Peruvians elected Ollanta Humala to the presidency June 5, concluding a highly contentious election. With around 90 percent of the vote counted, Humala appears to have secured around 51.3 percent while his opponent, Keiko Fujimori, received 48.7 percent. Though Humala was only able to secure 31.7 percent of the vote in the first round of elections, the political support of Peru Posible (the party of former President Alejandro Toledo) and strong anti-Fujimori sentiment can be credited with Humala's win. Peru has experienced the highest average rate of growth in the region over the past decade and a significant decline in poverty in the wake of adopting fiscally responsible, trade-friendly economic policies. These policies have often come at the expense of social unity. The question now is whether Humala — whose support base is among poor, indigenous Peruvians who have benefited the least from growth — will attempt to forge a new political path or stay the course on policies that appear to be having a positive effect on growth. There are two basic models in the region for leftist leaders. The first is the strongman approach adopted by leaders like Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Bolivian President Evo Morales and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. Though the policies of each are heavily dependent on the context of their domestic situations, they have trended toward increasing power under the executive in order to achieve popularly supported changes to the constitution and government institutions. At the extreme, this has entailed strong measures to bring the factors of production under state control in order to direct economic activity for political purposes. This has had the effect of threatening foreign and domestic private investment and, particularly in the case of Venezuela, disrupted overall macroeconomic stability. Each of these leaders took power at a time of economic downturn and instability in their respective countries and had a mandate for attempting serious reform. On the other end of the spectrum, there are the more moderate Latin American leftist leaders, exemplified by former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Da Silva continued the economic policies of his predecessor that had contributed to growth and stabilized the currency, with a greater focus on redistributive policies such as the Bolsa Familia program, which has shown successes in reducing poverty. Like Humala, da Silva took power at a time of relative economic prosperity (or at least a notable uptick in stability, as in Brazil’s case), and Humala will likely rely on policies like Bolsa Familia to meet the needs of his largely poor indigenous political base. In part because he is taking power at a time when the current economic policies appear to be having a positive effect, Humala is unlikely to follow the disruptive redistributive policies of the more extreme leftists. Furthermore, Humala does not have the kind of popular majority that Correa, Morales and Chavez have. With only about 30 percent of the population firmly in support of him, he will not be able to push through major constitutional changes against the will of the elite via national referendums. Humala will be reliant on the Peruvian Congress to make any shifts on his agenda. But Humala does not have the votes in the Congress to strong-arm anything through the legislature. His party, Gana Peru, has 47 out of 130 seats in Congress. In partnership with Toledo's centrist Peru Posible, Gana Peru could have a slight majority of 68 votes — a calculation Toledo undoubtedly made when deciding to back Humala ahead of the election. A partnership between these two parties will have the effect of moderating the leftist goals of Gana Peru, and will effectively make Peru Posible a key power broker and kingmaker. Peru Posible can be expected to be a greater champion of the interests of the business community. Humala will also come under direct pressure from business leaders on any major policy discussions. With both employment and economic growth dependent on foreign investment, this sector will wield a significant moderating effect on Humala, in spite of what is sure to be a period of increased negotiation between the two factions as a compromise between Humala's populist promises and the needs of the business community is sorted out. Another key institution to watch is the Peruvian military. Despite being a former military man, Humala does not enjoy the full support of military leaders. The military will not challenge his rule without evidence of significant support from the populace, but Humala will certainly have the military's political support on his mind going forward. The alliance between Peru Posible and Gana Peru will be the main vehicle for policy in Humala's presidency. Accordingly, we can expect the general maintenance of open economic policies and macroeconomic stability, higher — but not much higher — taxes on mining operations and a greater push for welfare programs. Humala will face a serious challenge in balancing many disparate interests. In the short term, he will enjoy a great deal of cachet with leftist organizations, such as those actively striking for higher wages in Puno department, which will allow him to negotiate in good faith. But change is difficult, and as an institutionally weak leftist leader who draws the majority of his support from the indigenous poor, Humala will lose credibility quickly if he is not able to deliver social welfare gains to his supporters.