These constraints have forced a narrowing of NATO's mission in Afghanistan. The lofty goal of building an Afghan nation through economic and infrastructure development has been pared down since 2010, when the troop surge and counterinsurgency strategies were implemented. The new strategy focuses on putting the ANSF at the forefront of security and combat operations as quickly as possible in all regions, even the volatile eastern provinces, with the hope that the ANSF becomes a cohesive, functional security force before the ISAF completes its withdrawal. This strategy will continue to facilitate the drawdown of NATO forces and prepare Afghanistan for post-NATO operations.
NATO's new strategy will continue the five-phase handover of Afghan provinces and districts — in order of most to least secure — that was a central element of the previous strategy. The gradual transition will allow for the buildup of Afghan security forces while providing the ISAF with more time to pacify less-secure areas. The regions named in the first two phases already have been handed over, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced May 13 the regions that will be included in the third phase. Once the third stage is complete, Afghan forces will control 75 percent of Afghanistan's population and portions of every Afghan province, with the ISAF controlling the rest.
Under the previous plan, the ANSF was expected to start taking the lead on missions in 2013. By accelerating this transition, Allen is gambling that Afghan forces can learn more from security operations in insecure provinces than from just training and conducting holding operations in relatively pacified provinces.
Allen also understands that the current combined NATO-ANSF force structure is the largest that will exist in Afghanistan before the withdrawal, making now — with the numbers needed to handle pitfalls — the best time to pursue a radical but necessary shift. The United States is drawing down from 90,000 to 68,000 troops by the end of September 2012. Other NATO allies have similar drawdown schedules, with some operating on even shorter timetables, leaving little faith that a robust ISAF structure will remain in Afghanistan for more than another few months. The ANSF is also expected to shrink from 352,000 to 230,000 troops, the level considered sustainable with a $4 billion annual budget.
The bulk of NATO forces will leave by the end of 2014, leaving behind a much smaller contingent of special operations forces from select countries. The ANSF must be prepared to handle this reality. The accelerated strategy will be difficult and bloody for Afghan forces, but it will pay off in the long run because Afghan soldiers and military planners will not have to endure simultaneously the challenges of a NATO withdrawal and the consolidation of new security responsibilities.
The new strategy could backfire, of course. The Taliban undoubtedly are trying to undermine Afghan forces through bribery, intimidation and infiltration. Persistent attacks on both the ISAF and the ANSF by Afghan troops loyal to the Taliban sow distrust between ISAF trainers and their students and within Afghan ranks. Moreover, the ANSF was established quickly and with limited training, and the bonds holding it together are tenuous. Forcing the ANSF to the front lines sooner than planned could divide Afghan soldiers rather than unite them. Despite these risks, Allen has little choice but to push ahead with the accelerated strategy.
