The loyalties within the group that propelled South African President Jacob Zuma to power are shifting. Although Zuma still has a powerful support base, one group of elites among the Northern Sotho ethnic group who supported Zuma in 2007 are considering their own political ambitions. These elites do not have a support base large enough to challenge Zuma and must form a new alliance to become a credible opposition force. If they fail to forge such an alliance, they likely will back down from political confrontation and content themselves with their current status.

Zuma's Supporters

In 2007, Zuma won the African National Congress (ANC) presidency, a position effectively guaranteeing that he would become South Africa's next president. Several political factions backed Zuma in his rise to power, including the labor movement, the communist party and other ANC networks, such as its military and intelligence wings.

Among Zuma's supporters were several members of the Sotho ethnic group: Kgalema Motlanthe, current deputy president of the ANC and of South Africa; Tokyo Sexwale, former chief of Gauteng province and current minister of human settlements; Julius Malema, suspended president of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL); and Mathews Phosa, former Mpumalanga province chief and current ANC treasurer-general. These ambitious politicians gained some success in joining others to support Zuma but were not content with the positions they were given, as they considered them stepping-stones to the highest office in the land. The Sotho elite broke away from Zuma not long after he became ANC president because they wanted to fulfill their own political ambitions of succeeding Zuma after a single term, while Zuma adamantly desired two full terms. Motlanthe and Sexwale both believe they have better presidential credentials than Zuma. However, their current support base is not large enough to challenge Zuma's.

Tribal Interests

Motlanthe, Sexwale, Malema, Phosa and other ANC members believed to be undermining Zuma all hail from the Northern Sotho ethnic group. The Northern Sotho make up about 9 percent of South Africa's population and roughly 11 percent of the ANC membership base; the Southern Sotho constitute 8 percent of South Africa's population and roughly 8 percent of the ANC membership base. Even if the two Sotho subgroups formed an alliance — and even if ethnicity strictly determined South Africans' voting preferences — they would not pose a credible challenge to the political hegemony of the Zulus, who make up 25 percent of both the national population and the ANC membership base. The Sotho elites looking to challenge Zuma would need to incorporate allies from outside their narrow group. The logical strategy would be to incorporate the Xhosa, the second-largest ethnic group in South Africa and the Zulus' main rivals for political power.

The Xhosa constitute 18 percent of South Africa's population and 23 percent of the ANC membership base. This ethnic group produced South Africa's first two democratically elected presidents: Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki was president from 1999 to 2008 and became a controversial leader as he increasingly isolated himself and focused more on retaining power at all costs. Mbeki's power base narrowed in 2007 as he tried to force his way to a third term, and this led to the formation of a broad-based alliance against him. He lost his bid for a third presidential term to Zuma when the alliance now in control of the ANC lost confidence in Mbeki's leadership. 

A Stratfor source in the Zuma camp said he does not believe the Sotho are planning an alliance against Zuma. However, if an alliance between the Sotho and the Xhosa is in the works, it would explain Malema's recent attempts to rehabilitate Mbeki's image and position in the ANC. (Mbeki has been virtually absent in domestic affairs since his recall as South African president in September 2008. His minimal presence — he makes only rare appearances at ANC events — is surely orchestrated by the Zuma-led ANC.) Prior to his suspension as ANCYL leader, Malema criticized Zuma's performance, comparing him unfavorably to Mbeki. More recently, Malema has said Mbeki should become more involved in ANC affairs again. A possible alliance would also explain Motlanthe's Jan. 11 visit to the Eastern Cape province, the heartland of the Xhosa, where he met with provincial leaders and promoted popular policy issues such as education advancements. 

If the Northern Sotho, Southern Sotho and Xhosa formed an alliance, they could credibly challenge Zulu hegemony if voting along ethnic lines was the ultimate deciding factor in South African elections. But voting in the ANC ultimately depends on power and patronage opportunities. No province — other than possibly Zuma's home province of KwaZulu-Natal, where there is a sentiment that this era is owed to the Zulu since the Xhosa benefited greatly from previous ANC administrations — will vote strongly along ethnic lines. The Sotho and Xhosa cannot count on all voters to choose candidates from their own ethnic groups, particularly since Zuma has some influence among the Sotho and Xhosa communities.

Zuma's Strategy

Zuma's camp in the ANC is taking steps to make sure it retains its advantage when ANC delegates meet in December to elect the party's leadership. Zuma has maintained strong relations with the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party, having given their leaders patronage and positions in his Cabinet. Zuma had a falling out with the Malema-led ANCYL (Malema likely was backed by Sexwale, who in turn is likely financing any campaigning for a leadership bid by Motlanthe), but his administration is working to install a Zulu leadership in the youth league to safeguard the agency's involvement in rallying young voters for Zuma. The president is also relying on ANC networks that supported his rise to power, most notably cadres from the ANC's former militant wing and its intelligence apparatus, to discreetly help with his re-election campaign.

Zuma's supporters are also promoting and expanding ANC membership nationwide. This is not only to ensure ANC hegemony among South African voters but also to give Zuma more delegates than any other candidate or alliance. Of the ANC's national membership of approximately 1 million, about 250,000 members are in KwaZulu-Natal. Roughly another 225,000 members are in the Eastern Cape province, and 121,000 are in the Gauteng province. Malema's home province of Limpopo has about 115,000 members, and approximately 99,000 ANC members live in Phosa's Mpumalanga province. The Free State, North West province and the Western Cape province have 76,000, 60,000 and 44,000 members, respectively. Pro-Zuma networks are at work in these provinces to recruit Zuma supporters and win their delegates' votes.

Zuma is waging an aggressive re-election campaign, and his ANC rivals, including Motlanthe, have yet to form a stable and credible counter-alliance. Should the opposition continue to falter, it likely will decide not to challenge Zuma. In that case, the Sotho elites likely would bide their time until the 2017 ANC leadership race and 2019 national presidential election. By that time, Zuma will have customarily stepped down after finishing his second term as party and state president, and a pan-Sotho alliance would have a better chance at fulfilling its ambitions.

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