Wednesday's bombing of the National Security building in Damascus delivered a direct hit against the core leadership of Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime. Although some of the men killed in the attack had questionable loyalties to al Assad, the bombing has gutted the regime of a number of members who carried out crucial security functions for the state. Those reportedly killed include Syrian Defense Minister Dawoud Rajha, Deputy Defense Minister Assef Shawkat (the president's brother-in-law) and former Defense Minister Hassan Turkmani. General Security Directorate chief Hafez Makhlouf is rumored to be dead, while Interior Minister Mohammad al-Shaar and National Security Council chief Hisham Biktyar were reportedly injured.
The symbolic weight of this attack is tremendous. Regionally, it complicates Iran's challenge of maintaining its influence in the Levant. At home, it sends a message that no one is safe — not even in the highest echelon of the regime. For Syrian opposition forces, the intent behind publicizing high-level defections, announcing an offensive on Damascus and carrying out sophisticated attacks has been to deny nervous regime members the option of neutrality. These members know their lives are now on the line.
An attack against high-value targets in a hardened security facility requires highly specific intelligence, which is typically difficult to obtain in a police state such as Syria. But the recent defection of the Tlass clan, as well as the recent attempted defection of senior military intelligence official Brig. Gen. Rustom Ghazaleh, has heightened the risk of major security breaches. Such high-level defectors have detailed knowledge of the regime's established behavior and movements. Lower-level dissenters may also be mixed in among regime security details and leaking information.
The probability of a coup is rapidly rising. A coup could entail an allied effort between the opposition and certain regime remnants. In light of the critical Tlass defection and Wednesday's attack, future defections will start to affect the regime's higher levels of leadership and will raise the potential for its Alawite core to begin to fragment.
It will be especially important to monitor rumors that the president’s brother, Maher al Assad, was also severely injured in the attack. An unconfirmed report claims that troops from the military's fourth division, which he commands in addition to the Republican Guard, have surrounded al-Shami hospital in Damascus, where he is supposedly being treated. The president's brother leads the regime's praetorian guard and has been the most ruthless commander in this fight — it is difficult to see the al Assad clan holding together without him.
Attempting to replace the dead, injured and defected with second-tier commanders will be risky for the al Assads. Loyalty does not transfer easily in a state dominated by family, clan and communal alliances. Thus, as could be expected, there are already rumors circulating that the president has left Damascus for the Alawite-dominated coast for safety.
Regional Implications
The steady degradation of the Syrian regime is welcome news for the insurgency's primary foreign backers, who are trying to undermine Iran's leverage in the Levant without incurring the cost of a military intervention. However, the transition to a new regime would likely be tumultuous; questions about who could stabilize a post-al Assad Syria are not easily answered.
In this context, it's important to closely monitor the reactions of the backers of the al Assad regime as new developments unfold. Russia has deep intelligence links and long-standing relationships inside Syria that it could try to use to influence a new regime. Iran may be in a more troubled position.
Iran has pushed significant financial and military assets toward securing the Alawite regime as the conflict has evolved, but there is no guarantee that Tehran will be able to retain its long-standing presence in Syria. The best Iran can realistically hope for is a negotiated settlement with the opposition's foreign backers that would allow Tehran to hold onto influence in Syria and Lebanon. Circumstances make this a difficult feat: Iran relies on a minority Alawite regime to serve its interests, while a Sunni leadership structure will likely emerge in Syria. Meanwhile, there is a region-wide campaign under way to undermine Iranian influence in the Levant.
Iran needs to find a way to convince the remaining members of the Syrian security establishment that alignment with the United States or its allies will backfire. Tehran can do this by reminding the Alawite community of the consequences for them should Syria return to Sunni rule. Iran can also try to trigger a conflict with Israel that would put Syrian security officials in a complicated position with the United States.
We may already be seeing that Iranian strategy in play. Earlier this week, a botched attack on Israeli tourists in Cyprus was revealed. On Wednesday, an Israeli tour bus in Bulgaria was attacked. Additional attacks could be in store. However, Israel is holding Iran responsible for the attacks, while Hezbollah has notably gone out of its way to distance itself from the Bulgaria attack to avoid becoming a target for Israeli retaliation. Iran may be trying to provoke Israel into a confrontation in southern Lebanon or even Syria, but neither Israel nor Hezbollah appears interested in engaging in conflict. Hezbollah is lying low in hopes of preserving itself as a Lebanese movement. Israel, while nervous about the fallout of the impending regime collapse in Syria, would probably rather let the Syrian conflict run its course than ensnare itself in Lebanon. After all, a Syria that falls back into Sunni hands will inevitably carry negative consequences for Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy.
