Turkish President Abdullah Gul said July 30 that the annual meeting of the Supreme Military Council would be held as planned on Aug. 1. The statement comes a day after the country’s top four generals resigned. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Necdet Ozel, commander of the military police, was named as the new land forces commander and is expected to be elevated to the position of chief of the General Staff of the Turkish armed forces (TSK). The TSK’s top brass resigned en masse to try to counter the efforts of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to bring the military under greater civilian control. This effort shows the extent to which the TSK’s control over the political system has waned. More important, the AKP government's move to accept the resignations and replace the top generals underscores a massive shift in the balance of power within the Turkish political system. While it would be premature to say that the military has been completely brought under civilian control, the TSK’s ability to influence governance and decision-making (even regarding its own institutional affairs) has been dealt a major blow. This is the same TSK that held the dominant position in the Turkish republic for nearly a half-century. It mounted coups in coordination with its allies in the higher judiciary, outlawed political parties and erected a deep state intelligence mechanism, heavily circumscribing civilian rule. In fact, as recently as 2007, the military tried to block the AKP's second most powerful member, Abdullah Gul, from the presidency — an effort that the AKP successfully countered by holding parliamentary elections and then having Gul assume the office. The following year, working through the judiciary, the TSK nearly had the Islamist-rooted ruling party outlawed on allegations of trying to undermine the secular foundations of the state. The constitutional court eventually threw out the charges on a narrow 6-5 vote. Encouraged by successful political reforms and having greatly improved the economy in its first term (2002-2007) — particularly after the 2001 economic crisis — the AKP slowly began working to weaken the TSK’s grip over the state. Making use of its growing control over the police, intelligence and judiciary, the AKP government in its second term opened probes into two alleged coup plots, Ergenekon and Balyoz. A well-calibrated campaign resulted in the arrests of hundreds of serving officers and dozens of commanders from all across the military. The AKP moved cautiously, seeking to gradually weaken the TSK without triggering a major response from it. The TSK was never really able to effectively counter the government’s moves and soon found itself on the defensive. Last year’s Supreme Military Council meeting represented the first time that the AKP was able to block the promotions of certain commanders it accused of being involved in plans to overthrow the government. There were fears that the AKP’s initiative to reach a political settlement with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been engaged in an insurgency against the state since the mid-1980s, could backfire on the ruling party and provide an opening for the TSK to reverse the trending decline of the military's political power. The AKP, however, managed the situation well enough to win a third term a little less than two months ago in the June 12 parliamentary polls. While losing some seats, the AKP did manage to increase its popular vote share to 50 percent. It was expected that the AKP would push harder to build on its gains vis-a-vis the TSK and that the Aug. 1 military council meeting would be the main platform for its efforts. As an added advantage, the three services chiefs were due to retire this year. The AKP pressured TSK chief Gen. Isik Kosaner to sideline generals accused of trying to stage a putsch. Realizing the weakness of their position, Kosaner and the top brass tendered their collective resignations in hopes that it would create a crisis and undermine the confidence of the Erdogan administration. Kosaner issued a written statement in which he made it clear that he resigned due to arrests of military officials, which he finds unjust. It was a weak hand to begin with, and the government’s decision to calmly accept the resignations and move toward replacing the top generals highlights the degree of control the civilian government has attained. The lack of reaction to this set of circumstances from within the military shows that a norm of accepting civilian supremacy over the military is beginning to take root. The TSK has gone from not tolerating even the slightest assertion of power by the civilian government, to accepting a government (and one led by its historical ideological rivals) that decides promotions within and appointments to the military hierarchy. It may have begrudgingly accepted this new reality because coups in Turkey have become increasingly obsolete due to the risks they present to political and economic stability. But the TSK can be expected to continue to press its viewpoint in national security policy issues, which the AKP will likely accept — at least for now. The tactical details of the civilian-military relationship aside, at a strategic level the pendulum has swung decisively in favor of the civilian government for the foreseeable future — until such a time when the AKP's ability to govern weakens.