Bahrain will hold parliamentary by-elections Sept. 24 to replace the 18 lawmakers, all members of Al Wefaq, the country's largest Shiite opposition party, who resigned in March and April in protest of the government. Al Wefaq is boycotting the elections. On Sept. 21, Shiite groups began a new round of protests, which they plan to stage daily through Oct. 2. The renewed unrest comes after six months of relative quiet in Bahrain after Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) military forces, led by Saudi Arabia, deployed to the country to crack down on mostly Shiite protesters who had been demonstrating for months against the Sunni regime. The Bahraini government, already facing an election that lacks any opposition candidates, wants — and is prepared — to end these protests quickly and mitigate the protesters' ability to call international attention to what they will claim to be illegitimate elections. However, the backlash against the response to the previous round of demonstrations has made both Bahrain and the GCC wary of another crackdown that could fuel Shiite dissent, not only in Bahrain but also in other GCC countries, and play directly into Iran's agenda for the region.

Renewed Protests, Coordination Among Opposition Groups

(click here to enlarge image) The opposition's Sept. 21 protest was dubbed the "Bahrain Blockade." A motorcade drove through Manama's financial and diplomatic districts as well as Pearl Roundabout, the center of the previous unrest, during morning rush hour, with the intent of blocking traffic for three hours. Eighteen people were arrested for allegedly attempting to hinder traffic, and the February 14 Movement, which organized the event, quickly dubbed it a success (though Bahraini General Directorate of Traffic Culture Director Maj. Moosa Al Dossary said traffic was unaffected). The February 14 Movement has called for similar events to occur daily from Sept. 25 through Oct. 2 and for a return to demonstrations in Pearl Roundabout from Sept. 23 to Sept. 24 — demonstrations unsanctioned by the Bahraini government. The Pearl Roundabout protests represent the largest events the February 14 Movement has organized since the height of the unrest in March. Notably, the Bahrain Islamic Freedom Movement, a London-based Shiite opposition group that vocally opposed the Bahraini government's behavior during the earlier unrest but did not publicly participate in protests, has echoed the call to protest in Pearl Roundabout, indicating that the two groups may be collaborating. If so, this kind of cooperation between an external group and one based in Bahrain would be unprecedented in the 2011 unrest and would indicate a notable shift and increase in opposition efforts. The opposition clearly remains large in number. A government-authorized protest Sept. 22 in Tubli, eight kilometers (five miles) southwest of Manama, gathered 3,000 people from several different Shiite opposition groups, including Al Wefaq, Wa'ad and Al Amad. These three groups, along with four others, had formed an alliance to coordinate protest efforts in March. This alliance remained dormant until the Sept. 22 demonstrations, which included members of five of the seven groups. That they scheduled protests for Pearl Roundabout also indicates that opposition groups are attempting a return to early protest tactics to regain the impact achieved during the early days of the March unrest. However, anti-government demonstrators have not successfully carried out a protest in Pearl Roundabout since the crackdown in March, and the fact that these protests are unauthorized could elicit a strong government response.

The Bahraini and GCC Response

When the unrest began in February, the Bahraini government was unprepared for the magnitude and frequency of the demonstrations. The security forces lacked a clear strategy to deal with protesters and resorted to violent crackdowns to contain the unrest. This provoked a backlash that led to larger, more disruptive protests, culminating in a shutdown of large portions of Manama on March 13. At Bahrain's behest, a Saudi-led GCC military force of more than 1,000 troops rapidly deployed to Bahrain on March 14. This force succeeded in shutting down the large protests and engendering the relatively quiet period in the country that ended Sept. 21 — but it also gave protesters another grievance against the government. The Bahraini government and GCC are better prepared to deal with this round of unrest. In June, the number of GCC troops was scaled back to roughly 500 and the Bahraini government recruited 2,000 troops for its security apparatus from countries such as Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Additionally, 200-600 troops were moved into the country on the night of Sept. 20, accompanied by armored personnel carriers and police vehicles, while four helicopters were placed on alert at the Saudi air base in Dhahran, according to STRATFOR sources. During the March unrest, GCC forces claimed they did not interact directly with Bahraini protesters, instead deploying to vital locations such as oil, electricity and water installations and financial and banking facilities. The Bahraini government is likely to remain sensitive to March protesters' claims of a "foreign occupation," but GCC forces likely will play a bigger — and more public — role in the crackdowns if protests escalate.

The Stakes for Iran and the GCC

(click here to enlarge image) However, if demonstrations escalate to the point that these forces need to be deployed, the crackdown will fuel even more Shiite dissent. GCC states are worried that Shiite anti-government unrest could spread to other countries at a time when the coalition already feels vulnerable because of the impending U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. These states are looking for ways to counter an increasingly powerful Iran. Tehran has exercised its influence during the Bahraini unrest, and the leaders of several of Bahrain's Shiite protest groups are linked either to the Iranian government or its clerical leadership. The GCC's overwhelming response to the March protests was, in part, a message to Tehran that the GCC would not easily relinquish Bahrain. This fear of contagion is likely what drove the GCC to scale down its military presence in Bahrain in June, amid indicators of private Saudi-Iranian negotiations over Bahrain (though these talks did not appear to last very long or result in any agreement). The outcome of the unrest ultimately lies with Bahraini opposition groups — specifically, whether they succeed in organizing protests of a similar magnitude to those in March. The full extent of Iran's assets in Bahrain is unknown — and internal discord in Tehran may be hampering its ability to manipulate these assets — so the strength of the protests will be indicative of Iran's capabilities in the country. Meanwhile, the force with which the GCC responds to demonstrations will shed light on the extent of the coalition's — and Saudi Arabia's — concerns over the spread of the unrest.