and ideological factions — without ever truly belonging, ideologically, to any — facilitated his rise not only as a politician but also as a popular Chinese icon. In a system designed to eliminate strong political personalities, Bo was highly unusual, and he propelled himself upward using his charm, charisma and penchant for inspiring Mao Zedong-style enthusiasm among the Chinese people. But when taken too far, Bo's personality and willingness to work around the system ultimately led to his demise.

With his wife's sentence already issued, Bo's sentence can soon be expected. As China's leadership transition nears, Beijing will work to bring a quiet close to a scandal it has characterized as corruptive and murderous but not ideological. With the country entering a period where economic realities and social tensions will test Beijing's fundamental imperatives, the Party leadership has no option but to press for greater party unity, if only superficially.