Ahead of U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to Australia and Indonesia in November, his administration has increased its rhetoric in its strategy of re-engagement with East Asia. In an opinion article in the November issue of Foreign Policy magazine titled "America's Pacific Century," U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the region "a key driver of global politics" and promised substantive U.S. involvement. The United States' main goal in this strategy is to counterbalance an increasingly powerful China, especially in light of Beijing's recent moves to aggressively stake its maritime claim in the region. To this end, the United States has pursued a leadership role in Asian multilateral organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the East Asia Summit while attempting to strengthen bilateral relations with Asian nations, including both traditional allies such as Australia and Japan and emerging regional powers, particularly India and Indonesia. While these nations will be wary of risking damage to their already established relations with China, increased U.S. attention will offer them strategic opportunities to fulfill vital domestic needs.

Traditional U.S. Allies

U.S. strategy for the Asia-Pacific region necessarily involves a maritime security component. The United States relies on its control of the oceans to project its power globally, and the Asia-Pacific region in particular is increasing both in economic significance and in competition. Washington is thus looking to strengthen its partnerships with capable regional militaries, such as Japan and Australia, to provide it with both security assistance and political backing for a sustained presence in the region. Japan and the United States have seen their strategic interests align over the past year as China has increased its maritime assertiveness in the region. Japan's interest in regional maritime security runs not only to the East China Sea, the location of a longtime dispute with China over resources and territory, but also in the South China Sea. A recent change in Japanese leadership and the Fukushima nuclear disaster also have brought Tokyo and Washington closer together, as Japan, constrained by domestic issues, has welcomed the U.S. presence in the region. Both Tokyo and Washington are focusing their attention on how they can meet challenges in a changing regional security environment and use maritime security as the pre-eminent avenue for increased involvement. In addition to improving bilateral relations with the United States, Japan has shown an interest in accepting wider responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific region. Tokyo has called for closer ties with India through India's Look East policy and indicated that it would be receptive to a trilateral dialogue with India and the United States over regional security issues. It also has worked to enhance relations with Myanmar and to develop security relationships with South China Sea stakeholders such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Similar to Japan, Australia is an increasingly strategic partner to U.S. regional interests. Australia's pivotal location between the Indian and Pacific oceans and its existing military infrastructure in the north and west make the country an important ally to supporting maritime security in the region's waters. Australia sees a partnership with the United States as a way to build economic opportunities while ensuring freedom of navigation for critical resources. An enhanced U.S. presence contributes to regional balance and provides Australia leverage in the region and with China, its major trading partner. Obama's Australia visit will take him to Darwin, Northern Territory, where he will finalize agreements that will give the U.S. military access to Australian bases, key to a U.S. foothold. U.S. strategy presumes that Australia's existing basing architecture is insufficient to meet emerging challenges in the Indian and Pacific oceans, and thus, during the 2010 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations, the two sides agreed to enhance the U.S. military presence in the country.

Indonesia

A substantive U.S. re-engagement strategy based around maritime security will begin with Indonesia. The archipelago nation covers critical international sea lanes through which energy supplies and goods are transported. Indonesia also — with U.S. support — is emerging as a leader in regional blocs such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Already the largest ASEAN economy, Indonesia has been attempting to increase its military prowess as well, with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono recently announcing a 35 percent increase in the country's defense budget to about $7.1 billion. Indonesia also has made regional political leadership overtures ahead of the 2011 East Asia Summit, agreeing in September to joint patrols with Vietnam of their shared maritime border and working with India on joint patrols of the Strait of Malacca. U.S.-Indonesian relations began to warm in August 2010 when the Obama administration lifted a decadelong ban on U.S. military contact with Indonesia's Kopassus special forces. Obama also visited the country in 2010, calling for improved U.S. relations with the Muslim world and pursuing security and economic partnerships. Since his visit, strong overtures have continued, with gestures such as Washington backing Jakarta against the Papuan independence movement despite Papuan accusations of military human rights abuses. The United States also has initiated joint ocean exploratory initiatives and worked toward increasing bilateral trade. The two also have conducted joint air force exercises as part of Garuda Shield 2011. Obama will meet with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit, where Yudhoyono will take advantage of the U.S.-Indonesian strategic relationship to gain its support for an enhanced Indonesian regional leadership role. However, Indonesia has tried to simultaneously balance its new partnership with the United States with its relations with China, as shown in the joint Indonesian-Chinese special operations training program Sharp Knife 2011. While it does not intend to be seen as countering or limiting China, Indonesia sees its strategic needs aligning with U.S. overtures such that a maritime security conducive for unimpeded resource exports would be ensured (these exports are vital to the country's economy). The Jakarta-Washington partnership also enhances the perception of Indonesia's regional leadership status as a partner to a dominant power, secures leverage among regional powers and promotes markets for bilateral trade.

India

India represents the most strategic and important potential partner in the U.S. Indian Ocean-Pacific Rim strategy. India and the United States likely will further define their strategic cooperation in Bali at the November East Asia Summit (EAS), particularly on regional security, economic and strategic issues. A comprehensive Indian Ocean-Pacific Rim strategy requires India's partnership on maritime security and increased influence in the Indian Ocean arena. The United States is betting on India's rising stature and on a perceived willingness to more aggressively engage Asia-Pacific players to bring it into the region as a prominent player with similar interests and strategic goals. The Obama administration has tried to build on closer Indian-Japanese relations by pushing for trilateral discussions. Since the initiation of the 2001 Malabar Exercise, the United States has attempted to enhance Indian-U.S. military ties as well as regional relations, including Japan, Australia and Singapore in Malabar 2007. The United States has also supported Indian military exercises near the Chinese-Pakistani border. Washington has hoped to develop U.S.-Indian relations into a broader and more comprehensive strategic platform, though the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 financial crisis made such moves of secondary interest. Post-9/11 Indian-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation and mutual concerns and goals in East Asia also have drawn India and the United States closer. Despite the commencement of a strategic dialogue through a nuclear deal, the much-sought-after regional strategic agenda has yet to develop. Mutual interests between the powers, however, will not necessarily lead to closer U.S.-Indian cooperation in the region. India's strategic interests in East Asia derive primarily from the domestic needs of ensuring energy security, safeguarding its sea-lanes in the Andaman Sea and enhancing the international image of India as a rising power. India is looking for markets to expand its rapid economic growth, avenues to amend its domestic energy deficits and methods to address its security concerns — all of which require the advancement of a reinvigorated Look East policy. Thus, India has attempted to diversify its energy procurement sources from unstable sources in the Middle East and West Africa to relatively stable locations such as Vietnam and Myanmar while also attempting to build positive relations through confidence-building measures in the region. In 2010, only 30.6 million barrels of India's oil originated from ASEAN countries as opposed to the 210.3 million barrels that China procured from those sources. India has shown signs of engaging with the U.S. strategy in East Asia through ties with Japan, boosting its strategic partnership with Vietnam, mandating the Indian navy as net security provider to island nations in the Indian Ocean region, economically engaging Myanmar and patrolling the Strait of Malacca with Indonesia. India may find it appropriate to pursue its interests in ASEAN nations through a reinvigorated Look East policy, coupled with cooperation with the United States on regional issues. Maritime security will require U.S. naval capacity and power projection, particularly as India gauges the possible Chinese threat to its Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean periphery. In particular, China's relations and cooperation with littoral Indian Ocean states and ASEAN raises Indian concerns of weakness and vulnerability. India thus may find it beneficial for growing Chinese power and attention to be diverted to issues of less interest to India's area of strategic concern. China's recent assertiveness in the South China Sea and East China Sea and the simultaneous momentum among Asia-Pacific stakeholders to address the issue has provided a fortuitous opportunity for India to re-engage its strategic needs by deflecting Chinese interests closer to Beijing's periphery. With Japan pushing for closer Indian-Japanese military and naval relations based on its 2009 Action Plan, U.S. hopes of Indian prominence in East Asia through trilateral agreements and ASEAN nations similarly open to an increased Indian position in Southeast Asia, India may find it opportune to further integrate into the regional security, economic and strategic discussions with a renewed push of its Look East policy. India's primary interests, however, will be to procure new and sustainable energy resources and markets. The U.S. re-engagement strategy has been centered on ensuring maritime security and providing a pivot point in the region to growing Chinese power. The powers around which Washington hopes to anchor its strategy in the region do not have an interest in damaging their respective relations with Beijing. The interest in the U.S. strategy, however, derives from an opportune alignment of strategic imperatives in which an enhanced U.S. presence provides a point of leverage, ensures freedom of navigation, increases economic opportunities and fortifies the leadership positions of growing powers. For India and Indonesia, U.S. offers of cooperation present unique strategic opportunities.