Irish Republican militants have demonstrated proficiency in deploying explosive devices in the past; attacks have occurred regularly across Northern Ireland for the past four years. However, they have shown less proficiency in deploying large bombs, which have either failed to fully detonate or have been discovered by police before they could explode, such as the devices that were defused April 28. In September 2009, British army experts defused a 270-kilogram roadside explosive device — similar to the device found April 26 near Newry — on a south Armagh roadside in Northern Ireland. In November 2009, a 180-kilogram explosive device inside a car that crashed outside police headquarters barriers in Belfast only partially detonated, resulting in no injuries. This indicates that Irish Republican militants are either having technical difficulties in deploying large devices or they are deliberately refraining from conducting large-scale attacks to minimize civilian casualties (or perhaps a combination of the two).
Irish Republican militants' past attacks have mainly caused small-scale destruction and have typically targeted British troops and police officers. Previous attacks include an explosive device planted under policeman Ronan Kerr's car in Omagh in April 2011, which killed Kerr, and a shooting outside a military base in Antrim in March 2009 that resulted in the deaths of British soldiers Patrick Azimkar and Mark Quinsey.
Irish Republican militants also tend to provide warnings to local institutions about explosive devices before detonating them, apparently in an attempt to avoid civilian casualties. However, the devices found April 26 and April 27 in Newry and Belfast reportedly were not accompanied by warnings. This means the devices could have been more lethal, since police would not necessarily have been able to clear the area before detonation. It is unclear whether the individuals who deployed the device deliberately chose not to detonate it, in order to send a signal of strength to authorities without causing any damage, or if there were technical difficulties in detonating the device.
The location of the explosive devices defused April 28 is significant, as the London 2012 Olympic torch relay is set to pass through both Newry and Belfast on June 5-6. With the media increasing focus on the London 2012 games, militants likely are using the games as an opportunity to gain more attention.
Although the Irish Republican militants failed to detonate the explosive devices in Belfast and Newry, they were able to formulate a plan, assemble the devices and deploy them in public without being detected. In other words, the militants were able to complete the terrorist attack cycle, and do so without police knowledge. The earlier authorities can detect an attack in the works, the less dangerous the situation is. However, if police only become aware of an explosive device after it has been assembled and deployed in public, resolving the situation is much more dangerous and much more urgent. That police and military forces did not know about the Belfast and Newry explosive devices until they had been deployed indicates an intelligence gap on the part of authorities in Northern Ireland.
The April 28 incident does not change Stratfor's assessment of Irish Republican militants' overall capabilities and intentions. Regardless of whether the militants are having problems detonating larger explosives or are choosing not to detonate them, their ability to acquire large amounts of explosives and maneuver them into position in public shows that Northern Ireland's police on several occasions have not been able to detect and halt the terrorist attack cycle at its early stages.
