In a meeting with military attaches in Moscow on Wednesday, Russian Gen. Nikolai Makarov, chief of the General Staff of Russian armed forces, said that the Russian military has begun to implement several military measures in response to U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans in Europe. These measures, which Russian President Dmitri Medvedev outlined in a televised address two weeks earlier, include activating an early warning radar in Kaliningrad and strengthening Russia's defensive capabilities for strategic nuclear forces installations.
In the same speech two weeks ago, Medvedev stressed Russia's desire to cooperate with Washington in a joint BMD framework, and said measures such as deploying advanced offensive systems — including Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missiles — would only be enacted if "the aforementioned measures prove to be insufficient."
But Russia has wasted no time following through on many of those harsher measures. On the same day as Makarov's statements, the press service of Russia's Western Military District said that an S-400 surface-to-air missile regiment will be placed on combat duty in Kaliningrad before the end of the year. Meanwhile, the chief of the Belarusian Armed Forces' General Staff said his country expects to receive Tor-M2 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia this month, adding that an Iskander deployment to the country would soon follow.
Russian opposition to U.S. BMD plans is nothing new. For Russia, the fundamental issue at hand is not the BMD system itself (which is nominally geared toward countering the ballistic missile capabilities of states like Iran), but the U.S. military presence the system would bring with it. U.S. BMD plans are focused on Central Europe, which abuts Russia's former Soviet periphery. Moscow can't help but feel threatened by the U.S. military commitment to the region that the system represents.
Russia Escalates Its Opposition
While Russia has publicly expressed its opposition to U.S. BMD plans on many occasions over the past few years, Wednesday marked a clear escalation by Moscow on the issue, particularly since Russia softened its stance on U.S. missile defense after the so-called "reset" in Russo-American relations in 2009. The timing of this escalation is important. On Thursday, a foreign minister-level Russia-NATO Council meeting will take place in Brussels, and Moscow has grown increasingly frustrated with Washington's unwillingness to even discuss the BMD issue with Russia in the weeks leading up to the meeting.
According to Stratfor sources, the United States has also been preparing to take BMD off the agenda for Thursday's meeting, and possibly even exclude it from the more significant NATO-Russia summit slated for March in Chicago. Russia continues to press the issue and demand talks, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stating that he plans to clarify Medvedev's position on the issue during Thursday's meeting.
More important than the timing of the upcoming meeting is the development of a more significant shift, between Washington and Moscow, over the position of U.S. BMD. Washington has no shortage of issues to deal with. It must wrap up the war in Afghanistan; address Iran's increased influence in strategic Middle Eastern countries like Iraq and Syria; shift its focus to the Western Pacific region; and prepare for a possible economic collapse in Europe that would have global implications. These concerns have served to distract Washington and limit its room for maneuver outside of the theaters it is already committed to. The last thing the United States needs is another crisis on its hands.
Conversely, Russia has seen its position steadily improve. Unlike the United States, the Russian military is not drawn into protracted conflicts far from home. Russia is flush with cash from energy revenues and has been looking to take advantage of the crisis raging in Europe. Most importantly, Russia has increased its leverage vis-à-vis Washington thanks to the United States' increased reliance on the Russian-dominated Northern Distribution Network (NDN), at the expense of Pakistan-based supply lines into Afghanistan. Moscow has already begun threatening to close the NDN if its interests over BMD are not taken into account.
Central Europeans are caught in the middle. In the face of a resurgent Russia, a concrete security commitment from Washington is exactly what these countries need, and the BMD system has come to serve as a symbol of that future commitment. Russia knows this and has worked to chip away at this commitment by attempting to wedge the United States between two bad scenarios: either abandon the BMD system and with it the Central Europeans, or risk a potential disruption to Washington's pressing commitment in Afghanistan. Essentially, Russia is attempting to force the United States to make a decision — over whether it wants the NDN now or BMD later — hoping that Washington leaves the Central Europeans out to dry.
Yet Russia knows that, whatever levers it may hold against the United States, it is not immune to global economic problems and to blowback from Afghanistan. Moscow knows it must be careful not to press its current advantage too far. The United States, despite its current relatively poor position, is still the dominant power on which the global system pivots. It can bring a range of forces to bear against Moscow if it deems them necessary. Ultimately, in any sparring match between the United States and Russia, neither player can deliver a knockout punch. And however long the match between the two powers drags out, it is the Central Europeans that will continue to be caught in the middle.
