Two al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) suicide bombers attacked a military barracks Aug. 26 in Cherchell, northern Algeria, killing 18 people — including 16 soldiers — and wounding 26, according to the Algerian government. The attack was the most recent in a series of strikes by the regional North African al Qaeda franchise targeting various police, military and paramilitary installations in the country. There is no indication yet that the increased rate of attacks is connected to a new influx of supplies or manpower from Libya, and the target set — Algerian government-affiliated targets — shows that AQIM remains focused on domestic, rather than transnational, goals, as it has for the past few years. While conforming to the expected target set, these recent attacks are noteworthy because for many months most AQIM attacks in the north of Algeria have been conducted in the group's home turf in the Kabylie region, and most of them have been defensive in nature, such as ambushes of security forces. The four attacks since July have not only been more widely distributed, with two occurring to the west of Algiers, but have also been more offensive in nature by taking the fight to the security forces. Though it is not clear that the group can sustain its current attack tempo, if AQIM begins using larger devices or new tactics or focusing on new target sets, it could be a sign that the group has found a new weapons supply. (click here to enlarge image) The Aug. 26 attack at Cherchell, about 90 kilometers (56 miles) west of the Algerian capital, Algiers, followed a suicide car bombing Aug. 14 at a police headquarters in Tizi Ouzou that wounded at least 29, according to Algerian officials. On July 31, two Algerian soldiers were killed and several were injured by a remote-controlled bomb targeting a military convoy in Hammamet, northwest Algeria. And in a July 14 incident, two AQIM suicide bombers attacked a police facility in Bordj Menaiel. The first attacker detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) about 100 meters away from the building. Minutes later, the second attacker, riding a motorcycle, drove into the scene of the bombing, which by then included ambulances, first responders and police, and detonated an explosive device. At least four people were killed, including three police officers, and more than 20 were injured. The type of targets chosen by AQIM has been a source of internal tension for the group since the decision was made to merge Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) militant group into the al Qaeda fold in 2006 and form AQIM. A string of very high-profile suicide attacks against civilian targets in 2007-2008 exacerbated this schism. Since late 2008, AQIM attacks, especially those conducted in the north of the country, have conformed to traditional GSPC targeting guidelines and have been directed against security targets, and these recent bombings are in line with that pattern. (click here to enlarge image) Since the uprising in Libya in February, STRATFOR has been watching carefully for signs of Libyan weapons making their way into AQIM hands. While there have been some uncorroborated reports of ordnance such as landmines and man-portable air defense systems making their way into the hands of AQIM's units in the south of the country, there is nothing in these recent attacks to suggest that they were aided by ordnance from Libya. Indeed, the recent improvised explosive devices used in these attacks in the north have been quite small, and even the VBIED used in the Aug. 14 attack in Tizi Ouzou was fairly ineffective. A larger VBIED — like those AQIM employed in 2007-2008 — detonated in the same location would have caused significant damage to the targeted police headquarters and likely would have caused far more casualties. To date, STRATFOR has not seen a corresponding spike in attacks by the group's units in the Sahel region. We believe this is likely due to recent pressure against the group by the governments of Mauritania and Mali, which have attacked AQIM bases in the region, causing the AQIM militants there to flee with significant loss of materiel. Despite this pressure and the group's apparent inability to acquire significant quantities of ordnance from Libya, it would appear that AQIM believes the political dynamics in the North African region, with unrest stretching from the Sinai to the Sahara, provide the group with a prime strategic opportunity that they are attempting to exploit. However, given AQIM's demonstrated weakness, unless the group is able to acquire the resources required to mount a more significant campaign, the threat it poses to the regimes in the region will remain limited.