Since the August 2011 offensive against al Shabaab, the African Union Mission in Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government have dislodged most al Shabaab militants from Mogadishu and have wrested control of key al Shabaab cities, including Afmadow, Baidoa and Afgoye. The African Union force has led these efforts, but many countries have participated. So far, the strategy has been deliberately slow, methodical and multilateral. With a focus on containment, the strategy has relegated the militant group to the southern part of the country, where it maintains control of five key cities: Merca, Bardera, Barawe, Jilib and its stronghold of Kismayo.
The Importance of Kismayo
Possessing one of Somalia's three deepwater ports, Kismayo is strategically important. Money generated from taxes and the profits from licit trade at the port are al Shabaab's primary sources of revenue. To deprive al Shabaab of this revenue, the U.N. Security Council in February prohibited countries from buying Somali charcoal, the primary commodity export from Kismayo. However, the ban has not discouraged Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Somalia's two largest charcoal importers, from buying the commodity. As a result, the militant group continues to receive roughly $35 million to $50 million from Kismayo annually.
But Kismayo's importance is not only economic. The city's large population provides ample recruitment opportunities to al Shabaab, which reportedly forces every clan in the city to contribute 150 youths to their ranks. Combined with youths abducted from schools and elsewhere, al Shabaab has gained thousands of new members from Kismayo.
Moreover, the port is a useful smuggling hub. Al Shabaab brings into Somalia weapons and new recruits from other countries, such as Tanzania. Likewise, the group smuggles its members out of Somalia, often to other areas of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.
Given its importance, it is little wonder African Union forces and their allies would want to seize Kismayo. Kenya, one of the African Union Mission in Somalia's newest participants, has wanted to remove al Shabaab from the city for several years to deny the group a base from which to meddle in Kenya's internal affairs. To that end, it has been working with the African Union and its military mission, but the latter is still looking for external support.
Kenya has approached both the European Union and the United States about aiding in the assault. Washington, already the largest contributor of monetary assistance to the African Union Mission in Somalia, has agreed to provide Kenya eight hand-operated Raven targeting unmanned aerial vehicles. The United States could also assist Kenya with airstrikes and unmanned aerial vehicle support. Kenya has asked the European Union to contribute naval forces off the coast of Somalia for counterpiracy operations, but so far it has not been promised any help.
Rainy Season
Somali troops and the African Union Mission in Somalia already have begun to march on Merca from the northeast. Jilib, located 100 kilometers (62 miles) north of Kismayo, has been hit by Kenyan air raids since October 2011, and the Ethiopians have been closing in on al Shabaab from the north. Cities in this area have been a refuge for al Shabaab leaders in the past, so African Union forces and their allies will need to secure them before assaulting Kismayo, lest they leave al Shabaab leadership a line of retreat or a stage from which al Shabaab members could refit themselves as a rural insurgency.
However, as the African Union forces and their allies make their way across the country, their opportunity for assaulting Kismayo is rapidly closing. The rainy season in southern Somalia, which usually occurs from September to December, could slow down the movement of supplies, troops and commerce in the region. In addition, rainfall and degraded road conditions could severely complicate the mission's logistics. If the battle for Kismayo lasts until the beginning of the rainy season, some advantages held by African Union forces and the Transitional Federal Government — tanks and close air support, for example — will be comparatively less useful.
Of course, Transitional Federal Government-allied forces could wait out the rainy season and continue containing al Shabaab in Kismayo. Such a decision may enable them to avoid the pitfalls of conducting an offensive in rainy conditions while preventing al Shabaab elements from retreating to other cities. Moreover, encircling and containing al Shabaab prior to an attack does not mean Kismayo will be a decisive battle or that al Shabaab will be defeated. Some of al Shabaab's members will still be able to evade death and detention and retreat to rural areas. Nonetheless, waiting until after the rainy season gives the Transitional Federal Government and the African Union Mission in Somalia a greater chance of disarming and removing a larger portion of al Shabaab members.
However, there are some disadvantages to waiting. Al Shabaab would have several months to continue generating money in the port city, enabling it to orchestrate operations in Kenya and Somalia. This is particularly daunting for a new government in Mogadishu, which will be entering a vital formative period immediately after the presidential election and will be attempting to establish its legitimacy as a permanent government. Lax security conditions, especially in the capital, would undermine these goals.
Seizing Kismayo would significantly weaken al Shabaab by depriving the group of key resources, but this alone will not eliminate the group. As long as al Shabaab continues to have local support in the south, elements of the group will survive and will try to reassert its influence as conditions allow. Seizing Kismayo also will not affect the support al Shabaab has elsewhere in the world, including in Tanzania, Kenya, Europe, the Middle East and North America.
Editor's note: A previous version of this analysis misstated the commodity for which Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the largest importers from Somalia. That commodity is charcoal.
