The crash occurred in Honduras' sparsely populated east, where significant amounts of drugs arrive from South America by air and by sea. The limited Honduran security forces in the area lack the equipment and personnel needed to control trafficking prevalent in parts of the Olancho, Gracias a Dios, Colon and Yoro departments.
Honduran forces also shot down aircraft thought to be carrying drugs in 2003 and 2009, but the military's lack of radar coverage means drug-laden planes from Venezuela or Colombia generally can enter Honduran airspace unopposed. Drug smugglers have been landing planes in eastern Honduras since at least 2006, though local media reports suggest that the activity has increased significantly since 2009. Traffickers have built a network of runways in the region, and they enjoy the local population's loyalty, which makes government deterrence difficult.
Once on the ground, the drugs are shipped by the Sinaloa Federation and Los Zetas — often through local proxies — north overland along Honduras' borders with Guatemala and El Salvador. The extent of Mexican cartel influence in Honduras was vividly displayed in December 2009 when gunmen allegedly working for the Sinaloa Federation shot and killed Gen. Julian Aristides Gonzalez, head of the country's National Directorate Against Drug Trafficking. The assassination exemplifies how vulnerable Honduran officials are to Mexican cartels' violent brand of intimidation. Given the state's limited resources and the magnitude of the threat, Honduran government officials have little incentive — aside from U.S. pressure to curtail narcotic flows — to put themselves in harm's way by intervening.
The U.S. State Department estimates that nearly 80 percent of South American cocaine headed for the United States transits Honduras, so Washington has increased its counternarcotics presence in the country. In 2011, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) sent Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams and special operations forces to train Honduran security forces and assist in operations. U.S. military personnel from the Honduras-based Joint Task Force Bravo helped the Honduran armed forces establish and operate at least three forward operating bases in areas known to host runways used for drug shipments. Because of Honduras' limited ability to track drug flights and quickly deploy forces, U.S. assistance remains key to successful patrols and interceptions.
The increasing pace and scope of joint counternarcotics activities in Honduras could, however, lead to an increase in unintended civilian deaths. Local political leaders already have reacted negatively to a DEA-led police raid in Ahuas, Gracias a Dios department, that left four civilians dead and two injured. If civilian casualties from anti-drug operations mount, active opposition to the presence of security forces could emerge, complicating U.S. and Honduran efforts.
The increased enforcement efforts also could spark a backlash from Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Traffickers cannot easily replace eastern Honduras as a smuggling point of entry. Thus, they will not hesitate to fight back and use their superior resources to intimidate local officials. Since drug suppliers operating in Honduras need continued control over drug trafficking routes, and since the United States fears that turmoil in the region could evolve into a serious strategic threat, Honduras finds itself trapped by geography in the middle of a fight it cannot control.
