After days of anticipation, North Korea on Thursday attempted to launch a satellite. The launch failed. In one sense, this is not an indicator of the level of North Korean prowess. Failures in development programs are both reasonable and necessary. Recall how many failures the United States experienced before it successfully launched a satellite. These failures allow engineers to correct inevitable design flaws in any complex system.
At the same time, the failed launch does teach us about the price of using complex engineering programs as a political lever. However reasonable it is to expect failures in prototypes, the purpose of the launch is political. The United States had to match Sputnik, and successive failures to do so wrought significant psychological damage. Even so, the United States retained its underlying power and capability; whatever the short-term cost, the United States could overcome it.
The impact of failure on North Korea is greater. There are serious doubts about whether North Korea's missile program can succeed. The North Korean model of testing for political purposes and the immense resource constraints under which Pyongyang operates have severely limited the North's testing experience. Due to their political nature, such failures strike at North Korea's already fragile credibility, which is central to its national strategy.
North Korea has survived by appearing to be dangerous. Its nuclear and missile programs, both of which are critical to North Korea's ability to project a credible threat, are designed to deter hostile action against the North and preserve the regime. Pyongyang fears that its enemies will not take it seriously and will apply increased pressure — or at worst, even launch an attack. North Korea is aware of its weakness and uses the potential threat of nuclear weapons to deter that pressure. Indeed, the United States and South Korea have been concerned enough with these programs to provide money and food aid in exchange for what turned out to be temporary suspensions of the programs.
The weaker their capabilities appear, the less deterrent power the North Koreans have. A successful launch would have increased their credibility and bargaining power. An unsuccessful launch raises the question of whether there is any need to negotiate with the North Koreans at all. Though unlikely, it could also result in increased risk-taking by North Korea's enemies, who will be less cautious in dealing with a North Korea that presents fewer risks than was once thought.
The lesson is interesting when applied to the more significant Iranian case, which in some ways takes its bearings from the North Korean model. Having a nuclear and missile program of unknown capability is an effective deterrent and bargaining tool. Iran has not yet tested a crude atomic device (which must be distinguished from a deliverable warhead), but its satellite launches have succeeded. For both countries, actually possessing deliverable weapons would represent a stronger tool, but there is also value and safety in ambiguity since the distance between early programs and a deliverable deterrent is fraught with risk. Iran also had failures prior to its successes. North Korea's position suffers from its repeated public failures to develop a deliverable system.
To this point the Iranians have not attempted an underground nuclear detonation. If they were to do so and it both failed and was detected, it would be a substantial blow to the Iranian position. This fourth failure by the North Koreans (the other three happened in 1998, 2006 and 2009), demonstrates the dangers of failed demonstrations, particularly when your true capabilities are already in doubt. The interesting question is why the North Koreans felt it necessary to take the public risk at this time. Though preparations for this launch probably began before the death of Kim Jong Il, we suspect it had to do in part with the internal politics of the succession, which, if true, will result in some officials stepping down. Alongside the national risk, that is the personal risk of such a strategy. Deliberately visible preparations for a third nuclear test began before the failed launch, so Pyongyang is not without options. But the totality of circumstances that argue against North Korean capability may be mounting.
