Early Aug. 1, a pair of improvised explosive devices detonated at the military intelligence building in Benghazi, damaging the structure but causing no casualties. The night before, gunmen broke into Benghazi's Kowaifiyah prison and freed Salem al-Obeidi, who has claimed responsibility for the 2011 killing of Maj. Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis, the highest-ranking defector from the Gadhafi regime and later a rebel military leader. These incidents followed a July 29 assassination attempt by gunmen against former rebel ground forces commander Lt. Gen. Khalifa Haftar as his convoy traveled to his residence, as well as a string of assassinations in Benghazi since June killing at least 12 former members of the Internal Security Organization.
Possible Strategies Behind the Attacks
The attacks diverge from the typical patterns of violence observed in Benghazi — usually characterized by spontaneous clashes between militias or ineffectual attacks against fortified facilities. Cumulatively, the recent, increasingly sophisticated attacks appear to represent a concerted effort by Benghazi-based militants to exact revenge upon former members of the Gadhafi regime.
Although the attack on Haftar's convoy failed, several other recent assassination attempts on similar targets succeeded. On July 28, a former colonel in Gadhafi's military intelligence division was reportedly killed while on his way to a mosque by a single gunshot from a moving vehicle. Three other high-ranking former Internal Security Organization officials were killed in separate incidents June 12, June 23 and July 26. In each of these attacks, an explosive device was planted in the official's vehicle and then detonated while the official was driving. Two of the bombings similarly took place while the officials were driving to or from mosques. Images of the scene of the June 12 bombing indicate that the explosive device was expertly placed and used no more explosive material than necessary to kill the target. The vehicle was left largely intact, with only the driver's seat damaged. Detailed imagery is not available for the other attacks, but reports suggest similar levels of sophistication.
This precision targeting is remarkably different from opportunistic potshot attacks conducted by militants in Libya in the past. Whoever was responsible for the recent strikes likely carefully organized the logistics and timing of the operations to capitalize on the targets' vulnerabilities — traveling to a mosque for prayer, for example, provides a predictable route.
Tripoli's Power
A symbolic connection is shared by the assault on the military intelligence building, the jailbreak of the prominent militant known for killing a top regime official, and the assassination campaign. Each incident involved striking institutions or individuals that represent the political power of Tripoli, which served as Gadhafi's base and remains the seat of power for the transitional government.
Grievances about Tripoli's domination of Libya — despite Benghazi's role in ousting the Gadhafi regime — are in some ways embodied by Haftar's career, making him an especially notable target. Haftar was a top military commander under Gadhafi until 1987, when his unit was abandoned during Libya's war with Chad. Haftar then defected to Libya's opposition movement before moving to the United States. After the start of the 2011 rebellion, however, Haftar returned to command opposition ground troops and led the invasion of Tripoli. The general now plays a key role in the transitional government in trying to consolidate a Libyan military force. His leadership role within the Tripoli-based administration reinforces the impression of some in Benghazi that the revolution has been hijacked from those who started it.
There are other possible factors contributing to the sharp uptick in attacks against elements of the former regime. Jihadists from militant organizations such as the now-defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group were often detained and tortured by the Gadhafi government, and the revolution has opened up a security vacuum in which such militants can seek retribution.
The assassination campaign could also be part of a larger strategic effort to eliminate government officials trained in intelligence gathering (the decree that Gadhafi-era officials cannot serve in the new government does not apply to lower-level personnel). The removal of intelligence operatives could effectively blind Tripoli to developments in Benghazi, where much of the population rejects the authority of the transitional government and seeks political independence for eastern Libya. It is possible that the assassinations are preliminary steps to escalate rhetorical calls for autonomy to a military offensive for secession, though there is no evidence for this.
Libya's East-West Divide
The Benghazi assassinations have been the most coordinated and effective campaign of attacks to take place in Libya in the post-Gadhafi era. Since the security situation in Benghazi is largely beyond Tripoli's control, the attacks are likely to continue. To further complicate matters, Tripoli also must contend with regional political divisions that similarly threaten the country's stability.
Tripoli has made several small concessions to Benghazi in hopes of ensuring a smooth political transition. For example, Libya's election committee has allowed Benghazi equal representation in the body that will draft the country's constitution. But until a political accommodation is reached and an effective security apparatus is built, Tripoli's ability to respond to the targeting of high-ranking regime figures in Benghazi will be limited.
