Shining Path originated as a militant Maoist political movement in the 1960s. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission estimates that more than 70,000 people died during fighting that pitted Shining Path and fellow leftist militant group Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement against the government in the 1980s and 1990s. Shining Path formed around an ideological allegiance to the Maoist teachings of the group's founder, Abimael Guzman. Guzman's ideology is frequently called "Gonzalo thought," and its followers consider it as important as the teachings of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin and Mao Zedong. Shining Path's political goals are to stop the exploitation of workers, promote human rights and create a communist state through violent uprising.
A previous military campaign against the group conducted by former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori resulted in Guzman's arrest in 1992. Since then, his release has been the most important issue for the group's ideologically motivated elements.
Shining Path's Factions
When Guzman was arrested, Shining Path fragmented into two groups, and its ranks declined from tens of thousands to just a few thousand fighters. The first Shining Path faction operates in the Alto Huallaga River Valley and is closely involved with drug cultivation and trafficking but maintains its allegiance to Gonzalo thought. The Huallaga group has undergone a series of setbacks after years of fighting Peruvian police, including the February arrest of ideological leader Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala, aka Comrade Artemio, and the April arrest of his successor, Jaime Arenas Caviedes, aka Braulio. These arrests were part of Operation Eclipse, which also yielded numerous arrests of midlevel militants and appears to have removed at least the group's ideological leadership, if not also the leadership of its narcotics operations. As a result, the government declared the Shining Path dead in the Alto Huallaga River Valley April 5 and announced that it would focus all of its efforts on combating the second Shining Path faction.
Victor Quispe Palomino, aka Comrade Jose, leads the VRAE Shining Path faction. His brother, Martin Quispe Palomino, aka Comrade Gabriel, led the militants who kidnapped the Camisea project workers. Part of an attack on a natural gas processing plant under construction in Kepashiato, Cuzco state, the kidnapping appears to have been a direct response to the government's operations against the Alto Huallaga group and its decision to focus on the VRAE group. The kidnapping was the first of its kind since 2003, when VRAE Shining Path militants briefly took 71 Techint employees working on the Camisea natural gas pipeline hostage.
Gabriel told the media that the kidnapping was designed to lure the military into the area, and he threatened to attack the Camisea natural gas pipeline should the government attempt to dismantle the VRAE branch of the Shining Path. The combination of the attack and the threats appear to be a warning to the government that the VRAE Shining Path is both willing and able to combat government interference in the region rather than face the same fate as the Alto Huallaga group. The move has created a substantial challenge for Peru's security forces, which must not only confront a militant organization but also protect the region's energy infrastructure.
Peru's Security Forces
Peruvian national police and army forces are already present in the VRAE, and Stratfor sources in Peru have said the Peruvian military is primarily engaged in intelligence collection and surveillance of the region before it follows through on its threats of a large operation. However, the military has concerns about the dangers of launching an attack on the Shining Path in the VRAE. Shining Path fighters are not only more familiar with the mountainous jungle terrain than the military, but they have also prepared defenses against security force incursions. Two police officers were injured last week when an anti-personnel land mine detonated, and the VRAE group is known to target security forces with hit-and-run and sniper attacks.
The Peruvian national police force is large by regional standards. It has specialized anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics detachments that historically have been actively involved in missions against Shining Path. The force has substantial transport and utility helicopter assets that are critical for missions in mountainous and jungle regions, where transportation infrastructure is limited. If the Peruvian military is joining the fight, it can contribute additional assets: manpower, transport helicopters and helicopter gunships. The military also has artillery, tanks and other armor, but these assets have limited use in the VRAE's difficult terrain.
One of the biggest challenges Peruvian security forces will face is gathering human intelligence. Locals in the VRAE rejected Shining Path when it espoused Guzman's Maoist philosophy, but the VRAE group's abandonment of Gonzalo thought has helped the group become more integrated with the local VRAE communities. Furthermore, coca growth and processing is a source of revenue for farmers in the region, regardless of their feelings about the Shining Path, and the government's negative stance on narcotics production and trafficking puts local residents at odds with the government. As a result, the militants have been able to develop close relationships with local policing groups, known as ronderos, and security forces struggle to use the local population as a source of intelligence against the Shining Path accordingly. These relationships also give the Shining Path the advantage in being able to track the movements of security forces, allowing the group to exploit security vulnerabilities or hide, sometimes in plain sight, by posing as civilian residents.
The Significance of Shining Path and Peru's Operations
Despite the group's relative strength in the VRAE, its overall decline in the past 20 years coupled with the government's recent successes against the Alto Huallaga group has rendered the Shining Path a very localized threat. There is little chance the group will soon be able to challenge the state as it did in the 1980s and early 1990s, and there is no evidence yet that the group has the capacity or inclination to extend attacks as far as Peru's core in Lima. However, Peru has vital interests in resource extraction in the Andes, making any threats to foreign resource investments, including frequent indigenous and labor unrest, an issue of national concern.
The April Camisea kidnappings were a direct challenge to this national interest and thus have provoked a national response. The Camisea natural gas blocks are in the valley adjacent to the VRAE, and Gabriel's threat against the 540-kilometer (336-mile) pipeline, which crosses the Apurimac River in its span from the Camisea fields to the coast, is very real. While Peruvian security forces may be able to protect sections of the pipeline, the length of the pipeline coupled with the area's rough terrain will make it difficult, if not impossible, to protect the entire line.
The potential Shining Path campaign against natural gas infrastructure threatens current revenue streams and future investment projects in Peru. This raises the stakes for Peru's security forces and could severely complicate any all-out attempt to eliminate the VRAE group. Given that the VRAE Shining Path has less of an ideological motivation and more of an interest in the drug trade, the ideal outcome for the group is to be left alone to operate in the valley. For this reason, some sort of demobilization may eventually be possible that would allow the group to shed the Shining Path moniker while continuing to engage in drug trafficking activities, much like the demobilized paramilitaries in Colombia.
However, there are no indications that the government is ready to make such a concession. After the embarrassment the April attack caused, it is probably not politically possible for Peru to back down without at least capturing the perpetrators, and a fight is likely. Given the challenges involved in operating in mountainous jungle terrain occupied by hostile militants who can blend in easily with local populations, any such fight is likely to be prolonged. The challenges in intelligence collection, in particular, may push Peru to seek outside help.
One option is to partner more closely with Colombia. Colombia's own experience in combating guerrilla insurgents and protecting its energy infrastructure from attack has resulted in the country's extending military training to many countries in the region. The United States, which already grants Peru millions of dollars annually for drug eradication and police training, is another possible partner. There is quite a bit of room for growth in the U.S.-Peru relationship. For instance, Peru's military faces equipment shortages and organizational challenges, but a closer partnership with the United States could give Peru greater access to training, equipment and funding. Such a partnership would take time to develop, however, and would not be a high priority for the United States.
The Shining Path will not engage government forces directly but will instead use insurgent tactics and attacks on the Camisea pipeline to keep security forces preoccupied and unable to focus on the group's interests in the VRAE. The Shining Path only needs to exist on an organizational level sufficient to traffic cocaine and carry out hit-and-run attacks on state interests. Peru will have to consider how far it can push the militants when the fight itself jeopardizes the operations of the foreign-owned companies the state is trying to protect. In the end, both sides are looking for a peaceful settlement that allows both to return to business, but until such a settlement can be found violence will increase as each side seeks to improve its negotiating position.
