The meeting Monday of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a group of nations comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, was expected to focus on discussions of a union of the six states. The most immediate union was to have been between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Bahrain, facing unrest from its Shiite population against its Sunni leadership, has seen the intervention of Saudi forces designed to stabilize the regime. Some sort of union was logical.
Neither increased integration between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain nor any move toward integration took place. It was, rather, postponed. The precise reason for postponement was unclear, but the logic wasn’t. The Iranians are, as Stratfor has pointed out, increasing their regional power. Apart from unrest in Bahrain, which clearly has some degree of Iranian support, there is Shiite unrest elsewhere, including Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province. Only on paper would a Saudi-Bahraini union strengthen the region. Like many unions that appear substantial at first glance, it is unclear how a union of the GCC states would increase effective cooperation beyond what they are already doing without a formal union.
What such a union might do is convince the Iranians that they ought to act more aggressively to undermine the union. The GCC countries do not want to provoke the Iranians by an action that would be more symbolic than real. If they want to support each other, they do not need a multilateral mechanism. But the truth of the matter is that except in specialized cases like Bahrain, a nation both small and connected to Saudi Arabia by a causeway, there is limited help that GCC countries can offer each other. The country with the most military assistance to offer, Saudi Arabia, has bolstered Bahrain’s security since the Saudi-led GCC Peninsula Shield Force intervention in Bahrain in the spring of 2011. The other GCC countries fear Iranian influence, but are happy with the Saudis staying home. Moreover, GCC states like Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman have their own way of managing their relationships with Iran and need to maintain flexibility in such foreign policy matters.
Interestingly, the one country that has raised regional concerns because of its Iran policy chose this time to announce that it was ending its freeze on weapons to Bahrain. The United States had suspended the sale of $53 million worth of equipment last September. The decision to resume sales is obviously intended to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the Bahraini status quo. Bahrain matters to the United States because the regional headquarters of the Fifth Fleet as well as the U.S. forward-deployed minesweeping presence are both based there. Just as important, the United States wanted to let the GCC know that it was in fact committed to resist what is regarded as Iranian subversion. In doing this, U.S. President Barack Obama's administration chose to offend not only Bahrain supporters, but also opponents of existing regimes in the Arab world. This is not something that the Obama administration would do casually. It clearly felt that it had to send a signal to the GCC that it was prepared to support their interest.
It is unknown whether the U.S. decision had anything to do with the surprise pronouncement to hold any action on GCC union. But on the whole, the Iranians are likely feeling quite satisfied. The United States is being drawn into Bahrain, a country where the primary interest is in enticing enemies into a quagmire. The fact that the GCC did not move toward union, which even if the union would have been less than significant, still gives Iran a symbolic victory.
The GCC conference did not change anything substantially in the region. At the same time, with Syrian President Bashar al Assad still surviving and unrest in Bahrain still under way, the events at the GCC meeting certainly did not disappoint Iran.
