Vietnamese oil exploration ship Binh Minh 02, the vessel that had its survey cables cut by Chinese marine surveillance ships in a confrontation on May 26, was sent back to sea June 5 to continue its exploration and surveying activities in Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone, PetroVietnam Vice President Do Van Hau said June 6. China's continued assertiveness over territorial claims in the South China Sea and Vietnam's unwillingness to back down on sovereignty issues or oil exploration mean that conflicts will continue to occur. This added new complications for a Vietnamese leadership in transition that is trying to manage public reactions and nationalist tendencies. (click here to enlarge image) Chinese vessels have recently been involved in a flurry of incidents with vessels from both Vietnam and the Philippines. Chinese marine vessels cut the survey cables of the Binh Minh 02 on May 26, and on June 1 Chinese naval vessels were accused of firing warning shots after a run-in with Vietnamese fishermen. The Philippines, for its part, claims that six, possibly seven, violations of sea or airspace have taken place in the past three months since the clash between Chinese ships and a Philippine Department of Energy exploration contractor in the Reed Bank, including one in which the Chinese allegedly fired on Filipino fishermen. These incidents distracted attention from the various pledges of cooperation at the 10th Asia Security Summit, also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, in Singapore from June 3 to June 5, an annual gathering of top security and defense officials. China sent an expanded delegation to the conference, including Defense Minister Liang Guanglie, for the first time, allegedly to emphasize its growing commitment to peaceful resolutions to regional disagreements. While a number of participants noted that China's rhetoric of increasing cooperation did not square with its maritime agencies' hard-line responses to Vietnamese and Philippine ships, the outcry against China's assertiveness was nevertheless noticeably reduced from last year. Part of the reason for this muted response is that Beijing has recently pledged to expand military dialogue and exchanges and improve relations in general with powers like the United States, which in turn limited its public criticisms this year. In other words, while Beijing continues to exert pressure selectively on territorial competitors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it has recently worked harder to manage the public relations fallout of these conflicts with other powers. But Chinese pressure on Vietnam and the Philippines has hardened domestic dilemmas for these countries. This is especially true for Vietnam. While the Philippines is a formal U.S. ally — it is looking forward to receiving a new U.S. patrol ship and purchasing more arms from the United States — Vietnam is in a different situation altogether. While Vietnam and the United States are gradually expanding cooperation, they are limited by memories of war, ideological divisions and Vietnam's wariness of aggravating relations with China. Vietnam's Communist Party remains close, ideologically and institutionally, to China's Communist Party. However, Vietnam and China have a history of armed conflict and Chinese occupation. Vietnam's first strategic priority is to create a balance of power with China. China's rapid economic growth and military modernization combined with its assertiveness in the South China Sea, especially since 2007, threaten to overturn the balance that has allowed for relatively smooth working relations over the past 20 years. As a result, the Vietnamese political elite are split over how they should respond to China and how to gain support from other ASEAN states and extraregional powers such as Russia and the United States. Vietnam's leaders face an additional problem in that China's increasing influence has generated a nationalist backlash among the Vietnamese public and some Vietnamese leaders. The June 5 protests in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City were only the latest outbursts of this trend. Nationalism presents a dilemma for the Vietnamese Communist Party, because it is a force that it cannot ignore and that in some cases can strengthen its public support, and yet that could coalesce into a challenging alternative to Communist ideology and leadership. Thus, Vietnamese security forces have followed their past practice of allowing the protests to take place, monitoring them to make sure they do not get out of control, and then shutting them down. Subsequently, Vietnamese authorities have had to downplay their approval of the protest to avoid the impression domestically that they are encouraging free assembly and free speech or condoning social media and the Internet as valid means by which special interests groups can organize. (Such things would pose a threat to the Vietnamese Communist Party itself.) Nor do Vietnamese leaders want the momentum of nationalist demonstrations to lead to something larger and harder to suppress that could complicate Vietnam's relationship with China. Since the protests, state press has emphasized that it was not an anti-Chinese protest but a demonstration linked to specific legal arguments in support of Vietnamese sovereignty. Vietnam's domestic situation is further complicated by the fact that it is in the midst of a transition of political leaders that began with the 11th National Congress in January and was formalized with a National Assembly vote in May. The split between nationalist impulses and pro-Chinese impulses over China's influence amounts to a huge challenge in forging policy. STRATFOR sources repeatedly have emphasized that the Politburo is becoming more polarized due to this conflict of interests.