The SCAF's decree confirms that the SCAF has assumed legislative powers, which it stripped from the parliament following the dissolution order. The SCAF will also be able to appoint a new assembly to directly control the writing of the new constitution. This assembly is mandated to complete its work within three months. And the decree sets up a timeline for the next parliamentary elections, which cannot be held until the constitution is written and approved by referendum. Finally, the decree grants the SCAF the right to veto any article in the draft constitution it deems "contrary to the supreme interests of the country." The MB rejected the decree, calling it "null and unconstitutional."

Holding parliamentary polls only after the constitutional referendum will give the SCAF leverage over the MB during the referendum. The maneuver will also ensure the referendum's passage, since the MB will want to cut a deal in order to ensure another chance to compete in parliamentary polls.

The SCAF is scheduled to issue a statement to the media later June 18 to clarify its constitutional declaration. It is already clear, though, that the council intends to maintain its direct hold on power for now. There is no guarantee that the constitutional assembly will complete a draft within the time allotted. Even if it does, there is no guarantee that the draft constitution will go to a referendum.

Egypt now stands at a point where the SCAF's opponents — be they a revolutionary movement or a popular Islamist party — largely lack the power, influence, legitimacy or mechanisms to challenge the ruling military junta.

The MB may continue to command a popular mandate, but with a weak president and lacking the option of calling for parliamentary elections, its role will be limited for the short term. The Brotherhood will not likely call for mass demonstrations — certainly not before Morsi is declared the official winner of the presidential runoff. Historically, the MB has used mass demonstrations surgically and usually in cooperation with others. Even then, as long as it sees a chance for new parliamentary elections, the MB will want to avoid mass demonstrations, which would carry the risk of clashes that could give the SCAF a reason to delay or suspend future polls.

Meanwhile, Egypt's revolutionaries — the liberals, secularists, youth activists and other groups that dominated the Tahrir protests — have failed to win majority support in either the parliamentary polls or the presidential election. These groups are fractured and have lost much of their legitimacy as everyday Egyptians grow weary of a spiraling economy, continued civil unrest and rising crime. As the SCAF has demonstrated, it has a lot of levers it can use to prevent elections and polls from bringing about a real transition of power in Egypt, and that will remain the case for the months to come.