NATO has been the main institutional security guarantor for the European continent since the end of World War II, but it has experienced a steady loss of strategic identity and instilled doubts among its peripheral members about its true commitment to their defense. Poland, a NATO member since 1999, has grown frustrated in recent months with the alliance's reluctance to make permanent security commitments to Warsaw on a range of issues, from ballistic missile defense to troop deployments. With Russia's resurgence into its periphery showing no signs of slowing, Poland has begun looking for alternative security arrangements, first on May 12 committing itself to the formation and leadership of a battlegroup with fellow Visegrad Group (V4) members Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and more recently on July 5 signing an agreement with Germany and France — the other two members of the so-called Weimar Triangle — to create a joint military force. While these options (and others Warsaw is considering) are only in the preliminary stages, they show that Poland is increasingly worried that NATO would be unable or unwilling to ensure its security, especially as Russia has mostly consolidated its position in Belarus and Ukraine and will likely make the Baltics (along Poland's eastern border) the next targets of its resurgence. In response, Warsaw is poised in the short term to explore and develop every potential avenue of cooperation in the region — without fully committing to any particular one. The first alternative is the creation of the V4. In theory, this alliance would be able to geographically contain Russia and its periphery by forming a bloc running across Central Europe. The V4, however, suffers from weaknesses that cast doubt on its ability to ensure the region's security. The members lack consensus on the threat posed by Russia: Hungary, for instance, feels secure behind the Carpathian Mountains. Furthermore, political tensions between some of the members of the V4, particularly regarding the Hungarian minority population in Slovakia, could threaten the stability of an alliance. The second avenue that Poland seeks to pursue is centered on the European Union. After recently assuming the EU presidency, Warsaw is readying itself to push for the creation of an EU-wide security framework. Poland is counting on the inefficiencies highlighted during the Libyan campaign to encourage EU members to develop an institutional military framework to share costs and distribute responsibilities as a way for individual European states to save money on defense. The main problem with this plan is that it replicates the fundamental flaw of NATO, which is the aggregation of widely divergent interests in a single institution. For example, France has strongly advocated strengthening the European Amphibious Initiative, hardly useful in preventing an onslaught of Russian tanks from landlocked Belarus. Another major point of concern for Poland is the increasingly close relationship between Germany and Russia, the consequences of which are still unknown for Warsaw, which has been dominated by one or the other since the 18th century. Once again, Poland remains determined to pursue this particular avenue of cooperation despite its apparent faults, in this case by creating a battlegroup with France and Germany, which would have to be the backbone of any European military alliance. The third option Poland is actively pursuing is its strategic partnership with the United States. As NATO's leading power, Washington has been a key ally of Poland since the fall of the Soviet Union. The United States placed Poland at the heart of its Central European policy, equipping it with relatively advanced weapon systems, particularly Patriot missiles and F-16 fighter jets. While the United States would be the most effective deterrent to Russia, its commitment to Poland has always seemed to fall short of its promises in Warsaw's view. Furthermore, the United States is still deeply involved militarily in the Middle East, delaying any potential increase in its commitment to Central Europe. Nevertheless, Poland will continue to push for a heavier American military presence on its territory. Finally, Poland has the option of joining a Nordic security alliance, centered in particular on Sweden and the Baltic states. Warsaw and Stockholm have established strong political ties, particularly during the establishment of the Eastern Partnership program. While no formal military commitment has been made, a Polish alliance with Sweden would prove more manageable in scale than an EU military force and less prone to internal divisions than the V4 battle group. We can expect Warsaw to pursue this option parallel to those highlighted above. Poland has no obvious replacement for NATO's security provision in the medium to long term and is therefore developing a set of cooperative relationships as a hedged security investment. The four options are not necessarily isolated, and Poland has the time and the room to maneuver to combine and adjust them to its needs. Pursuing these potential security cooperation avenues in parallel is a low-cost strategy that will not involve any exclusive commitments from Warsaw in the short term.