Since the fall of the regime of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi in October 2011, well-trained and well-armed Tuareg mercenaries left Libya to return home to Niger, Mali and Algeria. Of these countries, Mali and Niger have the largest Tuareg populations, with 1.7 million and 1.4 million Tuaregs, respectively. Fearful of these displaced mercenaries, Bamako and Niamey were quick to begin peace negotiations. But Malian-Tuareg negotiations broke down in October 2011, and a military coup in Bamako left Mali in disarray. Seizing the opportunity, Tuareg militias, most prominently the MNLA and Ansar Eddine, were able to effectively extricate Malian military forces from Azawad in the northeast.

Now firmly in control of Azawad, the Tuaregs have called for greater participation from their regional kin to consolidate their territorial gains. It is in this context that the FLAA announced its plans to assist the MNLA. Currently, the MNLA is only calling for an autonomous Azawad state in Mali, but the FLAA claims to be fighting for a joint Azawad-Air state. 

A call for a greater Azawad-Air state is not unprecedented. During a Tuareg rebellion from 2007 to 2009, leaders of a Nigerien militant group that would later come to be known as the Movement for Justice (MNJ) fought alongside militants from Mali's Democratic Alliance for Change. MNJ militants returned to Niger and formed the Niger-Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change, which raised its profile considerably by advocating the formation of a Tuareg state that would stretch from Azawad in Mali to the Air Mountains in Niger.

Threat of Spillover

The sudden takeover of Azawad has provoked calls for an immediate resolution from Mali's neighbors, which are concerned about similar rebellions at home. Militarily weak, Niger has advocated that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deploy 2,000-3,000 troops to intervene on its behalf.

Whether ECOWAS deploys troops, Niger is better positioned than Mali to fend off a potential Tuareg rebellion. One of the most useful levers Niamey has in this regard is political and economic influence brought on by uranium mining.

The Air Mountains, the region from which the majority of Nigerien Tuaregs hail, is home to some of the largest uranium sites in the world. Producing almost 3,000 tons of uranium every year, these sites are crucial for Niamey's influence over the Tuaregs. They provide mining jobs for uranium-producing Tuareg communities, which receive a 15 percent commission on state uranium revenues.

These government incentives have helped many Tuaregs, especially those disenchanted with or uninterested in the rising risks associated with the region's illicit economy, become participants in Nigerien state affairs. (The illicit economy involves gunrunning, kidnapping and other activities that bring the Tuaregs into contact with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, militants.) Niamey has even appointed former Tuareg leaders to military and political positions — a tactic that expands its patronage network among the Tuaregs.

Furthermore, uranium production accounts for 70 percent of Niger's export revenue ($330 million in 2010), and taxes on that production generate 5 percent of all revenue. But more important, it attracts foreign investment, which can take the form of infrastructure, construction and maintenance, and spurs foreign participation in other extractive industries, such as gold and oil.

Areva, a French energy company specializing in the nuclear sector, is particularly active in Niger. The company operates two of the country's largest mines, Arlit and Akokan, in the heart of Tuareg territory. The Arlit mine is the largest underground uranium mine in the world, and it employs scores of Tuaregs in labor-intensive jobs. Along with Akokan, it accounts for roughly 30 percent of French nuclear consumption. In addition, Areva is set to begin production at the Imouraren mine in 2014, which is expected to more than double Niger's total uranium output.

Paris and Niamey are mutually interested in Niger's uranium production. Unsurprisingly, France has been one of the most vocal outside parties to the Tuareg rebellion in Mali — and its potential spillover into Niger. France has called for a quick resolution to the matter, but it has stopped short of advocating military intervention in Mali. Instead, it has offered logistical support to ECOWAS.

But in the past France has shown a willingness to intervene when its own citizens are threatened. French forces responded within days to hostage situations in 2008, 2010 and 2011 — incidents in which Areva personnel had been kidnapped — with large military campaigns that included special operations forces and several maritime surveillance aircraft. Paris likely would not hesitate to act again in Niger if any considerable rebellion were to gain traction within the Air Mountains, lest it subject its citizens or energy assets to lawless rebellion.

Remaining Grievances

Despite the integration of many Tuaregs into Nigerien society, grievances within the Tuareg community remain. These grievances, which are especially pronounced in traditional nomadic sects and among disenchanted youths, constitute the biggest threat to the Nigerien government in the months ahead. Among these grievances are radiation exposure from the uranium mines, discrepancies in the government's mining concessions system and a larger foreign presence in their religious lands.

Tuareg grievances manifest themselves in several ways. Some Tuaregs see illicit trading activity as the only viable alternative to earning income via their French and Nigerien "colonialists" and participate in the trade accordingly. Others may try to assume control of the uranium trade themselves by disrupting road access — though they lack the technological skills to extract, produce and export the element. It also is not uncommon for Tuareg militants to kidnap Areva workers and turn them over to AQIM members.

Any of these scenarios could happen in the near future and should not be discounted. But they are unlikely to occur at such a level as to denote a full rebellion, due in part to incentives from Niamey. Moreover, were events to progress to levels of rebellion like those in Mali, Nigerien Tuaregs would have to consider the prospect of French intervention. Military intervention is by no means a certainty, but there is much more incentive for it to happen in Niger than there was in Mali.