Hamas issued a statement Monday condemning the jihadist attack that killed 15 Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai Peninsula on Sunday. The leadership of the Palestinian Islamist movement that rules Gaza also held an emergency meeting to discuss the ramifications of the attack. Egyptian authorities closed down the Egypt-Gaza border, and Egypt's new Islamist president and the country's ruling military council separately condemned the incident.
This latest attack differed from the usual pattern of militant activity in Sinai. Jihadists aligned with Bedouin elements in the peninsula have focused their attacks largely on natural gas infrastructure; only occasional attempts to strike across the border into Israel have occurred. Sunday's hit was less effective as a strike against Israel, but it did kill the largest number of Egyptian military personnel in any single attack in Sinai to date.
Over the past 18 months — since the ouster of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak — al Qaeda's allies have been increasingly active in Sinai and the Gaza Strip. They have worked to exacerbate tensions between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood and have aggravated tensions between Egypt, Hamas and Israel. Al Qaeda's allies have exploited these fault lines to foment regional unrest, thereby creating space for themselves in the region.
In keeping with their signature approach, the jihadists are attempting to create turmoil on Israel's southern frontier. The immediate goal is to get Israel to engage in a major offensive in the Palestinian territory (along the lines of Operation Cast Lead, which was launched in December 2008). So far, Israel has not taken the bait.
Trouble in Gaza alone will not likely stir the Israelis, who will probably continue to use routine airstrikes to manage the attacks from the settlements. Meanwhile, Hamas wants calm on the Israeli-Gaza border so the group can concentrate on reaping the geopolitical benefits of the allied Muslim Brotherhood's entry into the Egyptian political system. This is why the jihadists have staged attacks in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and have used the area to launch strikes in Israel.
By hitting Egyptian targets — especially security targets — the jihadists are shaping perceptions in Israel. For the Israelis, the nightmare scenario is that of the Egyptian military losing control of the country, thereby placing Israeli national security in jeopardy. Attacks like the one on Sunday are meant to stir up such concerns and eventually force Israel to react unilaterally, at least in Gaza and perhaps in Sinai.
At the very least, such attacks push Israel to increase pressure on Egypt's ruling military council and on Mohammed Morsi, Egypt's new Islamist president. This is not the jihadists' ideal outcome, but it complicates the already tense relationship between Egypt's ruling military council and the country's largest Islamist movement. While the tussle between the Brotherhood and the military plays out, both the president and the military will be forced to crack down on jihadists as well as on Egypt's wider Salafist community, upsetting the domestic political landscape.
More important, the military council will also want Hamas to go after the culprits in Gaza, which means Hamas will need to crack down on Salafists and jihadists there. Such an operation would elicit a strong reaction from Gaza's competing Islamist factions, which are further straining Hamas' ability to govern the area. The situation will be further compounded if the Israelis conduct airstrikes in Gaza.
These implications align well with the jihadist strategy and put Hamas in an even tighter spot. But Hamas is not completely without options. It has an ally in Cairo — President Morsi — and Hamas is likely relaying to Cairo that they face a common enemy in the Salafists and the jihadists. Thus, it would be in Egypt's interests to work with Gaza's Islamist rulers to combat jihadist threats in both Egypt and Gaza. Hamas argues that matters are made worse on both sides if only Hamas is held accountable. On the other hand, if Cairo and Hamas were to coordinate their efforts, they could more effectively deal with common threats. Such collaboration could also help each the Egyptians and Hamas manage the Israelis.
In fact, this is the situation that Hamas has been hoping for since the fall of Mubarak. Hamas has known all along that its Brotherhood allies will have limited influence in Cairo for some time to come. But the Muslim Brotherhood's hold on the presidency — even if the position has few real powers — gives Hamas the space it needs for now.
Hamas, however, needs Egypt's military council to agree to a security arrangement. Egypt's generals believe that a reasonable proposition would come at a price that the Egyptian security complex is unwilling to pay. Cairo wants to mitigate the threat from Salafists and jihadists, but it doesn't want to allow the Brotherhood and Hamas to enhance their influence in the process. It is also not clear whether Hamas has the ability to contain the growing Salafist-jihadist presence in the region.
