Beijing has used nationalist sentiment as a political tool to boost patriotism or bolster national cohesion, which in turn reinforces the central government's rule. For instance, in 2005, Chinese citizens in major cities took to the streets to protest the whitewashing of Japanese actions in World War II in Japanese history textbooks and Tokyo's attempt to secure a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Itself concerned about the possibility of a UNSC seat for Japan, Beijing largely tolerated the protests, which escalated into a boycott of Japanese goods and even violence against Japanese-run businesses and Japanese-made vehicles. Similar protests occurred in 2010 after a Chinese fishing vessel collided with a Japanese coast guard vessel near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This tolerance of protests runs counter to China's usual concerns about public gatherings.
The Chinese government also uses these nationalist protests to distract the public from other issues. Rather than let such frustrations become combustible, Beijing looks for other outlets. Frequently, this has meant anti-Japanese protests; having been in wars in the past two centuries and with a host of sensitive issues between them, there are a number of vulnerable points in Sino-Japanese relations that could lead to outbursts of nationalism.But recent developments in China's maritime disputes with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, together with Beijing's growing concerns about social grievances, may have convinced Beijing of the need to contain the protests.
In response to Beijing's growing ambitions in the South and East China seas, the Chinese public has been increasingly vocal in calling for the government to take a more assertive stance in the territorial disputes. Interestingly, unlike outsiders' perception that Beijing is becoming more assertive, Chinese citizens have criticized the state for its apparent inability to protect its citizens and territories. During the current round of anti-Japanese protests, slogans and banners have blamed the Chinese government for not acting to protect the arrested activists. Similarly, Chinese Internet users have asked why Beijing has not resorted to military options in territorial disputes with smaller claimant countries, such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Others have called for the abandonment of former leader Deng Xiaoping's policy of putting aside territorial disputes.
The public fervor is in large part a consequence of Chinese propaganda regarding the territorial disputes — propaganda that is intended to shore up nationalism. The Chinese government understands that some of its territorial claims can be resolved only through negotiation and that it will have to make compromises, but the nationalism it has promoted has put it in an irreversible position.
Moreover, Beijing is becoming nervous about its ability to control protests as it watches them spread across multiple regions and become more organized. Beijing has learned from history that when inter-regional demonstrations meet an issue capable of uniting the public, the demonstrators can quickly turn against the government. Given the increasing criticism of the central government and its handling of the territorial disputes, Beijing fears that the current protests will become a venue for social discontent and thus will become more unpredictable and volatile.
The result is that Beijing is likely looking to put the lid back on social frustrations, as evidenced by the removal of the Aug. 17 call for anti-Japanese protests. The Chinese government understands the utility of nationalism, but it also knows that it is imperative that protests not be allowed to turn against it.
