Although the June 12 protest is sanctioned, the Kremlin wants to disrupt the unity and strength of the protest movement. Russian police searched the apartments of several leading Russian opposition activists (including Alexei Navalny, Ksenia Sobchak and Sergei Udaltsov) the morning of June 11. Police said the searches were related to the May 6 demonstrations that ended in clashes between protesters and police. The opposition leaders were told to report for questioning the morning of June 12, meaning they cannot participate in the protest. Udaltsov attended despite the summons, according to an AP report, stating on Twitter that it is his duty to lead the protest.

The demonstration comes days after the Kremlin passed a bill that dramatically raises the fines for protesters and protest organizers. Currently, the maximum fine for organizing or participating in an unsanctioned protest is 5,000 rubles ($153). Under the new law, those found guilty of participating in an unsanctioned protest will pay 300,000 rubles, and protest organizers will pay a fine of 1 million rubles — a stiff penalty in a country where the average annual salary is 270,000 rubles. The new law also expands the definition of a protest in response to demonstrators setting up camping sites around Moscow and claiming to take strolls or organize festivals — activities that do not require permits.

The political environment surrounding the Russia Day protest is notable in part because of the bitter fight over the new law in the Duma — a rare occurrence. The Just Russia Party, which is typically thought of as United Russia's sister, submitted more than 400 amendments to the law in an attempt to stall the vote on the bill in a move referred to in Russia as an Italian Strike. Other parties, such as the Communists, supported the tactic. Since United Russia holds the majority in the Duma, it was able to push the bill through just before midnight June 8 with a 241-147 vote. Although theatrics occur in the Duma from time to time, this incident involved parties that United Russia once was able to persuade. Moreover, the entire incident was televised, making it harder for the Kremlin to cover up the disagreement.

Meanwhile, the protesters have not formed any real political parties, choosing instead to remain a disjointed movement. The opposition has remained nebulous in order to avoid becoming a clear target for Kremlin crackdowns on organized political parties or specific political figures. Moscow can pass tougher laws targeting protesters to try to disrupt the movement, but such laws will not stop the protests. The Kremlin could crack down on protests as a whole, such as the violent actions in 2007, but such actions could spark a backlash and disrupt the Kremlin's efforts to show that it has become less authoritarian — efforts that are important in attracting foreign investors.

In the long run, this strategy by the protesters will not lead to any change, since the demonstrators will need political parties and politicians to get into the government and to challenge United Russia. The opposition likely will change its strategy as regional and municipal elections approach and the movement feels the need for a larger push against the Kremlin. The upcoming elections are critical, since numerous candidates not under United Russia's or the Kremlin's wing have already notched a series of victories on the local level. The Kremlin will be paying close attention to the upcoming votes; it cannot afford to lose control at the regional level.

Russian election seasons are fairly short, so there is no need for the opposition to organize now and thus give the Kremlin more time to counter its plans. In the short term, continuing the protests will ensure the government remains focused on the difficult challenge of countering an amorphous movement instead of shifting its attention to the possibility of a more formal opposition effort in elections later this year.

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