The National Constituent Assembly is led by the country's moderately Islamist movement, Ennahda, which won the largest number of seats in the country's elections held in October 2011. Its coalition partners are the two secular parties, the Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol, which came in second and third in the elections, respectively. Lawmakers who parted ways with the two secular parties in recent months are pushing the no-confidence motion. These lawmakers gathered 75 signatures — the one-third necessary for a vote in the 217-seat assembly.
The move comes amid disagreements between Ennahda member Jebali and Marzouki, head of the Congress for the Republic, over Jebali's decision to extradite al-Mahmoudi. Critics are describing the extradition as a unilateral move by Jebali, who disregarded Marzouki's position on the matter. Prior to becoming interim president, Marzouki was a veteran human rights activist. He had been blocking the extradition for months, arguing that the former Libyan prime minister would not receive a fair trial in his home country and would be subject to torture. Jebali's position is that if Tunisia had refused to extradite al-Mahmoudi, it could not seek the extradition of ousted former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who has been in Saudi Arabia since he fled his country.
The Transition Thus Far
These tensions are the first major obstacle in the transition to democracy, which has otherwise been quite smooth, especially considering the volatility of the transitions in Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Tunisia is not only the country where the Arab uprising began and the first to topple a decades-old autocracy, but also the most successful case in which Islamists played a critical role in the transition to democracy.
Much of the success can be attributed to the relatively liberal Islamism of Ennahda, and particularly that of its leader and principal ideologue, Rachid Ghannouchi. While founded in the 1980s on the model of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, over the past two decades Ennahda has become comfortable with the ideas of secularism, the civil state and pluralism, to the point that it now has more in common with Turkey's Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party than Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. Ennahda quickly emerged as a major national force after Ghannouchi returned from exile in London following Ben Ali's ouster.
The existing Tunisian establishment, including the army, judiciary and large parts of the civilian bureaucracy, supported a genuine, albeit cautious, transition toward democratic rule. This explains why it purged all vestiges of Ben Ali's ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally party (RCD) from the interim government within weeks of toppling the former dictator. Furthermore, it outlawed the RCD and disbanded Ben Ali's internal security apparatus. Most critical to the transition's success was the establishment's willingness to allow Ennahda to lead a coalition government with two secular parties.
The establishment's cooperative attitude cannot simply be explained as a function of public pressure. The Tunisian establishment is cooperative because it sees Ennahda as a party it can work with, since Ennahda emphasizes achieving rule of law rather than pursuing an ideological agenda. This is also why both of its secular coalition partners have defended it, rejecting claims that Ennahda is harboring a secret radical agenda. Categorically stating that it would not impose religion in matters of public affairs helped facilitate negotiations between Islamists and secularists working toward the formation of a new consensus constitution.
The Future of the Tunisian Government
Despite the opposition's claims, the call for a vote of no confidence is not simply the outcome of the extradition dispute. Disagreements run much deeper, including divisions over the distribution of authority in the current power-sharing arrangement. Another complication is the recent reversal by the prime minister of a controversial decision by Marzouki to remove central bank chief Mustapha Kamel Nabli from his post. More important is the confusion among the coalition parties over the role of the National Constituent Assembly in day-to-day governance.
Also, the time frame in which the assembly must draft and approve the new charter is unclear. The assembly has a mandate of one year, which will end in about four months. But there is confusion over the term of the interim government, which has only existed for six months.
While Jebali and Mustapha Ben Jaafar, the leader of the National Constituent Assembly, have both said the charter will be ready by late October, other lawmakers involved in the process have called that deadline too ambitious. One of the key problems is that there is no hard deadline, which is why some lawmakers feel they can take until the end of the year to finish their work. It is also unclear whether completion means ratifying a document or merely drafting one.
When the six committees that are working on different parts of the constitution send an initial draft to the full assembly, the draft will need to be examined and debated, after which it will go to a national-level public deliberation. If the document then fails to pass by a two-thirds vote in the assembly, it will go back to the committees for changes.
If the edited version does not pass in the National Constituent Assembly, it will be submitted to a popular referendum and will need a simple majority to pass. There are no clear rules on how to proceed if the draft fails to win approval at referendum. Meanwhile, the challenges of day-to-day governance continue to distract from this process, especially now that disagreements have cropped up among the coalition parties.
It is possible that the no-confidence move will force the three principal stakeholders to renegotiate the power-sharing agreement to avoid the collapse of the current government. If the government does fall, a new one could emerge as part of an agreement by the current assembly. The worst-case scenario would be holding new elections for the assembly.
Given the unrest in the country, especially from Salafist forces, the poor economic conditions and the fear of chaos, it is unlikely that the government will allow the political situation to deteriorate too far. Also, the government has two things working in its favor: The military, unlike its Egyptian counterpart, is interested in eventual constitutional governance; and the various parties, despite their disagreements, have a working relationship.
The political transition will be a long and arduous process punctuated by disruptions, but it is unlikely to derail completely and thus force the military to step in.
