The conflict in Libya has raised concerns that weapons acquired by Moammar Gadhafi's regime could fall — or have fallen — into the hands of militants in the region who might use those weapons against U.S. interests. These concerns have drawn attention to West Africa, particularly countries in the Sahel sub-region, where Tuareg rebels and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are active. However, there are few direct U.S. interests in the Sahel that are likely targets for attacks by militants. AQIM has rarely carried out attacks in the Sahel's capital cities, where most Western interests in the region are located. Furthermore, the United States is already engaged in a multiyear program to establish stronger relations with governments in the Sahel region. Washington is working to equip and train these countries' forces to disrupt militant elements within their borders and aims to maintain a U.S. presence, however light or transient, to unilaterally engage militants in West Africa. The United States has had an active presence in the Sahel since shortly after 9/11. The current focus of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region is to root out AQIM, the al Qaeda franchise in North Africa. The group is based primarily in northern Algeria. Prior to 2006, when it adopted the AQIM name, it was known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, or GSPC by its French acronym. Though there is no formal alliance between them, some radical elements among the Tuareg rebels in Mali, Mauritania, Niger and southern Algeria have been known to cooperate with AQIM in smuggling and other activities. (There is also concern that Nigerian militant group Boko Haram has links to AQIM.) While the Department of Defense is responsible for the most visible U.S. security involvement in the region, the CIA and the State Department also cooperate with governments in the Sahel. The United States is furthermore not the only Western nation involved in the region. France has a special operations and intelligence presence in West Africa meant to disrupt AQIM and to respond to threats against French interests in the region, which extend broadly across commercial and political sectors due to France's colonial-era relationship with the region.

Focus on Mauritania, Mali and Niger

The geographic core of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel centers around Mauritania, Mali and to a lesser extent, Niger. Algeria is AQIM's primary base and as such sees a great deal of militant activity, but Algiers has a comparatively robust security apparatus. The CIA has been working with Algeria to help with intelligence gathering, but Washington has prioritized its military assistance on countries that are less capable of engaging AQIM across the jihadists' Sahel front. Mauritania and Mali (as well as Niger) have much weaker security forces and counterterrorism capabilities than Algeria, and that is where the United States is concentrating its military cooperation efforts. (click here to enlarge image) Mauritania is one of the United States' closest partners in the Sahel. U.S. forces support Mauritanian ground and air forces and contribute to operational and logistical activities. Mauritania's special forces, designated as Groupement Special d'Intervention, or GSI, have three units trained for counterterrorism or military operations. GSI-1, the best-trained unit in the country, was created and trained by U.S. special operations forces. GSI-2 is a peacekeeping unit that received training through the State Department's Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program. GSI-3 is another of Mauritania's main counterterrorism units. U.S. assistance to GSI includes regular training exercises and the provision of guns, ammunition, vehicles, radios and uniforms to ensure the special units are capable of carrying out the missions for which they are trained. French special operations forces also have worked closely with GSI units, notably at Bassiknou near the southeastern town of Nema, to conduct cross-border operations against AQIM in Mali. The United States has encouraged French assistance to GSI units. Washington is working to boost Mauritania's indigenous intelligence-gathering and analysis capabilities. The United States is helping refurbish a forward operating base near the Malian border, which, besides facilitating Mauritania's troop-transport abilities, will give the Mauritanians a forward-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Washington also has equipped Mauritania with aviation assets for ISR activities. These began with light propeller-driven aircraft but could eventually include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to help in intelligence collection — though the United States maintains its own unilateral airborne intelligence and reconnaissance abilities in the region. The United States also participates in humanitarian projects and anti-extremism measures to help Mauritania combat militancy. Similarly, Mali has received military assistance from the United States. Mali wants to assign two counterterrorism units to a refurbished military base in Tessalit and two other minor military outposts in the desert, which can serve as permanent bases allowing units to conduct regular patrols. The United States has given Malian forces truck transport, communication radios and radio systems, and assorted supplies including fuel, food, equipment for soldiers and medical supplies. As in Mauritania, U.S. special operations forces are training Malian units. Mali's Echelon Tactique Interarme (ETIA) units are small, mobile task forces comprising regular army troops and irregular fighters from northern militias. ETIA units are preferred for engaging AQIM in Mali and have succeeded against militants in the past. The United States also is carrying out a Military Intelligence Train and Equip program in Mali. This includes the creation of an analytic cell and funding for several aircraft to be used for surveillance and intelligence gathering. Humanitarian efforts, including medical and veterinary programs, are also part of U.S. cooperation with Mali. In Niger, the United States has engaged in bilateral military cooperation and general security assistance. This has included training one special operations-capable counterterrorism unit, with plans to train another. The United States also is offering training in police forensics, assisting in the creation of a military intelligence unit and a national intelligence fusion center, helping refurbish a forward airlift base and providing equipment to improve communications between Niger and Algeria.

Cooperation Beyond the Core Countries

Outside this core are several countries that receive U.S. military cooperation, but not as much as Mauritania and Mali. Senegal, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Chad are important to U.S. counterterrorism efforts in West Africa but are not the focus of U.S. military assistance. In Senegal, the United States has provided military-intelligence training, equipped a U.S. special operations forces-trained counterterrorism unit and improved the country's national intelligence capabilities. U.S. special operations forces also have trained counterterrorism units in Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Chad, and those units have received small-unit equipment from the United States so they can carry out missions. The United States also has provided military intelligence training in Nigeria and improved Chad's tactical airlift capability. Beyond that are peripheral countries like Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast and Liberia, where the United States is fostering political support and providing some security assistance. These countries are seen as gatekeepers to the coast. There is no meaningful AQIM or Tuareg presence there, but these countries can serve as transit points along militants' smuggling routes. The U.S. goal in these countries is to strengthen governments and make sure they are working to prevent the smuggling of guns, drugs and people who might be making their way to AQIM havens elsewhere in the Sahel. The stated goal is not to defeat all AQIM cells throughout the Sahel, Sahara and North Africa; U.S. efforts in West Africa have made it more likely that local military forces can locate and disrupt them. Though the U.S. involvement is modest by global standards, the training and equipment given to African military forces in the Sahel can subject AQIM and other militant elements to persistent probing attacks and disrupt their ability to mobilize into a coherent, organized large-scale threat.