The overseas Chinese rumor mill is not altogether trustworthy, nor is it unified. Many of the more prominent Hong Kong- and U.S.-based blogs and news sources in question have ties — direct or indirect — to political networks and interests that do not necessarily coincide with Beijing's own. Nonetheless, these outlets have emerged in recent years as supplements to China's politically constrained domestic media, and many appear to have strong sources within the Party itself. Therefore, even if rumored changes do not come to pass, the proliferation of the rumors may reflect a debate within the Party leadership over the nature and direction of the Standing Committee.
It is still unclear whether the reduction will occur and, if so, how it will affect the current Standing Committee structure. Both of these issues will likely be worked out during the Beidaihe conference in the coming months. But despite whatever rationale Beijing may provide, a change to the Standing Committee never involves simply a bureaucratic readjustment; such a change would realign the deep power networks associated with each post. With China mired in economic problems and Beijing reeling from the Bo Xilai scandal, such a change could disrupt the finely tuned balance of the top leadership.
Evolution of the Standing Committee
The Standing Committee is not a static institution. Throughout the Communist Party's history, the nature and relative power of the committee have oscillated dramatically. During eras of strongman rule under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the committee was largely subjugated by the powerful Party secretary (previously known as Party president) and the Party elders, prominent leaders from the early revolutionary period.
Throughout these periods, the Standing Committee continually shifted in response to the political environment of the time. Mao personally reorganized the committee a number of times after power struggles against supposed competitors resulted in their deposition and sometimes imprisonment. Most prominently, during the 8th Party Congress in 1956, the Standing Committee was expanded to 11 seats, only to be reduced to five in 1969 as the Cultural Revolution raged and figures such as Deng and Liu Shaoqi fell from favor. Toward the end of the Cultural Revolution, the committee's duties were fully shifted to the Cultural Revolution Working Group, led by four powerful Party officials known as the Gang of Four.
When the Cultural Revolution came to a close and Deng returned to power in 1978, he, like Mao, retained strong personal control over the country's key political decisions. Throughout the 1980s, Deng gradually eclipsed the Standing Committee to become China's undisputed leader. But whereas Mao, as a revolutionary, was willing to sacrifice social and economic stability for the sake of his own political vision (and personal power), Deng was a pragmatist. He understood that economic growth required political stability and that stability could be best maintained through a collective and consensus-based approach to decision-making.
Deng thus laid the foundation for a Standing Committee built around competing, but structurally balanced, political factions. Led by astute and pragmatic technocrats often handpicked by Deng, these factions provided a built-in check on each other and on the dangers inherent in China's single-party political system. At the same time they provided a blueprint for two phases of economic development: first coastal (under Jiang) and later inland (under Hu).
The Standing Committee finally achieved the status of a true governing force after the 14th Communist Party Congress in 1992, where Deng set in motion both the Jiang and Hu administrations that have ruled China since.
Implications of a Change
The expansion of the Standing Committee structure in 2002 — from seven to nine members — reportedly resulted from Jiang's efforts to retain influence after his official retirement. As a result, it is a product of the ongoing struggle between broad networks of political ties and interests. These networks overlap with the basic factional divide between Jiang's political circle (a descendent of the Shanghai Clique) and Hu's power base (the Communist Youth League). Moreover, they often cross over the ideological divide between a centralized, inland-focused "left" and a more economically liberal, coastal-based "right." In many ways, the interlinking of political networks keeps the system stable — ideological and political divisions persist, but complex patronage networks always temper them.
A change in the number of seats on the Standing Committee, especially if it meant that one or more positions were removed or subsumed within others, would therefore reflect the Party's evolving priorities and, perhaps, its effort to quell internal power struggles.
There have been calls within the Party to reduce the size of the Standing Committee since 2002, when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took office. Hu himself (along with incoming President Xi Jinping) has noted his interest in reducing the number of seats in an effort to streamline governance and raise efficiency — and more important, to reduce Jiang's remaining influence. But while such a move would appear to be aimed at improving the Party's political alacrity as it enters a difficult period, it also raises the specter of internal struggle against any change to the status quo.
In the upcoming leadership transition, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are the only Standing Committee members guaranteed positions on the next committee. The remaining seven posts will be open, so long as the Party's age restrictions stay intact. Consequently, there are a number of possible arrangements for the next committee. If the current nine-member structure is retained, most existing institutional interests may be met. But if it is reduced by two, membership on the committee will likely open a wider factional struggle, resulting in the marginalization or elimination of existing networks.
This risk is especially prominent in the immediate wake of Bo Xilai's downfall, which triggered a reappraisal of the depth and complexity of the political networks that bind China's ruling elite. Bo was a prominent node in a system of relationships that stretches to the upper echelons of the Politburo Standing Committee and down through a wide net of provincial, municipal, military and business leaders. While a Standing Committee resizing might have happened regardless of Bo — or may not happen, again regardless of Bo — the breakup and seizure of his networks and the frenzy of rumors they have triggered will undoubtedly cast a shadow over any move by Beijing to restructure the political status quo.
