An arrest warrant was issued Feb. 9 for former Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed, who resigned from his post Feb. 7 after security forces temporarily detained him. His resignation comes after pro-Nasheed demonstrators clashed with security forces during protests in the capital of Male. Protests began Jan. 16 and stemmed from widespread dissatisfaction with what Nasheed's opponents see as undemocratic, secular and anti-Islamic policies. Vice President Mohamed Waheed Hassan has since assumed the presidency in what Nasheed and his supporters describe as a coup d'etat. Hassan denies the accusations, saying he is merely following constitutional protocol.
Because of its position in the Indian Ocean, the Maldives draws the attention of regional powers, particularly China and India, which see the island nation as a useful component in their respective efforts to control the region. Beijing and New Delhi have both described the situation in the Maldives as a domestic issue and so far have decided not to intervene. Maldivian foreign policy has traditionally favored India, and while a new or volatile regime could call that favoritism into question, Stratfor does not believe that will be the case. Regardless, both countries will monitor the events as they unfold, as regime change in the Maldives could disrupt the Sino-Indian balance of power in the region.
India has long maintained cultural and economic influence in the Maldives, due in part to geographic proximity. But India has shown a willingness to use military power to exert influence in its island neighbor. As recently as 1988, Tamil rebels attempted to oust former Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom but were thwarted when India deployed naval forces and paratroopers to intervene. India's interest in the Maldives is understandable: Its geographic position is an ideal location from which the Indian navy can project power into the wider Indian Ocean. Conversely, it is also prime location for foreign actors to project power into India.
But China, another ascendant regional power, would like to wrest the island nation from India's sphere of influence. For Beijing, the Maldives has become more valuable as China grows as an economic and military power. China's need for raw materials to fuel its growing economy — and the need to protect those materials — has led Beijing to try to secure relationships with countries along transit corridors in the Indian Ocean. To lure the Maldives into its sphere of influence, the Chinese have relied mainly on soft power, including economic power. In fact, Chinese nationals have become some of the most important patrons of Maldivian tourism.
China's strategy in the Indian Ocean worries New Delhi. China already operates in Myanmar's Coco Islands and Pakistan's Gwadar port, located respectively to India's east and west. China has yet to secure any permanent military bases on the Indian Ocean's many islands, though the Chinese navy has been involved in anti-piracy operations farther west, off the coast of Seychelles. In the early 2000s, there was speculation that Beijing would build a submarine base on a Maldivian atoll, but there is no evidence that project is coming to fruition. In any case, securing a presence in the Maldives would place the Chinese to the southwest of India, adding to New Delhi's concerns of being boxed in by Beijing.
These concerns have prompted India to increase its military involvement in the area surrounding the Maldives. The Indian navy has conducted regular patrols in Maldivian waters since 2009, and in 2011, New Delhi reached an agreement with Male to build 26 radar bases in different atolls of the archipelago (officially to counteract marine poaching). Male also gave New Delhi permission to run Dornier patrols around the archipelago.
Indeed, despite Chinese forays into the region, the Maldives continues to favor New Delhi. Gayoom owed his administration's existence to the Indians, and Nasheed continued many of Gayoom's pro-India policies. The question is whether these policies will be reversed under Hassan, who came to power amid dissatisfaction with the Nasheed administration. Stratfor believes Hassan is unlikely to change loyalties. A longtime public servant, he held positions under both Gayoom and Nasheed, so already he is familiar with his country's policies toward India. Moreover, the political opposition that helped bring about Nasheed's resignation is divided; some support the return of Gayoom and his brand of state-sponsored Islam, whereas others advocate varying degrees of Islamic influence in society. Thus, even if the opposition were to oust Hassan in favor of Gayoom, pro-India policies likely will remain intact.
However, a possible shift in the region's balance of power cannot be completely ruled out. A pro-Islam regime could oppose the influx of trade and tourism, in which case China would lose its primary options for a soft-power approach to currying favor with the Maldivians. Such a regime could also harm relations with a predominately Hindu India, though the tradition of close political relations, geographic proximity and cultural relatedness points to an outcome that continues to benefit New Delhi.
