Al-Awfea Brigade militiamen from the town of Tarhuna took over Tripoli's international airport early Wednesday morning, causing the shutdown of the airport and the diversion of flights to Mitiga air base. Armed members of the brigade demanded the release of their leader, Colonel Abu Ajila al-Habshi, who they say disappeared two days earlier. The situation remains in flux, but government forces reportedly clashed with the militiamen during an attempt to recapture the airport.
The incident highlights the fact that more than seven months after the end of the 2011 Libyan Civil War, the oil-producing nation remains unstable with a number of heavily armed militia groups vying for power. Libya has yet to hold comprehensive elections, and a Libyan official announced Monday that assembly elections originally slated for June 19 will now be delayed until at least the first week of July. Despite increasing oil production since the end of the war, the consistent clashes, lack of centralized governance, and widespread tribal rivalries have kept Libya in an unstable and tenuous position.
In fact, Stratfor has learned that a number of ex-revolutionary fighters have received orders from their former militias to return to the ranks in anticipation of further clashes. Given that the al-Awfea Brigade militiamen predominantly come from the Tarhuna tribe that was heavily favored by former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, there is a serious risk that these militiamen will clash with other fighters, such as the militiamen from the Zintan region who were heavily persecuted by Gadhafi.
Many of the same Western countries that supported the foreign military intervention in Libya are condemning Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime. Yet the Syrian conflict has played out for more than a year without drawing overt foreign military intervention — in contrast to Libya, where foreign forces intervened a little more than a month after unrest struck Benghazi. The international community's reluctance to get involved can be traced to lessons learned from the longer-than-anticipated military engagement in Libya, which required an intensive bombing campaign, insertion of special forces and significant funding.
A simple cost-benefit analysis shows one reason Western powers are reluctant to intervene militarily. Libya is a key oil exporter to countries in Western Europe, whereas Syria produces and exports significantly less oil to Western countries. Because they do not rely on Syrian exports, these countries are less motivated to commit to a prolonged and intensive military and financial involvement in Syria. In addition, the Syrian military apparatus remains largely cohesive with a redundant, overlapping and relatively sophisticated air defense network.
The fall of Gadhafi did not stop Libya's many tribes and militant groups from vying for territory and autonomy, leading to continued unrest. As Monday's airport takeover made clear, the Libyan National Transition Council is not capable of pacifying tribal militants or of unifying eastern and western Libya. On the contrary, some militant factions have become stronger during the Libyan unrest.
This lesson is applicable to Syria, which comprises a variety of religions, ethnicities and sects. Prior to 2011, the minority Alawite al Assad regime effectively managed these groups, namely the majority Sunni adherents. If al Assad fell, the predominately Sunni opposition and rebel fighters would not likely remain subdued. This could threaten the delicate ethno-religious balance in the Levant. Indications of jihadist activity in Syria represent another threat. On February 12, al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri expressed support for the popular unrest in Syria, and jihadists from Iraq and foreign fighters from North Africa have already streamed into Syria to fight the al Assad regime. While the United States and NATO hesitate to support an insurgency that includes jihadists, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries could encourage jihadist non-state actors to fight in Syria.
In the past month, violent conflicts have increased between pro-al Assad and anti-al Assad demonstrators in central and northern Lebanon. These would likely intensify if the Syrian regime fell.
There has also been significant discord between the United States and Saudi Arabia over the control of supply routes from northern Lebanon into Syria. The al Assad regime is trying to destabilize northern Lebanon to disrupt these supply routes and to distract from the conflict within its own borders. Meanwhile, Riyadh and Washington are trying to funnel money and weapons through northern Lebanon to sustain the Syrian rebellion. This contest is creating an environment that could reignite Salafist militancy in the Levant.
The United States and other Western countries have acted with considerable restraint in supplying weapons to the Syrian rebels. Massive arms shipments to Libyan rebels have resulted in a transfer of arms across Libyan borders to militants in countries such as Algeria, Mali and even the Gaza Strip. This is something Western countries are very conscious of, given the number of tribal and militant factions in the Levant, which could use such weapons to threaten the security and stability of those countries.
The aftermath of NATO intervention in Libya is still fresh in the minds of participating Western countries. In addition to the serious military and political hurdles NATO would face in a Syrian intervention scenario, the lessons from post-Gadhafi Libya highlight the complications that could play out in a post-al Assad Syria.
