A letter released Jan. 27 by Bahrain's anti-regime February 14 Movement has been circulating among the country's sizable community of foreigners. The letter accused foreigners of working as mercenaries for the ruling al-Khalifa regime, threatening their lives if they did not leave the country. Foreigners constitute roughly 54 percent of Bahrain's total population, and roughly 45 percent of these foreigners hail from South and Southeast Asia, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia and the Philippines. Indeed, the February 14 Movement's letter — written in Hindi, Urdu and Arabic — seems to be directed at this demographic, which is a large portion of the country's work force. And as the letter alleges, many of these foreigners are, in fact, recruited by the al-Khalifa regime to serve as security personnel. But almost all of these foreigners are drawn to Bahrain by economic opportunities not available to them in their home countries. Economic opportunity and a combination of concessions, incentives and penalties have instilled a sense of loyalty in Bahrain's foreign workforce. As a result, an intimidating letter is unlikely to compel them to flee the country. Tensions between Bahraini citizens and foreigners living in Bahrain, particularly those from South Asia, are nothing new — unsurprising for a country with fewer citizens than foreigners. Several factors contribute to these tensions. Many native Bahrainis believe the cultures these foreigners bring to Bahrain infringe on their own, and the Bahraini government marginalizes these workers economically and politically, strictly limiting their labor rights. For most foreigners in Bahrain, the promise of a paycheck outweighs the disadvantages of being marginalized. In addition, Bahrain, like most Gulf Cooperation Council states, is quick to deport foreigners for perceived wrongdoings or legal transgressions. But more important, much of the tension between citizens and foreigners stems from the al-Khalifa regime's longtime practice of using foreign mercenaries to supplement its security apparatus. This practice insulates the regime from differences — and defections — brought on by sectarian divides and stands in stark contrast to Syria, which relies on security forces composed only of Syrian citizens. In February and March 2011, the height of political unrest in Bahrain, the regime increased its use of South Asian foreigners for cracking down on opposition groups and protesters. In the ensuing clashes, some of the mercenaries were responsible for killing and injuring pro-reform activists. Thus, protesters came to associate violent crackdowns with foreign mercenaries. Also, many South Asians were co-opted by the regime to participate in the pro-regime rallies and exaggerate the size of the demonstrations. Some were injured and even killed, leading to concerns among leaders in Bahrain's South Asian community. The regime responded with a measured concession: It made more media available in foreign languages, printing some newspapers in such languages as Malayalam and Urdu and running subtitles on the state television channel. Ultimately, the regime knows the lack of economic opportunity in foreigners' home countries is a strong incentive for them to stay in Bahrain, and if they can be pacified with such small concessions, then there is little reason to offer larger ones. The real issue is how far the February 14 Movement is willing to go in targeting foreigners associated with violent crackdowns. While the movement has evolved from a non-violent opposition group to a more organized armed resistance — issuing how-to guides for using Molotov cocktails on security forces and police stations and explaining how to build a command-detonated improvised explosive device using nails as shrapnel — the letter is the only instance in which the group has threatened foreigners. In the past, the movement has honored its threats to attack security forces, but there is no evidence to suggest the letter is anything more than heated rhetoric. If the February 14 Movement ever explicitly calls for violent action against foreigners, it is possible that future attacks would target South Asian businesses and individuals or security personnel who bear a resemblance to South Asians. Over the past two months the February 14 Movement has proved capable of damaging buildings and vehicles as well as injuring security personnel. However, it has yet to demonstrate a capability to kill security forces. Targeted violence may create fear within the foreign community, which could call for tempered responses such as strikes or protests. The al-Khalifa regime is well-versed in dealing with Bahrain's foreign community and could again enact small concessions to placate this large demographic. But foreigners will be careful not to go too far in their response because they know they are easily replaced.