Kenyan troops supported by Somali militiamen took control of the port of Bur Gabo early Oct. 28 in their advance along the Somali coast toward Kismayo, an al Shabaab stronghold. The capture of Bur Gabo puts Kenyan forces 140 kilometers (86 miles) from Kismayo. Meanwhile, Kenyan troops and Somali militias forming the central part of the two-pronged offensive continue to mass around the town of Afmadow, which sits along the key A3 road leading to Kismayo. The operation, launched in mid-October to counter recent kidnappings and killings along the Somalia-Kenya border that Nairobi has blamed on al Shabaab, is not being conducted by Kenyans alone. The Kenyan military has depended on the United States, France and the United Kingdom for logistical support and intelligence assistance during the incursion. The Somali militias that have partnered with Kenyan forces during the operation have played an even more important role. These militias can provide legitimacy for the operation in the eyes of the Somali population, and since they are operating on their home territory, they provide the Kenyan military a valuable intelligence resource. Al Shabaab knows that these militias are critical to the success of the mission and understands the risks Kenyan forces run by relying on them. Al Shabaab can thus be expected to try to turn local populations against the operation and to exploit divisions within the militia groups to stymie the Kenyan advance. (click here to enlarge image) Cross-border raids and kidnappings are not a recent phenomenon. Because of the threat these acts pose to Kenya's tourism-dependent economy, Nairobi has long conducted contingency planning for an incursion across the porous Kenya-Somalia border. One possible method for preventing these incidents would be to establish a buffer zone in Jubaland, an autonomous region in southern Somalia, in order to prevent al Shabaab activity from spilling over into Kenya. An incursion into Somalia, such as the one currently ongoing, would be a necessary first step for such a plan. Even before this operation began, Kenya had been providing a number of local militias with arms, training them, and cooperating with the militias on border security. Now, with Kenyan forces engaging in conventional military operations alongside these militias deep in Somali territory, this cooperation has intensified to an unprecedented level.

Prominent Militia Groups

Ahlu Sunnah Waljamaah (ASWJ) is a multi-clan militia primarily composed of Sufis, a minority Islamic sect, and is currently operating alongside Kenyan forces near Afmadow. ASWJ first took up arms against al Shabaab when the latter began to destroy the tombs of the country's Sufi saints, among other reasons. ASWJ is composed of around 2,000 men, half of which were trained in Ethiopia by Ethiopian troops before returning to Somalia early this year. Indeed, ASWJ received substantial help from the Ethiopians as the latter withdrew from Somalia in late 2008 and early 2009. The Raas Kaambooni Front is another militia currently fighting alongside the Kenyans, primarily in the offensive along the coast. The Raas Kaambooni Front is mostly composed of Hawiye clansmen and is under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed Madobe. The militia previously allied with Hizbul Islam in its fight against al Shabaab, but Hizbul Islam merged with al Shabaab in December 2010. Since then, Madobe and his Raas Kaambooni militiamen have joined forces with ASWJ and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to continue their fight against al Shabaab. The Jubaland militia has also joined the offensive. The militia is predominantly composed of Darod clansmen and was formed under the leadership of the former defense minister of the TFG, Mohamed Abdi Mohamed, also known in Somalia by his nickname "Gandhi." Mohamed named himself president of Azania (Jubaland), though his position is not officially recognized by the Mogadishu-based TFG. The Jubaland militia consists of approximately 2,500 Somali men recruited from Somali refugee camps in Kenya and trained by the Kenyan government (which also reportedly provided them with Chinese-made weapons). The Jubaland militia is currently primarily supporting Kenyan forces in the central sector of their actions near Afmadow. With only around 4,000 troops deployed in Somalia, Kenya depends heavily on local troops and militias to bolster its ranks, facilitate its operations and secure its rear. The Kenyan army's lines of communication and supply now extend across hundreds of kilometers. Al Shabaab already sought to disrupt these lines during an attack on a Kenyan reinforcement convoy in the central sector near Dalbiyow on Oct. 27. In order to avoid nationalist backlash against the Kenyan operation, Kenya wants to head off the perception it is an invading force and wants to be viewed rather as an ally of the local population against al Shabaab. The participation of these militiamen grants a degree of legitimacy to the Kenyan operation. For instance, both ASWJ and the Raas Kaambooni Front have spoken out against TFG President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed for his statements Oct. 24 criticizing Kenya's military operation, perhaps fearing an infringement of TFG authority in Jubaland. In a positive sign for the Kenyans, the militias even managed to organize the local populace to stage street demonstrations. In Dhobley, hundreds of demonstrators turned out to denounce Ahmed's statement and praise the Kenyan military. Both the nationalist and the transnationalist factions of al Shabaab are under considerable pressure. In the north, the nationalist faction of al Shabaab lost control of most of Mogadishu to African Union Mission in Somalia and TFG forces in August 2011, though it has since inflicted considerable casualties near the capital. Kenyan-supported militias have been driving back the more transnationalist elements of al Shabaab in Jubaland since the beginning of 2011, well before the Kenyan operation, putting that faction under pressure as well. The fact that Kenyan forces and their allies are nearing areas that act as major sources of revenue, such as Kismayo, may explain why al Shabaab has apparently elected to make a stand at Afmadow and other areas. Given al Shabaab's fighting history, the militant group will probably not attempt a protracted and costly stand against superior forces, instead opting to wage a renewed guerrilla campaign.

Risks in the Militia Strategy

The Kenyan strategy of heavy reliance on local Somali militias is not new (many other countries, including Ethiopia, have done the same), nor without drawbacks. The militias are largely working together now because they view al Shabaab as a common enemy, but the many differences and the history of animosity between them may yet threaten their unity of purpose. The biggest risk in utilizing these militias is that they are largely fighting for their own interests — territory, financial incentives or warlord politics. Differences in clan and ideology could also threaten the effort. For instance, ASWJ is a predominantly Sufi movement, which may lead it into conflict with the Raas Kaambooni Front, which had previously identified itself as an Islamist group. In addition, the militia is also working for the establishment of Jubaland as an independent entity, which is a point of friction with the TFG forces in the south that ostensibly report to Mogadishu. Furthermore, aside from the Ras Kambooni Front, these militias are neither as experienced as al Shabaab nor as well-trained as the Kenyan forces. Al Shabaab is also fully aware of the crucial impact of the propaganda war and has sought to turn local opinion against Kenyan forces, painting them as invaders and crusaders. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow, aka Abu Mansur, both prominent nationalist al Shabaab officials, have denounced the Kenyan operation as an instance of colonization and have urged Somalis to fight back. However, there has been no sign of the nationalist al Shabaab faction mobilizing its fighters against Kenyan forces. The Kenyan military has pushed deep into Somalia, but the ultimate goals of the operation — whether Kenya intends to establish a permanent buffer zone or even if it intends to take Kismayo — are unclear. The militia groups have already played an important role in supplementing the relatively small deployment of Kenyan forces and may become even more important when Kenyan forces eventually withdraw.