The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are known for their strategic location on the North European Plain and as the most Western-oriented countries of the former Soviet Union. Their membership in and commitment to both the European Union and NATO also make the Baltic region an important bellwether of Russia's strength and influence in its former Soviet periphery. However, these three countries are far from homogeneous. There are broad similarities that shape a common identity in the region, such as geography, as well as a shared identity in the wider geopolitical sense; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are committed to their orientation toward the European Union and NATO and their skepticism and fear of Russia. But when these countries are examined more deeply, clear differences emerge that will shape the future geopolitical trajectory of the Baltics at a time when the European Union and NATO face growing pressures.

Similarities and Differences

Estonia is much more akin culturally and historically to its Nordic neighbors, Finland and Sweden, than it is to Latvia or Lithuania. This Scandinavian influence is something that has translated into the political and economic realms, as seen in Sweden's dominant presence in Estonia's banking industry and Estonia's robust trade relationship with Finland. Estonia is the only Baltic country in the eurozone, and it has weathered the financial crisis relatively well. Exports have rebounded and the country's economy is growing again, though unemployment, especially for youth, is still quite high and the country has taken austerity measures quite seriously. In terms of its relations with Russia, Estonia is neither as engaged nor as confrontational as the other two Baltic countries. While there is a substantial Russian minority in the country, this minority is not as influential in business or politics as the sizable Russian minority is in Latvia. On the economic side, Estonia is relatively transparent, which explains both its eurozone membership and lack of major business deals with Russia. With sizable domestic energy production coming from both oil shale and renewables, Estonia also is not as dependent on Russia for energy as the other two Baltic states are, though it still gets a significant portion of its natural gas from Russia, which remains a factor in the energy realm. Latvia is neither as "Scandinavianized" as Estonia nor as historically powerful in its own right as Lithuania. Moreover, unlike Estonia, Latvia is not in the eurozone, nor does it have the same active foreign policy. Instead, Latvia tries to leverage its centralized location in the region for the same energy projects that Lithuania is pursuing and by being more open to working with anyone — including Russia. Russia's presence and influence stands out in Latvia compared to the other two Baltic states. Latvia has powerful oligarchic interests that have been quite cooperative with Russia's in terms of business deals. But Russian influence is still relatively limited; indeed, the preferred party of the large Russian minority in Latvia, Harmony Center, was excluded from government in recent elections despite gaining the most votes. Even if Harmony Center is included in future governments, it will have to depend on other rightist and EU-oriented parties for support. But Latvia is quite useful for Russia in that it often serves as spoiler to Baltic-wide EU or Western-oriented projects such as the currently stalled Rail Baltica. In many ways, Lithuania is oriented more toward Central and Eastern Europe than the Baltic region. This is due to the country's role in the 14th through 18th centuries as one of the largest states in Europe (first as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and then via the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth), stretching at its height from the Baltic to the Black seas. When it comes to Russia, Lithuania has always been the most active and assertive of the Baltic states, rebelling against Russia during the Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet eras. It also has a very ambitious foreign policy when it comes to Belarus and Ukraine, which it has been trying to pull closer to the European Union and further away from Russia. But Lithuania has very complicated relations with another large country in the wider region, Poland, something that goes back to the two countries' historical alliance-turned-competition and has long caused political and cultural tensions. In many ways, the tensions stemming from the Polish minority in Lithuania can be seen in the same light as those stemming from the Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania is also quite assertive on the energy front. It is the only Baltic state so far that has implemented the EU energy package, acting on it quickly by taking Gazprom to court. With the closure of the Ignalina nuclear plant and subsequent increase in dependence on Russian energy, Lithuania is trying to make a name for itself as a hub for energy projects (both nuclear and liquefied natural gas, or LNG) and by promoting energy diversification.

Regional and Foreign Policy

The biggest divergence stemming from these national differences is the way these three Baltic countries view the surrounding region. Estonia looks first to Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Finland, while Lithuania focuses on its neighbors in mainland Europe, such as Poland, Belarus and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine. Latvia's view is closer to Estonia's, but Latvia has to factor in Russia much more because of a greater Russian presence in the country and a lack of clear strategic options. In terms of how they view each other, the Baltic states are in many ways more competitive than cooperative. They are individual states with different cultures, languages and histories. Most people in Estonia do not speak Latvian and vice versa, and Lithuania still views itself as an important player in Central and Eastern Europe. They also have different political and economic interests, which lead them to compete for EU funding and NATO recognition and otherwise try to stand out in some way. This has made any pursuit of Baltic-wide projects like Rail Baltica and construction of an LNG facility prone to bickering and long delays. In the bigger and more geopolitical scheme of things, the three countries will put aside their differences if national security or strategic interests are threatened, and thus they stand united in their orientation toward the West. But because the very foundation of what the European Union and NATO represent is at risk — the former due to the European financial crisis and the latter due to the increasing divergence in the interests of member states — some interesting questions may arise. The Baltics have vociferously voiced their support for both of these Western institutions, with Latvia saying it is still committed to joining the eurozone by 2014 despite the issues currently facing the monetary bloc. However, if the European financial crisis continues to worsen, and if the interests of NATO member states continue to diverge, one likely outcome could be more cooperation in regional subgroups than in the European Union as a whole — a development in which the Baltic states could play a leading role. Whether this would serve to unite Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as part of a wider Nordic-Baltic grouping or lead to more centrifugal pressures on the Baltic states will be a key question moving forward.