Japanese media have reported that Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda is finalizing arrangements for a two-day trip to China in mid-December. This would mark the first such visit to Beijing since relations between the two Asian countries began to decline in 2010. China reportedly has agreed with Noda's proposal to resume a joint natural gas exploration project in the East China Sea — a project for which Japan has long lobbied. Talks on the project stalled in September 2010 after the Japanese arrested a Chinese trawler captain over boat collisions in the disputed waters, but the project will almost assuredly be addressed during the visit. That China revisits the issue at this time is unsurprising, given the U.S. re-engagement plan in the Asia-Pacific region and moves by Tokyo to fall in line with that plan. Under the leadership of the Democratic Party of Japan, Tokyo often has used strong ties to the United States to balance its relationship with China, and Noda is continuing that strategy to some degree. But as the prime minister's popularity falters at home and in Washington, Noda desperately needs a political victory if he is to retain power. His political vulnerability provides China an opportunity to improve relations with the island nation, but there is an ulterior motive behind any potential cooperation: Beijing wants to demonstrate that it can ease tensions on its periphery amid the United States' increasing engagement with the region and that it can resolve its maritime territorial disputes without U.S. intervention. There is much room for relations between Japan and China to improve. Relations were relatively warm under the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who favored a foreign policy that distanced Japan from the United States. Hatoyama advocated the "East Asia Community," which emphasized relations with neighboring countries. Relations worsened sharply, however, under the administration of Naoto Kan, Hatoyama's successor, when in the aftermath of a boat collision in the East China Sea, the Japanese became convinced that Beijing would not compromise on its territorial claims. Beijing responded to the incident by not only suspending gas talks but also by cutting the supply of rare earth elements to Japan. To hedge against Chinese power in the region, Kan focused on U.S.-Japanese military ties and on developing natural gas deposits in disputed waters in the East China Sea. Beijing now sees Noda, who before coming to power in September had made inflammatory comments regarding war with China — as a continuation of Kan and his policies. Most notably, Noda has increased Japan's involvement in South China Sea disputes, a departure from Japan's previous position. He also has prioritized U.S-Japan security ties; included Vietnam, the Philippines and India on a number of issues through greater security cooperation; and announced that Japan would join negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement (TPP). Participating in the TPP discussions especially has convinced Beijing that Japan is falling in line with Washington's re-engagement strategy in the Asia-Pacific region — with the intention of counterbalancing China economically and strategically. However, Noda has fallen out of favor with the United States and with his own constituency. His popularity rating at home has fallen from 60 percent to 40 percent (due in part to the perception of his being soft on China and North Korea). Beijing senses that Noda needs a political victory to salvage any hope of retaining his post, and cooperating with Noda to resolve a territorial dispute could provide him with much-needed domestic political capital. Indeed, the Chunxiao project could provide that victory. In 2008, China and Japan reached an agreement on where and how to conduct natural gas exploration in the East China Sea. Included in that agreement was the Chunxiao natural gas field, which Beijing unilaterally developed after deeming the area Chinese territory. Japan has long advocated a treaty to resolve the disagreement and has sought to participate in Chinese exploration projects. Several rounds of talks on Chunxiao took place before the September 2010 suspension. While Beijing's agreeing to resume talks may be largely symbolic, it offers Noda a chance to gain some ground on the issue. Beijing has advocated a joint exploration initiative with countries claiming sovereignty of the South China Sea. But China knows that it needs to ease tensions on its periphery, and this no doubt contributed to Beijing's reconsidering its position on the Chunxiao project. Beijing also knows that the region's dynamics may soon change as the United States increases its presence in the region, challenging Beijing's maritime claims as well as its sphere of influence. China therefore is looking to ease tensions in its periphery and prove that it can resolve maritime territorial disputes without outside intervention, thereby staving off the need for what Beijing sees as U.S. meddling. If it believes that Japan is using the United States to counterbalance China — and that it is increasing its involvement in the South China Sea — Beijing has every reason to incentivize the East China Sea issue for Tokyo. A potential agreement on the Chunxiao project would not only give Noda a political victory in Japan, but would be tangible evidence that China can achieve agreements over territorial disputes with its neighbors — through bilateral or even trilateral mechanisms — amid shifting dynamics in the region.