Given the military's ambitious timeline for settling the country's most contentious political issues, the intensified rhetoric between the leading forces in Egyptian politics was expected. By the end of June, Egypt is scheduled to hold its presidential election (the vote is set for May 23-24, with a runoff scheduled for June 16-17 if no candidate wins an outright majority), draft and ratify a constitution (the final draft must be ratified via public referendum within 15 days of its release), and formally transfer political power from the SCAF to a civilian government. With the political foundation of the country being laid, the MB will push its demands now, before a power balance between the civilians and the military is enshrined in a new constitution.
Competing SCAF and MB Demands
The Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafist Nour party together won 70 percent of the seats in the People's Assembly and Shura Council, which make up Egypt's upper and lower houses of parliament, respectively. Now the MB needs to ensure that those gains actually mean something.
During the transition of power in early 2011 from President Hosni Mubarak to the military, the SCAF issued a constitutional declaration that now governs the country. This declaration included a number of amendments to the country's 1971 constitution and left enough ambiguity for the military to adjust the rules as it saw fit. Now that Egypt is preparing to move out of this transition period, the MB wants to use its influence within the constitution-drafting process to orient Egypt toward a British-style system that would give more weight to the parliament, which the Islamists currently dominate. The MB would like a constitution that places clear limits on the military's authority and ensures civilian primacy in the government. Wary of further alienating secularists in the opposition, the Brotherhood has been cautious in airing its intentions on the religious clauses in the constitution. Still, a debate can be expected over the place of Islamic law in the country's legal fabric.
The military has made little secret of what it wants from the new constitution. SCAF-backed Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmi in November 2011 circulated for review a draft of "supra-constitutional principles" that essentially laid out the military's ideal constitution. The guidelines called for a constitution that granted the military exclusive control over its budget, gave the SCAF veto authority over the constitution-drafting process and, most critically, called on the military to defend the "constitutional legitimacy" of the state. After public backlash brought military crackdowns at the end of the year, the military backed off the al-Selmi document. Since then the military has probably sent a revised draft outlining its expectations to the MB leadership. However, the military is unlikely to compromise on its core principles in the creation of the constitution.
The military does not want exclusive control of the government; it would rather return to exercising authority behind the scenes. The SCAF also wants immunity from civilian political forces and for its economic assets to be protected. In contrast to the MB's preference for a strong parliament, the military would like the presidency to hold more power. Therefore, the military will bargain with the Muslim Brotherhood to ensure that whoever takes the president's seat is approved by and under the influence of the military. Since the president also appoints one-third of the members in the Shura Council, the SCAF envisions the presidency and a more balanced Shura Council acting as a check on the Islamist-filled parliament.
Notably, the MB has not fielded a presidential candidate of its own so far. The list of candidates the SCAF presumably favors includes Ahmed Shafiq, the last prime minister appointed by Mubarak and Egypt's former air force chief; Hossam Khairallah, who headed Egypt's general intelligence apparatus; Mansour Hasan, the head of the SCAF advisory council; and Omar Suleiman, a Mubarak-era intelligence chief who has yet to formally announce his candidacy.
Candidates with ties to the Mubarak regime will be a tough sell in the upcoming election, and it remains unclear which, if any, of these candidates (or any others who emerge later) could emerge victorious. The SCAF's ability to see its favored candidate through to the presidency stands at the center of negotiations between the MB and the SCAF over the political transition. Suspicions of election engineering could produce a major backlash, which the SCAF is unlikely to risk triggering without an understanding with the MB, the opposition faction that has significant numbers on the streets.
Most important, the military expects to carry out the role of commander-in-chief by using the presidency to dictate Egypt's national security and foreign policy. The creation of a constitutionally mandated National Security Council that institutionalizes the military's role is a possibility. The military will probably concede formal legislative authority on domestic issues to parliament, and it would likely bargain with the Muslim Brotherhood to have parliament appoint a new prime minister in exchange for facilitating the military's choice for president. The military will still want to maintain some form of veto power over the parliament's and Cabinet's decisions.
The Limits of Posturing
There is still a significant gap between the versions of the constitution pushed by the military and those promoted by the MB. The MB derives its leverage from its ability to pull supporters into the streets, creating a security crisis for the military, and its power to boycott, and thus discredit, the political transition.
Neither of these scenarios appears likely. The Brotherhood has achieved the first crucial step of simply entering the political process, managing to gain control of the parliament along the way. If the MB tried to use its popular support to reinvigorate street protests, it would risk a military crackdown and martial law. If the MB boycotted the process altogether, the military would appoint its own council and run the political transition as it saw fit. Both scenarios would enable the military to reassume control over the political transition and to sideline the MB. This is not a gamble that the Brotherhood wants to make.
Nor is this a scenario that the military is necessarily trying to create. It would be a major risk for the military to outright deny the MB a political presence and revert to a police state. The SCAF has been trying to avoid major protests that force the military to crack down and also to maintain foreign aid to keep the country's fragile economy afloat. At the same time, the military currently has greater authority than the MB to influence the terms of the political transition. The MB's authority in parliament does not yet mean anything in practice.
These factors constitute the grounds for an MB-SCAF bargain. Despite its reputation as the most organized and powerful opposition group in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood has had no other choice but to work closely with the military throughout the political transition. The MB's dealings with the military have cost it credibility, with an increasing number of opposition factions accusing the MB of being the "loyal opposition" and the military's stooge. While the MB has deliberately limited its presence on the streets as part of this broad understanding with the SCAF, the SCAF has advanced the political process, albeit piecemeal, and has not stood in the way of the MB's domination of parliament.
The MB Under Pressure
The MB's informal standing with the SCAF now needs to be formalized. The Islamist-controlled parliament's power with respect to the military will be determined in the election of the president, appointment of the prime minister and, most critically, the writing of the constitution. The MB is trying to rebuild its credibility by speaking out against the SCAF, but it is also threatening a crisis so it can push its demands in the constitutional process.
The Muslim Brotherhood is in the weaker position in this negotiation. The SCAF has reminded the MB publicly and privately that by pushing its demands too far it risks losing its political presence altogether. At the same time, the MB is facing rising pressure from liberal secularists, who are now intensifying their protest against the Islamists because they dominate the 100-member constitutional panel. (It was the Islamist-controlled parliament that recently passed a vote to appoint 50 of the panel members from among the parliament, with the rest coming from the outside.) Already, a number of liberal and leftist parties have pulled out of the constitutional panel to protest the heavy concentration of Islamists. These parties claim that the Islamists are not fully representative of Egyptian society and should not have overwhelming influence in drafting the country's post-Mubarak constitution.
Cairo's Administrative Court is expected to deliver a ruling April 10 on whether the current panel is even legal. The judiciary, which is still heavily influenced by the military and secularists, could mandate that a new panel be organized under different parameters to allow the inclusion of more non-Islamist members. Less than a week after the first panel was formed, the MB may already be on the verge of losing some of its clout in the drafting process.
While this debate unfolds, the SCAF can be expected to play the liberals, religious minorities and Islamists off each other, especially on the question of Article Two of the 1971 constitution, which states that Islam is the country's religion, Arabic is its official language and Sharia ("Islamic law") is its primary source of legislation. The SCAF can also use the debate over Article Two to exacerbate rifts between Salafists and moderate Islamists over whether the text should be altered to elevate the status of Sharia.
The Clock Is Ticking
The MB and the SCAF have three months to complete the political transition. Considering the number of contentious issues at play, there is no guarantee they will meet this deadline. The military could make some concessions but will not compromise on its core demand of maintaining authority behind the scenes; it is determined to keep any Islamist-dominated civilian government in check.
Though the SCAF does not hold a formal veto over the process, there are still a number of informal tactics the military can employ to influence the drafting of the constitution and the presidential election. The Muslim Brotherhood lacks the leverage at his point in the political transition to force the military's hand and does not want to derail its political project altogether. More threats can be expected, but the MB will end up making the bigger compromise to see the process through.
