The head of Iranian intelligence, Heidar Moslehi, briefly spoke July 15 ahead of the regular sermon delivered at the main Friday prayer congregation at Tehran University. Moslehi, a cleric who holds the rank of hojjat ol-eslam (junior to the ayatollah), said the Ministry of Intelligence and Security was well prepared to thwart any plots hatched by foreign intelligence services hostile to the Islamic republic. Moslehi claimed that the ministry was particularly focused on identifying and neutralizing efforts to undermine the country via cultural, economic and social means. STRATFOR would usually attach little significance to Moslehi's remarks. But considering the venue and Moslehi's place at the center of an increasingly bitter and very public power struggle between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the intelligence chief's statements cannot be dismissed as routine. Moslehi is a key opponent of the president, and having him deliver a pre-sermon lecture in the current context is part of Khamenei's efforts to push Ahmadinejad into a corner.

Origins of the Struggle

Moslehi is the latest in a host of key officials throughout the Iranian political establishment (clerical, judicial, parliamentary and military) to come out and issue statements against the president's intransigence toward the supreme leader. After Ahmadinejad's controversial re-election in June 2009, Khamenei more or less tolerated the president's assertiveness until April 2011, when he reinstated Moslehi after Ahmadinejad forced the intelligence head to resign a few days earlier. Ahmadinejad's refusal to accept the reinstatement led Khamenei to rally the entire political establishment against the president. No longer Khamenei's favored leader, Ahmadinejad came to represent the biggest threat to the supreme leader's position. Every week since, some key official or another has come out chastising the president. Additionally, a number of individuals from the presidential camp have been arrested. But because he went out of his way to support Ahmadinejad's re-election in 2009, and because he fears that any moves to get rid of the president would further destabilize the political system already weakened by intra-elite infighting, Khamenei prefers to contain Ahmadinejad's moves by building pressure from other institutions until the expiration of the president's second (and likely final) term in office. Khamenei recognizes that Ahmadinejad, a non-cleric, has no significant future role within the Islamic republic. Nonetheless, Khamenei and the clerics fear that Ahmadinejad can do a lot to undermine their power in the next two years. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad is trying to exploit the key fissure within the Iranian political system: the one between its republican and clerical parts. Ahmadinejad, who has a significant support base within the country, came to power on a mandate to end the corruption within the clerical elite. During his first term as president, Ahmadinejad aligned with hard-line clerics as well as Khamenei to undermine the position of Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who even after the rise of Ahmadinejad was considered the regime's second-most influential figure after the supreme leader. Having secured a second term in office, Ahmadinejad, playing on the popular sentiment that opposes elite corruption and the control of the clerics, turned against the same hard-line clerics that brought him to power. Until earlier this year, the struggle between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei remained largely behind the scenes. However, Khamenei's efforts to circumscribe Ahmadinejad's decision-making authority — both on the domestic and foreign policy fronts — have triggered growing resistance from the president. The clerical establishment is concerned that while Ahmadinejad and his faction may be a passing phenomenon, their goal of securing greater authority for elected officials over clerics is one that has great resonance within the country, especially within the reformist camp, which has been silenced but not eliminated.

Fragility of the Clerical Order

Most observers view the struggle between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei as one in which the supreme leader is trying to get all the various players within the system to align against the president. But while Ahmadinejad is only one individual, he represents a faction that would only be standing up to Khamenei and the clerics if it felt that it could do so. That Khamenei has had to intervene — and so publicly — underscores the fragility of the clerical order. In this regard it was interesting to see both parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani and the commander of the country's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jaafari, both declare that reformists have a place within the political system provided they not challenge the position of the clerics. Larijani and Jaafari, both close allies of Khamenei, hoped to use the statements to garner broader support for the supreme leader, fearing that the moves of the Ahmadinejad faction could further undermine the foundation of the regime. Considering the enmity between Ahmadinejad and the reformists over the 2009 election, it is difficult to see the two aligning with each other against the clerics. The reformists would, however, want to take advantage of the rift between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad to try to stage a comeback. To a great degree it was the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad alliance that cost the reformists the 2008 parliamentary elections and the 2009 presidential vote. But reformists and assertive hard-liners like Ahmadinejad are not the only worries for the Khamenei-led clerical establishment. Their biggest concern is that the military, particularly the IRGC, will benefit from the intra-elite struggle. Iran has an unique form of civilian supremacy over the military because the security forces are religiously and constitutionally under the control of the supreme leader, a civilian. Due to concerns about the military, the head of the Guardians Council (the six-member clerical body that oversees the legislature and has the authority to vet candidates for public office) criticized the IRGC chief's statements about reformists in the political system, saying the military had no say in political matters. Put simply, Khamenei's efforts to use Jaafari and the IRGC, the core of the security establishment, to contain Ahmadinejad has opened yet another fissure within the system — between the clerics and the military. But at a time when the clergy has been significantly weakened due to infighting, the only other major institution is the IRGC. Over the decades the IRGC has developed into a major power center, but its leadership and rank-and-file members have remained loyal to Khamenei. The IRGC knows that its privileged position is due to its relationship with the clerics. But the IRGC is concerned about the future of the Islamic republic, especially as the clergy weakens. Additionally, the IRGC already wields a disproportionate amount of influence and would like to build upon it. The IRGC has in fact benefited from the internal struggle — first between the hard-liners and the pragmatists and reformists and now between the conservative factions. Ahmadinejad's moves against Khamenei have been useful for the IRGC's efforts to enhance its clout, but it is rallying behind Khamenei in order to position itself to become kingmaker — both while the clergy still dominates the system and, more important, in the event that the republican part of the system gains more power. Khamenei is aware of the IRGC's ambitions and has thus been trying to counter it by increasingly supporting the Artesh (the larger, regular armed forces). But the key issue is that Khamenei is the only supreme leader that the Islamic republic has seen since the death of its founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in 1989. The turning point in the civil-military balance of power will come once the 73-year-old Khamenei dies and a third supreme leader is chosen — one who will likely be even more dependent upon the IRGC to maintain his position.