With Thailand's fiercely contested general elections to take place July 3, public opinion polls suggest that the opposition Pheu Thai party leads by a margin of 4 percentage points — and a much wider margin according to some other polls. STRATFOR does not forecast the outcome of elections. The fundamental conflicts of interest at the heart of Thailand's political crisis will remain in place regardless of the outcome. The elections are important because they mark the start of the next round of conflict between Thailand's opposing domestic forces. On the surface, a Pheu Thai victory in this election would rectify the problem of the previous two elections (2006 and 2007), which saw victories by the Pheu Thai's predecessors but were nullified by extra-electoral power plays — a military coup and a judicial coup. If the Pheu Thai party is somehow deprived of an election win, or prevented from cobbling together a ruling coalition, then its supporters (including the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship, aka the Red Shirt movement) will protest and launch a new campaign to claim their democratic rights. Even with a landslide victory, a new Pheu Thai government will face the same opposition by powerful institutional forces — the Thai Privy Council and Royal Army, the palace, the civil bureaucracy, the courts and opposing parties. For some time, there have been attempts at forming a Thai-style compromise that would allow the political elite across the divide to find a temporary working arrangement. Broadly, such an arrangement would require excluding any amnesty for exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, while allowing his followers and supporters to rule government. But at present there seems to be no agreement on such a deal. Thaksin's appointment of his sister Yingluck as the top prime ministerial candidate for Pheu Thai has energized the party and other voters who would like to see Thailand get a fresh face and its first female prime minister. Since Yingluck is seen as a proxy for Thaksin, the opposition will not tolerate her; even if it did, it is hard to believe she could give up on amnesty for Thaksin. Meanwhile, the anti-Thaksin forces have shown every sign of hardening their position. Thai army chief Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, who heads a staunchly royalist military faction, is viewed as uncompromising and willing to go to great lengths (even by the Thai military's standards) to prevent pro-Thaksin forces from attempting to secure amnesty or to undercut Prayuth's or his faction's influence. With compromise unlikely, the only question is what lines of attack the opposing sides will take. Reliable STRATFOR sources suggest that the most likely outcome is that the Pheu Thai party will win and the leaders of the elite royalist faction initially will defer their response and wait. When the time comes, these forces seem likely to use their advantage in the court system to impede the Pheu Thai politicians, particularly to try to oust Yingluck on charges of perjury for statements under oath relating to her shares in the family business during investigations against Thaksin. Should the courts rule against her or the party, mass protests could re-emerge, and any mass Red Shirt uprising against the courts would be framed as a threat to the rule of law itself and could be used as a pretext for the army to exert greater influence, or even intervene directly. Another course of action for the military leadership would be to stir up trouble on the border with Cambodia. Cambodia has been openly sympathetic to Thaksin and has attempted to take advantage of Thailand's internal political tumult. But the Thai army maintains its prerogative for handling the border, both on the tactical level and on the level of national security strategy and could attempt to play up the Cambodian threat as a means of destabilizing the government and justifying a more hands-on approach for itself. As with the flare-ups on the Cambodian border in late 2008, when the Pheu Thai party's predecessors were in power, and the recent fighting in 2011, it would be difficult to tell what was driving the conflict. But the Thai army could attempt to dictate the response. Finally, the Yellow Shirts, or People's Alliance for Democracy, appear weak and disconnected, far less relevant than when they stormed Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi International Airport in 2008. They have made the border dispute with Cambodia a major rallying cry but have not garnered large public support in recent demonstrations. Still, though it may seem unlikely at present, it is possible that anti-Thaksin forces could move behind the scenes to rehabilitate the Yellow Shirts or launch another mass protest movement to attempt to destabilize a pro-Thaksin government. As for the pro-Thaksin forces, assuming they rise to power, STRATFOR sources believe they will try to avoid the appearance of seeking charter changes and Thaksin's amnesty immediately, and bringing all government to a halt in the meantime, which they were accused of doing in 2008. Instead, they may attempt to build legitimacy as a ruling party by passing legislation and going through the "normal" business of running the country, without immediately broaching the most irreconcilable issues. It would also make sense for this group to attempt to use its democratic credentials to gain international support in a bid to deter domestic enemies from forcing them from power through non-democratic means. However, there can be little doubt that the group intends to clear Thaksin from legal trouble and bring him back into the country, which is the point at which a clash with the establishment cannot be deferred. The reason the opposing forces in the political crisis are becoming more recalcitrant is most likely the overlapping succession in the monarchy. This long-term trend poses opportunities and dangers for all major players. The greatest threat to Thai stability is that a succession crisis should emerge, based on opposition to Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, the heir apparent. A struggle within the royalty would add enormous uncertainty, even if it were not intertwined with the political crisis — Thaksin has been accused of entertaining designs of gaining influence over or weakening the palace, while the movement against the prince is thought to be partially supported by his alleged ties to Thaksin. A threat to the monarchy, real or perceived, is one scenario that has a higher probability than others of provoking more direct intervention by the army into politics, potentially even another open coup. Rising uncertainty over a potential succession crisis has made the intensifying political crisis even more volatile and threatens to break the 60-year-old system, which thus far has survived considerable political commotion.