The agreement will have some short-term political and practical effects. For instance, it will give Canberra moderately more control over maritime traffic to Australia, particularly traffic of the clandestine variety. It is also an opportunity for the Australian government to boost its security credentials with Australian voters, particularly as it pertains to illegal immigration. (The highly politicized nature of the domestic debate on immigration, however, makes it uncertain to what extent the move will satisfy most major constituencies.) For Indonesia, the agreement will allow the government to pass off some of the security burden — including responsibility for combating overseas human trafficking — from its comparatively constrained navy to Canberra.
However, the agreement could have serious long-term repercussions for Indonesia, namely as it relates to Indonesian sovereignty. In another article by The Jakarta Post, published Aug. 4, Indonesian military chief Adm. Agus Suhartono clarified that Australian vessels could enter Indonesian waters only with Jakarta's permission and only during humanitarian crises, and added that Australian activity would be limited to specific "zones" to be determined at a meeting between the two countries' defense ministers in September. That Suhartono felt compelled to clarify claims in the original report suggests that the Indonesian government is aware of the risks the agreement entails, which means that Jakarta has determined that the near-term benefits outweigh potential future complications.
With regard to Australia, the agreement is significant less for its practical effects on border security than for its reflection of the imperatives underpinning Canberra's evolving foreign and maritime policy. The agreement is the result of a series of maritime defense talks between Australia and Indonesia that began with Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard's July 2 meeting with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In recent years, as the threat of Indonesia-based terrorist acts against Australia has receded and naval competition among Asian maritime nations has heated up, Canberra has started to expand its focus beyond immediate border security and toward the wider Asian maritime realm.
Australia's Interests
In the post-World War II era, Australian foreign policy has been characterized by an embrace of its maritime isolation, with periods of selective engagement interspersed (the Korean and Vietnam wars, the Malayan Emergency and the Konfrontasi). Both of these policies have been deeply affected by the presence of the Indonesian archipelago.
As Australia's economy grew, so did its need to maintain influence in its immediate periphery. This was especially true because many of the islands along the Indonesian archipelago waded through bouts of political instability that left them open to the influence of hostile forces such as China or the Soviet Union. Due to its size, population, proximity and inherent problems with unification, Indonesia has always been at the core of Australian efforts to secure its periphery. The archipelago's continual struggle to solidify itself as a unified, coherent nation-state has required Canberra's constant attention.
At any given time, Indonesia's 17,500 islands are either a protective wall for Australia or a beachhead for foreign aggression. When Indonesia is secure and under the influence of Australia and its allies, it serves as a security perimeter and valuable trading link for Canberra. In wartime, a stable and friendly Indonesia can provide Australia with a buffer against potential incursion from hostile foreign powers. But if the archipelago destabilizes or falls to an enemy power, as it did to Japan during World War II, Australia quickly finds itself highly vulnerable.
Australia's population is as small as its landmass is large, and is mostly clustered in a few coastal cities. Though its massive, largely unpopulated outback provides some strategic depth, its historical fortress mentality and misgivings about Asian immigration or invasion necessitate the possession of naval capabilities that Australia sometimes finds problematic to field. Instead, Canberra has historically sought to maintain stable, friendly relationships with the countries in its immediate periphery through enormous economic aid and diplomatic, military and energy support.
The turn of the century saw another turning point in Australian-Indonesian relations as Australia's involvement in the East Timor conflict and increased focus on anti-terrorism operations post-9/11 pushed Australia to cycle from its post-Cold War isolationism back toward engagement in global security and military affairs. Likewise, the rising importance of East Asia's maritime sphere and the United States' shift in focus toward the region marked another inflection point for Canberra's defense policy. Australia's 2009 Defense White Paper called for a revitalized navy in response to rising maritime activity in the South China Sea and Chinese naval modernization in particular. At the same time, the Defense White Paper acknowledged that Australia's role in the wider Asia-Pacific region is highly dependent on what happens in Indonesia.
Benefits for Indonesia
As Canberra's security imperative — to maintain influence and stability in its immediate periphery — expands to include developments in the wider Asian maritime realm, Australia needs to expand its range of operations concomitantly. Indonesian policy will have to change to accompany increased Australian involvement in Asian naval matters, which will allow Canberra to address security concerns north of the Indonesian archipelago before they approach Australia's shores. Australia will try to ensure Jakarta's acquiescence to its expanded security efforts through intensive trade, energy and political cooperation — topics that have come up in the series of talks between Gillard and Yudhoyono.
But Indonesia, which itself aspires to become a key player in the region, will not be content to be a pawn in Australia's security strategy. Indonesia is attempting to become a leader in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and an economic link between both the Pacific and Indian oceans and the Northern and Southern hemispheres. It cannot afford to relinquish sovereignty and capabilities to foreign powers, especially in an exclusive relationship. Thus, Indonesia is likely to follow the agreement with Australia with measures aimed at reassuring China (and Japan, to a lesser extent) that it is committed to remaining an independent player.
Indonesia will likely profit from its position by catering to the security concerns of both its Asian neighbors and Australia. In the process it can bolster its own naval capabilities, whose deficiency has always been an important impediment to Indonesia's viability as a unified and influential nation-state.
